

Mk^ 


LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 






UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 




9 



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NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S 
FIRST CAMPAIGN 



Napoleon Bonaparte's 
First Campaign 



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BY 



HERBERT H. SARGENT 



FIRST LIEUTENANT SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY 




CHICAGO 
A. C. McCLURG AND COMPANY 




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Copyright 

By Herbert H. Sargent 

A.D. 1894 



TO 



VICTOR M. GORE 

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR 

IN REMEMBRANCE OF THE DAYS OF 

OUR BOYHOOD TOGETHER 

IN ILLINOIS. 



'* 'There is no genius like the genius of labor. There is 
re-TV ard like that ^-which comes from energy, system, and 



no 
perse-uerance 



PREFACE. 



^T^HE matter contained in this book has been 
obtained from mihtary histories, and by a 
study of the art and science of war as set forth 
in the writings of others. 

My thanks are due to Professor A. S. Hill, of 
Harvard College, to Professor George L. Andrews, 
Colonel (retired) U. S. Army, and especially to 
Jos. B. Batchelor, Jr., First Lieutenant Twenty- 
fourth Infantry, U. S. Army, for suggestions and 
criticisims in the composition of this book. 

H. H. S. 

Fort Bowie, Arizona, 

September 29, 1894. 



CONTENTS. 



Page 

Introduction 15 

CHAPTER I. 

montexotte 19 

Comments 27 

CHAPTER II. 

LoDi 38 

Comments 43 

CHAPTER III. 

LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE 47 

Comments 51 

CHAPTER IV. 

Bassano and San Georgio 63 

Comments 68 

CHAPTER V. 

ARCOLE 'J'j 

Comments 85 

CHAPTER VI. 

RiVOLI 96 

Comments 107 



1 2 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Face 

The Tagliamento 123 

Comments 144 

CHAPTER VIII. 
General Comments 167 

Index 223 



LIST OF MAPS 

TO ILLUSTRATE 

Facing Page 

First Part of Campaign 28 

Battle of Arcole 86 

Battle of Rivoli 106 

Last Part of Campaign 144 



INTRODUCTION. 



' "Nothing is attained in war except by calculation. Dur- 
ing a campaign, whatever is not profoundly considered in all 
its details is without result. Every enterprise should be 
conducted according to a system ; chance alone can never 
bring success." — Napoleon. 

'T^O obtain a knowledge of the science of war, 
the military student should study the cam- 
paigns of great commanders. *' Alexander," says 
Napoleon, "made eight campaigns; Hannibal, 
seventeen, one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one 
in Africa; Caesar, thirteen, of which eight were 
against the Gauls and five against the legions of 
Pompey ; Gustavus Adolphus, three ; Turenne, 
eighteen; Prince Eugene of Savoy, thirteen; Fred- 
erick, eleven, in Bohemia, Silesia, and on the banks 
of the Elbe. The history of these campaigns, 
written with care, would be a complete treatise on 
the art of war. From this source the principles 
which ought to be followed, in offensive as well as 
in defensive warfare, could at once be obtained." 



1 6 INTRODUCTION. 

Again he says : " Read and meditate upon the 
wars of the greatest captains. This is the only 
means of rightly learning the science of war." 

Nearly one hundred years ago, Napoleon Bona- 
parte's military achievements amazed the world. 
To-day, when his campaigns and battles are studied 
by us, their brilliancy and completeness strike us 
with wonder. The strategy that he exhibited in 
these campaigns, and the wonderful battle tactics 
that he employed, strongly impress us with his 
^military greatness. His combinations, his rapid 
marches, his concentration of masses upon the 
vital points of his enemy, his victory upon victory, 
his wonderful power of foreseeing the results of 
these victories and of appropriating to himself all 
the advantages to be derived from them, show not 
merely that he was a genius in war, but that he 
was the greatest soldier in modern times, and one 
of the greatest masters of the military art that the 
world has ever known. 

Bonaparte's campaign in Italy in 1796-97, though 
conducted on a less stupendous scale than many 
other campaigns in his remarkable career, was 
surpassed by none in brilliancy, in completeness, 
in rapidity of movement, and in strategical com- 
binations. Here he first gained his renown as a 
soldier. Here, at the age of twenty-six, he took 
the first great step in his immortal career, and. 



INTRO D UCTION, I / 

with one small army, in a single campaign, de- 
feated six Austrian armies sent successively against 
him. 

Since Napoleon's time many changes in tactics 
and in tactical formations have resulted from the 
inventions of man, from the use of steam, and from 
discoveries in electricity; but no material changes 
in strategy have resulted from these causes. Im- 
proved weapons and improved methods of trans- 
portation may, in some cases, slightly modify 
strategical movements and strategical combinations ; 
but the principles of strategy, the great principles 
of war, are the same to-day as in the days of the 
great Napoleon. To divide the forces of the enemy 
and beat them in detail, to manoeuvre upon inte- 
rior lines, to concentrate an overwhelming mass 
upon the vital point of the enemy, — these are 
principles that do not change, however rapid the 
fire of modern guns, however quick the movements 
of troops, or however swift the dispatch of orders. 
*'The application of strategical principles," says 
Dufour, '' is the same at all times and in all places." 
To the military student this campaign is, therefore, 
from a strategical point of view, a very interesting 
study. 

H. H. S. 
Fort Bowie, Arizona, 

November^ 1894. 



NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST 
CAMPAIGN. 



CHAPTER I. 

M O N T E N O T T E. 

TT THEN in March, 1796, Bonaparte took com- 
' ' mand of the Army of Italy, he found it in 
a destitute condition and paralyzed for the want of 
financial means. He found that many soldiers 
were without food and sufficient clothing. He 
addressed the army in these words: ''Soldiers, 
you are naked and ill fed ; I will lead you into the 
most fruitful plains in the world. Rich provinces, 
great cities, will be in your power. There you 
will find honor, fame, and wealth." 

The situation was as follows. In Northwestern 
Italy, the Alps on the west and the Apennines on 
the south divided the opposing forces. To the 
west and south of these mountain ranges were the 
French ; on the opposite sides, the Austrians and 
Sardinians. Along the Alps, two armies of about 
twenty thousand each were holding each other in 



20 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

check. As these two armies neutralized each 
other during the active operations in the vicinity 
of the Apennines, they may for the present be 
omitted from the description of this part of the 
campaign. Bonaparte's army, known as the Army 
of Italy, which was about forty thousand strong, 
and which had only twenty- four cannon of small 
calibre, extended from Genoa to Nice along the 
narrow strip of land between the Apennines and 
the sea. Upon Bonaparte's right, at Genoa, a 
British fleet, which was hostile to the French, held 
possession of the sea. The allied armies on the 
north side of the Apennines and immediately 
opposed to Bonaparte, were commanded by Beau- 
lieu, the Austrian general, and consisted of thirty 
thousand Austrians and twenty thousand Sardin- 
ians, the latter under General Colli. They had two 
hundred cannon. They were facing the passes of 
Col di Tenda, Ormea, Savona, and Bochetta, which 
led from their position to that of Bonaparte. 

The positions in detail of Bonaparte's forces 
were as follows. His left was at the pass of 
Tenda, which was held by seven thousand soldiers ; 
Serrurier's division of seven thousand held the 
pass of Ormea; Augereau with eight thousand 
was at Mont San Giacomo ; Massena with eight 
thousand was at Cadibona; and La Harpe with 
eight thousand was at Savona, having one of 



MONTENOTTE. 21 

Ill's brigades at Voltri. In the pass of Savona, 
near Montenotte, works had been constructed and 
were occupied by the French. On the north side 
of the Apennines these passes become valleys, 
and are separated from each other by spurs run- 
ning out from the main chain. Though these 
valleys were closed by the fortifications of Coni, 
Mondovi, and Ceva, which were held by the Sar- 
dinians, yet the French divisions, by descending 
from the passes of the Apennines to the north, 
could, before arriving at the fortifications, pass 
from one valley to another over the spurs, and 
could in this w^ay easily communicate with one an- 
other ; while on the south side they could still more 
easily communicate by the Nice-Genoa road. 

The allies, who were attempting to guard all the 
valleys by occupying them all, had their forces 
greatly subdivided and separated. They held the 
fortresses and fortified towns of Coni, Mondovi, 
Ceva, Alessandria, Tortona, Voghera, Turin, and 
Ivrea. The Sardinians extended from Coni on 
their right to Millesimo on their left. The Aus- 
trians occupied Sassello, Ovada, Voltaggio, Genoa, 
and the Bochetta pass. The Sardinians were com- 
manded by Colli ; the Austrian right or allied 
centre, by Argenteau ; the Austrian left was under 
the immediate command of Beaulieu, the general 
in chief of the allied armies. 



22 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

The line of communication of Bonaparte's army 
was by the road from Savona to Nice, and thence 
to its base of operations in France ; that of the 
Austrian army was by two roads, — one through 
Alessandria and Pavia, and one through Novi and 
Placentia, — to its base of operations upon the 
Mincio ; that of the Sardinian army was by the 
roads through Fossano, Cherasco, and Alba, to its 
base of operations at Turin. 

Since the Republic of Genoa, though occupied 
by the Austrians, was considered neutral territory, 
Bonaparte asked of the Senate of Genoa permis- 
sion to conduct his army through Genoa, and 
thence through the Bochetta pass. Should this 
permission be granted, his plan was, while holding 
with small forces the passes of the Apennines, to 
debouch with his principal army from the Bochetta 
pass so as to throw his forces upon the Austrians 
with his front parallel to their communications, and 
to take in reverse the Sardinians and their fortifica- 
tions. Should this permission be refused, he ex- 
pected the Senate to inform Beaulieu of their 
refusal. In that case he expected the latter to 
move his forces towards Genoa in anticipation of 
an attack from that quarter. By so extending 
his left, Beaulieu would still more scatter his 
^ forces and weaken his centre, and thus give Bona- 
parte an opportunity to throw his masses upon 



MONTENOTTE. 



23 



this isolated centre, defeat it, and separate the 
allies. 

On the other hand, Beaulieu, who had probably 
heard of Bonaparte's request and of the extension 
of his right wing to Voltri, was expecting an attack 
in force by way of Genoa. He resolved to antici- 
pate this movement. His plan was to meet it by 
moving his left wing through Genoa to attack 
Bonaparte in front, while his centre, commanded 
by Argenteau, was to advance upon Savona, cut 
off the French right wing from its communica- 
tions, and together they were to capture this 
wing, or envelop it and drive It into the sea. 
By adopting this plan, he expected an additional 
axivantage; namely, that of establishing commu- 
nication with Nelson, who was in the waters of 
Genoa with an English squadron. 

Such was the situation of the opposing forces, 
and such were the plans of the two commanders, 
when, on April loth, Beaulieu began active opera- 
tions. He moved his left, about one third of his 
entire army, through the Bochetta pass upon 
Genoa and Voltri ; and ordered his centre, con- 
sisting of ten thousand men under Argenteau, to 
move at the same time from Sassello upon Savona. 
Beaulieu reached Voltri the next day, and made 
two unsuccessful attacks upon the brigade there. 
Argenteau was also unsuccessful ; he was stopped 



24 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

on the nth by the works in the pass near Monte- 
notte; for though these works were defended by 
only twelve hundred men, and though he attacked 
with great fury all day, he did not succeed in 
carrying the position. 

On the I ith of April, while these two small forces 
— the brigade at Voltri and the twelve hundred men 
in the pass — were engaged with superior num- 
bers, Bonaparte was active in making preparations 
to crush Argenteau. He gave orders to his divis- 
ion commanders as follows : Massena was to leave 
Cadibona, march to Cairo, then cross the ridge 
towards Argenteau and be ready to fall on his 
flank and rear; Augereau, to march from San 
Giacomo to Cairo and be ready to hold back the 
Sardinians ; La Harpe, to recall his brigade from 
Voltri, then march with his whole division to 
the pass near Montenotte and post it behind the 
works there. During the day and night of the 
nth, these movements were all successfully ac- 
complished; and on the morning of the I2th 
Bonaparte directed La Harpe to attack Argenteau 
in front, and Massena to attack him on the flank 
and rear. Argenteau was defeated. His army 
was routed, and the remnants and stragglers 
rallied at Dego. 

By this battle, known as Montenotte, the centre 
of the allies was broken. The first step in Bona- 



MONTENOTTE. 25 

partc's plan had been accomplished. Bcaulicu 
was still south of the Apennines. He advanced 
from Voltri, but, finding no enemy and hearing 
the guns of Montenotte, he halted for information; 
and on the morning of April 13th, having learned 
of the defeat of his centre, he faced about his 
own columns and ordered them to concentrate 
at Dego. 

While Beaulieu was retracing his steps, Bona- 
parte was preparing to attack the left of the Sar- 
dinians, who were divided into two armies. One, 
under Colli, was at Ceva; and the other, under 
Provera, at Millesimo. Bonaparte ordered La 
Harpe to Sassello to hold back any Austrians 
in that direction, and ordered Serrurier to make 
false attacks from Ormea to Ceva against Colli, 
so as to keep him occupied and prevent his re- 
enforcing Provera. Then, at the head of Masse- 
na's and Augereau's divisions, he marched against 
Provera at Millesimo, defeated him, and on the 
morning of the 14th captured his army. 

On the same day, Bonaparte, leaving Augereau 
in front of Colli to aid Serrurier, conducted the 
divisions of La Harpe and Mass^na upon Dego, 
drove back and defeated the Austrians there, and 
also defeated, the next day, a corps of Beaulieu's 
army that was attempting to reach Dego. Beau- 
lieu, learning of Bonaparte's success at Dego, now 



26 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

attempted to concentrate his scattered troops at 
Acqui. 

Thus in four days Bonaparte had crushed the 
centre of the alHes, captured a Sardinian army 
upon his left, and forced back the Austrians threat- 
ening his right. Now, with his divisions perched 
upon the spurs of the Apennines, with his whole 
army in a central position and his right well ex- 
tended between the wings of the allies, he was 
preparing to move against the Sardinians, to crush 
them if he could, or to drive them back upon Turin 
and detach them from the alliance, so as to leave 
himself free to meet the Austrians single-handed 
upon the fertile plains of Northern Italy. Ac- 
cordingly, he ordered La Harpe to San Benedetto 
to watch Beaulieu, and either to protect the French 
rear should the Austrians move by Cairo, or to 
prevent the junction of Beaulieu with Colli by way 
of Alba; he also ordered a brigade to remain 
at Cairo in order to protect the French communi- 
cations with Savona. 

These dispositions having been made, Bonaparte 
with Massena's, Augereau's, and Serrurier's divis- 
ions attacked the Sardinians at Ceva and Mondovi, 
and drove them towards Turin. The Austrians 
attempted to join the Sardinians at Alba; but 
Bonaparte united his divisions there, and thus 
destroyed Beaulieu's last hope of a junction with 



MONTENOTTE. 27 

his ally. The French continued their advance on 
Turin. The Sardinians then treated separately for 
peace, and gave up to the French the fortresses 
of Alessandria, Coni, Tortona, and the citadel of 
Ccva. 

By these manoeuvres, Bonaparte's lines of com- 
munication with Nice by the passes of Savona, 
Ormea, and Tenda, and directly with France by the 
much shorter route of Mont Cenis, were secured. 

Thus it appears that Bonaparte made his first 
movement against the allies on April nth; and 
that the armistice of Cherasco was signed with the 
Sardinians on April 28th. In eighteen days he 
had turned the Apennines, driven back the allies, 
won six victories captured or killed more than 
twelve thousand men, taken more than forty can- 
non, detached the Sardinians from the Austrians, 
compelled the former to make a separate peace, 
and had acquired, as a base for future operations 
against the Austrians, the three fortresses of Coni, 
Tortona, and Alessandria, with their artillery, mag- 
azines, and stores. 

COMMENTS. 

For a proper concentration for battle, not taking 
into account obstacles such as mountains, rivers, 
and fortifications, the front of an army of one 



28 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

hundred and fifty thousand men or less should not 
be more than thirty miles. However, in this case 
it is to be noticed that both armies, at the outset, 
had much longer fronts, — that of the French ex- 
tending from Tenda to Savona, a distance of about 
fifty miles; that of the allies, from Coni to Vol- 
taggio, about seventy-five miles. But the Apen- 
nines, which were intervening obstacles, were 
favorable to Bonaparte, who could with small 
forces easily hold the passes, and could quickly 
concentrate his army at any point upon his front 
by the road south of them. During this concen- 
tration, his forces would be perfectly protected by 
the mountains from the attacks of the allies. The 
Apennines, therefore, allowed him to extend his 
front with safety beyond thirty miles. 

On the other hand, the allies were not only 
more extended than the French, but they had their 
principal forces at the ends of their long line. 
Furthermore, these forces themselves were sepa- 
rated into parts by the spurs of the Apennines, 
which made it difficult to re-enforce any portion of 
their front without the danger of being struck in 
flank by Bonaparte's divisions issuing from the 
passes of the Apennines. Upon the principle that 
** an army in motion should always be able to con- 
centrate for battle within a single day," it is safe to 
say that the front of the allies should not have been 



MONTENOTTE. 29 

longer than thirty miles. But it was more than 
twice this distance ; they had scattered their forces; 
they had weakened their line in proportion as they 
had extended it, and had thus allowed their adver- 
sary to break through and divide their army, so 
as to force them to choose between retreating, and 
fighting with only a part of their forces. 

Why did the Austrian general so scatter his 
forces? Why did he make this fatal mistake? At 
this time, and also in after years, the Austrian gen- 
erals, in making war, seemed to believe in a di- 
vision of forces. They made war by detachments. 
Their main army was invariably divided into two 
or three armies, and these were often subdivided. 
Under this system they expected to hold all the 
parts of their front by occupying them all. But 
there was another reason for the separation of 
the Austrian and Sardinian armies. Beaulieu was 
anxious about his lines of communication, and in 
order to protect them he separated his forces. 

This anxiety, even though it led to error, was 
natural ; for the lines of communication of an army 
are always of the utmost importance to its safety. 
In every manoeuvre, combination, and battle of a 
campaign, the commanding general should give 
the most careful consideration to his communica- 
tions, — to their direction, extent, and protection. 
In order to fight, soldiers must have food and 



30 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

ammunition. The loss of an army's communica- 
tions almost always leads to immediate disaster. 
*' While the distant spectator," says Hamley, " im. 
agines a general to be intent only on striking or 
parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred 
glances, a hundred anxious thoughts, to the com- 
munications in his rear, for one that he bestows 
upon his adversary's front." 

Now, the Sardinians at Ceva and Millesimo 
directly covered their communications with Turin. 
The Austrians at Ovada and Voltaggio covered 
their communications back through Pavia to their 
base on the Mincio. Beaulieu, being anxious 
■about his communications, had therefore divided 
his forces ; and as they fell back along these diver- 
gent lines of communication, they of necessity 
became more and more separated. That it was an 
error to attempt, by separating these two armies, 
to cover directly their communications, is shown 
by the victor, Napoleon himself, in his criticism of 
the allies' position. He says : — 

" But the army under the orders of Colli, instead of 
moving upon Millesimo, should have supported itself 
upon Dego. It was an error to suppose that, in order to 
cover Turin, Colli must station himself directly upon the 
road to that city. The united armies at Dego would have 
covered Milan, because they would have been astride of 
the high road of Montferrat; they would have covered 



MONTENOTTE. 3 1 

Turin, because they would have been near the road 
to that place. United, the two forces would have been 
superior to the French army ; separated, they were lost." 

Though the disposition of the forces of the Aus- 
trian commander-in-chief were faulty in so many 
particulars, it is interesting to note how very near 
he came to being successful. Had his centre, 
under Argcnteau, succeeded in the assaults of the 
earthworks in Savona pass, the Army of Italy, 
instead of the allies, would have been cut in two. 
By means of these works, a handful of men were 
enabled to repulse the furious assaults of many 
times their number, and thus give to Bonaparte 
time to make his dispositions for the destruction of 
Argenteau. 

Though these insignificant works played for a 
few hours an important part in the campaign, 
it is worthy of notice that the strong fortresses 
which were held by the allies, and which were 
on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did 
not stop his advance for a moment; even though, 
on account of having no siege artillery and only 
a few cannon of small calibre, he could not com- 
pletely invest them. He pushed forward past them 
to decide, if possible, their fate upon the open 
battle-field. *' It is upon the open field of battle," 
said Napoleon thirteen years afterwards, *' that the 
fate of fortresses and empires is decided." 



32 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 

As soon as Beaulieu learned of the defeat of 
his centre, he turned back for fear of losing his 
own communications, and to avoid meeting single- 
handed Bonaparte's victorious army. Upon this 
point, Hamley comments as follows : — 

" Upon the defeat of Argenteau at Montenotte, Beau- 
lieu was compelled to pause. For though he was pre- 
pared to attack the French in front of him, yet it was on 
the assumption that Argenteau would co-operate by an 
attack on their flank and rear ; and this was only possible 
on condition that the French should be concentrating 
towards Voltri. Therefore, when Beaulieu found that 
they had retired from that point, he knew they must be 
either beyond the reach of Argenteau, by retreating west- 
ward beyond Savona, — in which case he would presently 
be apprised of it by the advance-guard of his colleague 
issuing from the pass, — or that they had concentrated 
for an attack, in which case he might, if he should advance, 
find himself single-handed in the presence of a victorious 
enemy, as would indeed have been the case. Therefore, 
as soon as he was certified of disaster to his colleague, 
he hastened to recover his communications, which he 
might else find to be endangered." 

Thus far I have said nothing about the French 
and Sardinian armies in the Alps, for the reason 
that they neutralized each other, and had no 
immediate effect upon the results. It will now be 
noticed, that, when Bonaparte was advancing upon 
Turin, both of the Sardinian armies were between 



MONTENOTTE. 33 

him and Kellcrman, the commander of the French 
army in the Alps. The Sardinian general could, 
therefore, have left a small containing force ^ be- 
fore Kellcrman and have massed against Bona- 
parte, thus playing the same game against him 
that he had played against BeaulieUo Upon this 
point Hamley says: — 

" It was to guard against such a contingency that 
Bonaparte, on the 2 5lh, from Fossano pressed the com- 
mander of the right of Kellerman's army to issue from 
the Alps towards him. But it is to be observed, first, 
that, even when thus combined, the Sardinians would 
have been inferior to Bonaparte in numbers, having been 
only equal to his single army at the outset ; and, secondly, 
that the distance from Mont Cenis to Turin is so short 
that Kellerman, unless strongly opposed, might reach in 
a single march and enclose their armies while he seized 
their capital." 

The Sardinians fought hard. Before they treated 
for peace, they were defeated in several battles. 
This was due in a great measure to the plan of 
campaign which Bonaparte adopted. When he 
threw his forces against the Sardinians, they fell 
back after each battle upon their communications 
with Turin, rallied their scattered troops, and 

1 *' Containing force. A body of troops charged with the dut}' 
of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the 
enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against 
another portion of the hostile forces.'' — Wagner. 

3 



34 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

were ready in a short time to fight again. Had 
Bonaparte held the passes of the Apennines with 
small forces, issued with his principal army from 
the Bochetta pass with his front parallel to the 
Austrian communications, and attacked success- 
fully, he would in all probability have decided the 
campaign in a single battle ; for a defeat of the 
Austrian army, or of both armies combined, meant 
a loss of the Austrian communications, — in other 
words, meant ruin to the Austrian army. Had 
the Austrians alone been defeated, the Sardinians 
would hardly have been able, single-handed, to 
cope successfully with Bonaparte, and v/ould in 
all probability have treated for peace. Under cir- 
cumstances very similar to this supposititious case, 
Bonaparte, in the Marengo campaign, debouched 
from the St. Bernard pass, threw his army from 
the north upon these same Austrian communica- 
tions, and in one battle decided the fate of the 
whole Austrian army. 

But there were several reasons for not adopting 
this plan besides the one already given. First: 
Beaulieu was expecting an attack in force from 
Bonaparte's right, and was prepared for it. Second : 
The allies by extending their front had weakened 
and isolated their centre. Third : An attack by 
the right must necessarily cause a concentration of 
the allies, and this was the very thing that Bona- 



MONTE NOTTE. 35 

parte wislicd to prevent. L^ourth: Besides these 
military reasons, there was also a political one, 
which appears in the instructions given to Bona- 
parte by the Directory, as follows : *' The Aiis- 
trians, as was shown in the last campaign, trouble 
themselves very little about the disaster of the 
allies, and, in moments of danger, far from seek- 
ing effectually to protect them, immediately sepa- 
rate from them and are concerned only to cover 
the country which belongs to themselves." This 
fact, taken in connection with the fact that the 
lines of communication of the two armies back 
to their bases of operation were divergent, was 
another strong reason for striking at the centre 
and separating the allies. Fifth: If Bonaparte 
really had any serious doubts as to which was 
the better plan of campaign, the offensive move- 
ment in force by Beaulieu upon Genoa and Voltri 
decided the question in favor of an attack upon 
the centre. Beaulieu's movement was a fatal one; 
by it he extended still more his front, separated 
himself more and more from Argenteau, and, by 
his fruitless march against an almost imaginary 
enemy, took from the field of action one third 
of his entire army. When Bonaparte saw this, 
he immediately took advantage of it, and struck 
with the rapidity of lightning. In four days he 
gained four victories. Before Beaulieu's return, 



36 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Montenotte, Milleslmo, and the two battles of 
Dego had been fought and won. 

Operating upon interior Hnes from his central 
position, Bonaparte could concentrate his divis- 
ions much more rapidly than the enemy, who 
was operating upon exterior or double lines. Dur- 
ing these actions, with one division, sometimes 
two, as a containing force, he held back a portion 
of the allies, and then concentrated an overwhelm- 
ing mass upon their remaining forces at some 
decisive point. Though the allies outnumbered 
him, yet he invariably brought a superior force 
against them upon the battle-field. At Monte- 
notte, La Harpe and Massena had sixteen thou- 
sand, Argenteau only ten thousand ; at Millesimo, 
Massena and Augereau had nearly sixteen thou- 
sand, Provera several thousand less; at Dego, La 
Harpe and Massena engaged about six thousand 
Austrian soldiers, and the next day about six 
thousand more ; at Mondovi, Bonaparte had three 
divisions — Serrurier's, Augereau's, and Massena's 
— for an attack against the remnant of the Sar- 
dinian army, about eight thousand strong. So to 
manoeuvre as to divide the forces of the enemy 
and beat them in detail, so to manoeuvre as 
always to bring an overwhelming mass upon the. 
vital point of the enemy, so to manoeuvre with 
forty thousand soldiers against fifty thousand as to 



MON TENO TTE. 3 7 

outnumber the enemy upon every battle-field, — 
this is generalship, this is strategy; it is more, it 
is victory. Victory is the aim of all strategy. This 
much of the campaign, Bonaparte's first, was very 
similar to the Waterloo campaign, his last. In the 
first, he was opposed by the Sardinians and Aus- 
trians ; in the last, by the English and the Prussians. 
In each case, the armies opposed to him had diver- 
gent lines of communication. In each case, he used 
his own army as an entering wedge to separate the 
allies ; and when, after defeating the Prussians, he 
detached a containing force to hold them in check 
while he massed his force against the English, he 
was repeating the manoeuvre that nineteen years 
before had made him victorious in the beginning 
of his matchless military career. 



CHAPTER II. 

LODI. 

T3EF0RE entering upon a detailed description of 
this part of the campaign, it will be well to 
describe in a few words the nature of the country 
in which the French and Austrians during the re- 
mainder of the year 1796 conducted their opera- 
tions ; and also to point out the sources from 
which both sides obtained supplies for their men 
and animals. 

Northern Italy was the theatre of war.^ Between 
the Tyrolese Alps, in the extreme northern part 
of Italy, and the Ligurian and Adriatic Seas, the 
country is fertile and the climate mild. The rivers 
Sesia, Ticino, Adda, Oglio, and Chiesa run south- 
eastward from the Alpine region of the north and 
join the Po, which, running eastward through most 
of its course, collects their waters into one body 

1 *' The theatre of war comprises all the territory upon which 
the parties may assail each other, whether it belongs to them- 
selves, to their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn 
into the war through fear or interest. . . . The theatre of war 
may thus be undefined, and must not be confounded with the 
theatre of operations of one or the other army." — Jomini. 



LODL 39 

and pours thcni into the Gulf of Venice. The 
Mincio, which is the outlet of Lake Garda, flows 
south to the fortress of Mantua, at this time held 
by the Austrians, and then flows southeast into 
the Po. The Adige, which is deep and unford- 
able, flows south along the east side of Lake 
Garda till opposite the south end of the lake, 
and then southeast into the Gulf of Venice. Up- 
on the east bank of this river, at the point where 
the mountains end and the plains begin, is the 
fortified town of Verona; and on the same bank, 
thirty miles nearer the mouth, is the fortified town 
of Legnago. The Brenta rises in the Tyrol near 
Trent, and flows southeast, past the town of Bas- 
sano and near the town of Padua, into the Gulf 
of Venice. Along the line of the Alps are a 
number of lakes. The largest of these is Garda, 
wdiich is thirty miles long and tw^o to eight miles 
wide. Its northern end extends well into the 
mountains ; its southern end, into the plains of 
Italy. 

In this \vell-watered and fertile country, Bona- 
parte found supplies in abundance for his army. 
When he took command of the Army of Italy, his 
soldiers were suff"ering for the necessaries of life. 
Upon the barren rocks of the Apennines nothing 
would grow. The bread and wine necessary to 
hold body and soul together came mostly from 



40 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

France. But as soon as his soldiers descended the 
mountains into the fertile plains of Italy they found 
plenty of food for themselves and plenty of forage 
for their animals. By levying contributions upon 
the invaded territory Bonaparte collected these 
supplies. Thus from the very start he made war 
support war. Money, clothing, food, forage, wine, 
— in fact all the supplies needed for his army ex- 
cept ammunition, which came from France, — were 
obtained from the invaded and conquered territory. 
With the money and supplies thus obtained, he 
established in Italy magazines and hospitals, which, 
with the fortresses he had already acquired, formed 
a secondary base of operations for the further 
prosecution of the war. 

The Austrians obtained their ammunition from 
Austria and their suppHes from Italy; but as soon 
as they were pushed back into the Alps, they were 
compelled to obtain the greater portion of their 
supplies also from Austria. 

The situations of the opposing forces were, 
therefore, in many respects similar. Behind the 
French army were the Apennines and French 
Alps ; behind the Austrian army were the Tyrol- 
ese and Swiss Alps. As each army advanced into 
the valley of the Po, supplies were obtained in 
abundance ; as each fell back into the mountains, 
suppHes were obtained with difficulty. These 



LODI. 41 

facts should be kept in mind by the reader that 
he may understand thoroughly the succeeding 
movements. 

The Sardinians, having been defeated by Bona- 
parte, had, by the armistice of Cherasco, left him 
free to proceed against the Austrian arm}\ Bona- 
parte with about forty thousand soldiers was at 
Alessandria. Beaulieu with about thirty thousand 
was occupying Valeggio, and had in addition 
twelve thousand at Mantua. 

The French lines of communication extended 
from Alessandria, through the passes of the Alps 
and the Apennines, into France. The Austrian 
lines of communication extended through IMilan 
and Pavia, around the south end of Lake Garda, 
and thence along the high-road to Austria, which 
penetrates the Tyrol by the valley of the Upper 
Adige. 

Bonaparte, by causing to be inserted in the ar- 
mistice of Cherasco a stipulation that he should be 
allowed to cross the Po at Valenza, and by moving 
his troops towards that place, had led the Aus- 
trian commander to expect him there. But he did 
not intend to cross at that point On May 6th he 
took his cavalry, three thousand five hundred gren- 
adiers, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, as an 
advance-guard, and marched rapidly down the Po 
to Placentia. In thirty-six hours he marched forty 



42 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

miles. His main army followed him in echelon by 
divisions. 

At Placentia he forced a crossing, but, having 
no pontoon train, he had to build a bridge for the 
passage of the main army, and on this account his 
divisions were considerably delayed. He advanced 
with what force he hdd, attacked the Austrians at 
Fom.bio, defeated them, and drove them before 
him. Expecting to find the Austrian main force 
between the Ticino and the Adda, he stationed one 
division on the Lower Adda to protect his right, 
and one at Pavia to protect his left, while with his 
main force he ascended the Adda towards Milan. 
Upon his arrival at Lodi, he found that Beaulieu, 
having crossed the Adda with his main army, had 
made good his escape ; but that he had left a force 
of twelve thousand at the bridge of Lodi to defend 
it. This force was the Austrian rear-guard. Bona- 
parte formed his grenadiers, ordered an attack, and, 
with Lannes and himself at the head of the attack- 
ing column, carried the bridge after a desperate 
fight and a great loss of life on both sides. The 
Austrians retreated behind the MIncio, and there 
halted in a strong position, with Lake Garda on 
their right and Mantua on their left. 

Bonaparte with his victorious columns then made 
a triumphal march into Milan, which he entered 
just one month and* three days after the battle of 



LODI. 43 

Montenotte. But he did not remain there long. 
After investing the citadel of Milan, in which Beau- 
lieu had left a garrison of two thousand Austrians, 
Bonaparte hastened with his main army to the 
Mincio to drive the Austrians out of Italy. His 
purpose was to attack the Austrian centre at Bor- 
ghetto. In order to deceive the Austrians as to 
the real point of attack, he caused a demonstration 
to be made against Peschiera. Then, on May 
29th, he hurled his cavalry under Murat upon 
Borghetto. He supported it with artillery and 
infantry. The French were victorious. They car- 
ried the bridge there, broke through the Austrian 
line, drove the Austrian army into the Tyrol, and 
separated this army from Mantua with its twelve 
thousand combatants. The first Austrian army 
was defeated. 

Bonaparte now marched to the Adige, took pos- 
session of Verona and Legnago, and on June 14th 
beean the investment of Mantua. 

COMMENTS. 

When Bonaparte crossed the Po at Placentia, 
he expected to throw his whole army upon the 
Austrian communications, to envelop their army, 
and compel its surrender; but, having no pontoon 
train, he was delayed at the crossing, and this 



44 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

delay gave to Beaulieu the opportunity to make his 
escape. '* If I had had a good pontoon equipage," 
said Bonaparte, speaking of this passage of the Po, 
" the fate of the enemy's army had been sealed." 
And, judging from what in after years he accom- 
plished at Marengo and Ulm, where, by manoeu- 
vres similar to this, he threw his army upon his 
enemies' communications, we cannot avoid the 
belief that, had it not been for the delay, he would 
have here captured the entire Austrian army. 

If he had attempted to cross, or had crossed, the 
Po at Valenza, as he had purposely made the Aus- 
trians believe he would do, the two armies would 
have been facing each other with their lines of 
communication (and, in this case, their lines of 
retreat) perpendicular to their fronts. In this situ- 
ation, the advantages of victory and the disad- 
vantages of defeat would have been the same or 
nearly so to each of the two armies. Neither 
would have had the advantage in position, and in 
case of defeat either could have retreated with 
little or no danger of losing its communications. 
But it was to avoid this, and to give the advantage 
to the French, that Bonaparte made his flank 
movement. For this reason he placed his army 
on the north side of the Po with his front parallel 
to the Austrian communications. 

In this position, the Austrians, in order to give 



LODI. 45 

battle; must form front to a ilank,^ and if defeated 
must lose their communications. On the other 
hand, the French if defeated could fall back across 
the To with little or no danger of losing their 
communications. 

In the march down the Po to gain this position 
upon the Austrian flank, the French army had of 
necessity to expose its own flank to the enemy. 
The river, however, in a measure protected the 
French from a flank attack ; but Bonaparte took 
further precautions : he marched rapidly, and re- 
quired his divisions to march in echelon with the 
leading division farthest from the river. By this 
means they supported one another, and, in case 
the leading division had been attacked in flank, 
the rear divisions could in turn have struck the 
Austrians in flank. 

When Bonaparte arrived before Lodi, Beaulieu 
had already crossed the Adda with his main army. 
The Austrian force at Lodi was simply Beaulieu's 
rear-guard, vvhich he had left there to protect his re- 
treat. For these reasons, Bonaparte's victory there 
had but little efl"ect upon the result of the cam- 
paign. From a strategical point of view, therefore, 
the battle at the bridge of Lodi was unimportant. 
Nevertheless, it gave to Bonaparte the opportunity 

1 An ?iX\ri\' forms front to a flank when it operates on a front 
parallel to the line communicating with its base. 



46 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

to show his soldiers that he himself was brave 
and fearless, and it covered Lannes with glory. 
Jomini, writing of this battle in his Life of Napo- 
leon, puts into Bonaparte's mouth these words : 

" " The occasion furnished an opportunity for stamping 
by some bold stroke the character of my individual 
actions, and I did not let it escape. The affair might 
be attended with the loss of a few hundred men ; but 
even should I be defeated, it could not have the least 
influence on the result of the campaign. . . . This was 
merely an affair of a rear-guard, but still it was a brilliant 
one." 

On April nth, Bonaparte made his first move- 
ment against the Sardinians and Austrians from the 
narrow strip of land between the Apennines and 
the sea. On May 29th, he crushed the Austrians 
at Borghetto, and drove them into the Tyrol. In 
less than two months, he had compelled th-e 
Sardinians to make peace, and had driven the 
Austrians out of Italy. Could he hold Italy? 
This was now the problem. 



CHAPTER III. 

LONATO AND CASTIGLTONE. 

A USTRIA became alarmed at Bonaparte's pro- 
^ ^ grcss. She determined to make a great 
effort for the rehef of Mantua and for the recovery 
of Italy. The Austrian army in the Tyrol was 
increased to sixty thousand men. Marshal Wurm- 
ser, an old man, but a brave soldier, who had dis- 
tinguished himself in several Austrian campaigns, 
received the command of this army. Besides 
these sixty thousand there were twelve thousand 
Austrian soldiers shut up in Mantua. 

Bonaparte had altogether forty-five thousand 
soldiers. Serrurier's division, ten thousand strong, 
was besieging Mantua; Augereau with eight thou- 
sand was at Legnago ; Massena with fifteen thou- 
sand was at Verona and Rivoli; Sauret with four 
thousand was at Salo ; and in the rear of these 
divisions about eight thousand were in reserve. 

From Trent, where the Austrian army was 
assembled, three direct routes led to Bonaparte's 
position. One route was by the road from Trent to 
Riva, and thence along the west side of Lake Garda 



48 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

to Brescia. This road, which passed through a 
mountainous country, was impassable for artillery. 
The other two routes were by the two roads from 
Roveredo down the Adige, — one to Rivoli by the 
right bank of the river, and the other to Verona 
by the left bank. These two roads were passable 
for artillery. 

Marshal Wurmser divided his forces into two 
armies : one, twenty-five thousand strong, com- 
manded by Quasdanovich, marched on the west 
side of Lake Garda; the other, thirty-five thou- 
sand strong, commanded by Wurmser himself, de- 
scended the Adige in two columns, one on each 
side of the river. His plan was to have these 
two columns make simultaneous attacks upon 
Rivoli and Verona, and, while these attacks were 
being made, he expected Quasdanovich to de- 
bouch by Salo on the French line of communi- 
cations. In this way Wurmser expected to 
envelop and capture the whole French army. 

Bonaparte, not being strong enough to take the 
offensive, had no plan. He was waiting for de- 
velopments. On July 30th he learned that the 
Austrians were advancing on both sides of the 
lake. He learned that Massena had been driven 
back from Rivoli, and that Sauret had been driven 
back from Salo. Already the Austrians were 
debouching on his rear; in a few hours at most 



LON'ATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 49 

they would sever his communications. His situa- 
tion was critical and time was precious. He hastily 
called a council of war. All his generals except 
Augereau advised retreat; but nevertheless Bona- 
part decided to fight, and immediately formed his 
plan. It was to raise the siege of Mantua and to 
concentrate at once all his available force at the 
lower end of Lake Garda, where, from his central 
position, he could fall with almost his entire force 
on one and then on the other of the two Austrian 
armies. By this means he hoped to defeat them 
separately, and to prevent them from uniting on 
the Mincio. 

On the same day that the council of war was 
assembled, Bonaparte gave his orders to his divis- 
ion commanders. The next day, July 31st, was a 
day of concentration. Massena fell back across 
the Mincio. Augereau left Legnago and marched 
to join Massena. At the crossings of the Mincio, 
both division commanders left rear-guards to watch 
the march of the enemy. On the same day Ser- 
rurier raised the siege of Mantua, spiked his guns, 
burned his carriages, buried his projectiles, and 
began his march to join Massena and Auge- 
reau. Meanwhile, Wurmser, having united his 
two columns, was approaching the Mincio. On 
the afternoon of the same day, and on the next 
day, Bonaparte with Mass6na's and Augereau's 

4 



50 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

divisions attacked and worsted Quasdanovich at 
Lonato, Brescia, and Salo, without doing him a 
great amount of damage. 

On August 1st Bonaparte halted on the Chiesa. 
He had succeeded in placing Massena's and 
Augereau's divisions between Wurmser and Quas- 
danovich. He had forced back the latter into the 
mountains upon the west side of Lake Garda; and, 
having advanced to the Chiesa, he found that his 
communications with Milan were safe. In order 
still to maintain his central position, and to be 
ready to meet Wurmser, whom he Avas expecting 
from the direction of the Mincio, he turned back 
his columns and marched towards Lonato and 
Castiglione. During these maniDeuvres, Wurmser 
crossed the Mincio and directed one of his divis- 
ions on Lonato and one on Castiglione, but with 
the main part of his army continued his march on 
Mantua. Meanwhile, Quasdanovich, having seen 
the necessity of uniting with Wurmser, was ex- 
tending his left towards Lonato. 

On August 2d Bonaparte, having received a 
part of Serrurier's division, directed Massena upon 
Lonato, and Augereau upon Castiglione. On the 
same day, Wurmser arrived at Mantua, revictualled 
the garrison, and then marched out in the direc- 
tion of Castiglione to find Bonaparte. 

On August 3d Massena fought the battle of 



LONATO AND CASTIGL/ONE. 51 

Lonato, and Augcrcau fought the battle of Cas- 
tighonc. After hard fighting both were victorious. 
Ouasdanovich was pursued and badly cut up. He 
retreated on Riva. 

Bonaparte, having disposed of Quasdanovich, 
now turned his attention to Wurmser, who was 
marching on CastigHone. On August 4th he 
ordered all his available force to concentrate at 
this place, and on August 5th he fought the sec- 
ond battle of Castiglione. Massena and Augereau 
attacked Wurmser in front, while Serrurier at- 
tacked his left flank. Wurmser was beaten and 
driven across the Mincio. Bonaparte followed up 
his victory, attacked again at Peschiera, and drove 
the Austrians into the Tyrol. TJie second Austrian 
army was defeated. The French divisions were 
again established on the Adige, and Mantua was 
again invested. In six days Bonaparte had cap- 
tured, killed, or wounded nearly twenty thousand 
Austrians, and lost but seven thousand French. In 
six days he had fought and won three pitched 
battles, had almost annihilated Wurmser's army, 
and had for the second time driven the Austrians 
out of Italy. 

COMMENTS. 

In this part of the campaign, sixty thousand 
Austrians were marching down upon Bonaparte, 



52 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

and twelve thousand in Mantua were in his rear; 
yet with only forty-five thousand soldiers he suc- 
ceeded in winning every battle and in utterly rout- 
ing the Austrian forces. How did he accomplish 
this? It was not that the Austrians lacked cour- 
age ; for they are a brave people, and fought hard, 
even desperately. How, then, did he win such 
success? The answer is, that he won it by his 
marches, by his concentrations for battle, by util- 
izing every available French soldier, by bringing 
upon every battle-field a stronger force than his 
adversary, and by taking advantage of the errors 
made by the Austrian commander. 

In advancing upon the French on both sides of 
Lake Garda, Wurmser committed a great error. 
With Lake Garda separating his two armies, neither 
could support the other. This error allowed Bona- 
parte to place almost his entire force at the foot 
of the lake, where he could bring a superior force 
against either army. To separate the forces of his 
enemy at the beginning of a campaign was one of 
Bonaparte's first endeavors. It was one of his 
master strokes. In order to separate his enemy's 
forces, he had, at the beginning of his career in 
Italy, fought the battle of Montenotte, But in the 
case before us no battle was necessary to accom- 
plish this object. Wurmser, by separating his 
forces, did the very thing that Bonaparte wished 



LONATO AND CASTJGLIOISrE. 53 

him to do. It is remarkable that Wurmser should 
have made this movement; for he certainly knew 
that Bonaparte's success in the Montcnotte cam- 
paign had been gained against the Austrians and 
Sardinians by overwhelming the centre of the allied 
armies, by separating them and keeping them sep- 
arated till, by concentrating a superior force against 
one and then the other, he had succeeded in 
defeating both. 

In advancing on the east side of Lake Garda in 
two columns separated by the river Adige, Wurmser 
committed another error. These two columns, by 
following the two roads down the Adige, one to 
Rivoli and the other to Verona, were, as they 
approached these places, separated by an unforda- 
ble river and by impassable mountains. But the 
French, who were occupying both places, had easy 
communication between them by the bridge over 
the Adige at Verona. Thus it is seen how a small 
containing force could have checked the advance 
of one column, while a concentration was being 
made against the other. Such a plan surely offered 
great chances of victory to Bonaparte. Other con- 
siderations, however, which will be discussed later, 
led him to adopt a different plan. 

In going to relieve Mantua before he had de- 
feated the French army, Wurmser made a third 
great error. While Bonaparte was hotly engaged 



54 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

with Quasdanovich, Wurmser was making a fruit- 
less march into Mantua. Had he crossed the 
Mincio and connected with Quasdanovich a day or 
so before the battles of Lonato and Castiglione, 
and brought upon these battle-fields thirty thou- 
sand fresh troops, as he could easily have done, 
Bonaparte would probably have been defeated. 
Here, Wurmser had the opportunity of rectifying 
his errors; but, instead of doing so, he continued 
still to blunder on with that persistency in error 
that seemed to follow nearly all the Austrian com- 
manders throughout the campaign. 

It is, however, very easy to criticise Wurmser 
after the event ; but it was not so easy for him to 
see clearly at the time what to do. Being anxious 
to relieve Mantua, he needed but the opportunity. 
His soldiers there were in a critical condition and 
needed supplies. This fact undoubtedly made a 
strong impression on his mind. To the accomplish- 
ment of the relief of Mantua everything seemed 
favorable; for, when he reached Rivoli, Mas- 
sena retreated towards Milan; Augereau, too, 
marched towards Milan and crossed the Mincio ; 
and even Serrurier, after raising the siege of Man- 
tua, marched in the same direction. Knowing all 
this, Wurmser thought the French were retreating 
on Milan. He therefore concluded that he would 
revictual Mantua before starting in pursuit of Bona- 



LONATO AND CAS7IGLJ0NE. 55 

parte. This conclusion was a very natural one ; 
still he should have known that Bonaparte would 
not yield Italy without a battle ; he should have 
known that the victor of Montenottc, of Dego, of 
Mondovi, of Millesimo, and of Lodi would not 
seek safety in retreat without at least making one 
great effort to hold what he had conquered. 

Napoleon has passed judgment upon this part 
of the campaign as follows : — 

" Wurmser's plan was defective ; his three corps were 
separated by two large rivers (the Adige and the Mincio), 
several mountain chains, and Lake Garda. He ought 
either to have debouched with all his forces between Lake 
Garda and the Adige, or to have advanced with his united 
army by the Chiesa upon Brescia. In the execution of 
his plan, he committed an error which cost him dear : he 
wasted two days in marching to Mantua. He should, on 
the contrary, have thrown two bridges over the Mincio at 
Peschiera, hastily crossed this river, joined his right at 
Lonato, Desenzano, and Sale, and thus, by rapidly uniting 
his divided forces, have repaired the defects of his plan." 

While Wurmser was marching and counter- 
marching with half of his command to no purpose, 
Bonaparte was taking advantage of every moment 
of time, and using every one of his available men. 
At no time does Wurmser bring half of his force 
upon the battle-field, while on August 3d and on 
August 5th Bonaparte concentrates there nearly 



56 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

the whole of his army. By a superiority of force 
tip oil the battle-fields i he won these victories. The 
energy that he infused into this part of the cam- 
paign is something wonderful. On July 30th he 
learned that the French were being driven back on 
both sides of Lake Garda. On the same day he 
called a council of war and then issued his orders. 
In the next twenty-four hours he concentrated for 
battle, drove back the Austrians from Desenzano 
and Salo, and recovered his communications. For 
six days he was fighting almost constantly. With 
the rapidity of lightning he struck blow after blow. 
Though he had but a handful of men, his grena- 
diers seemed to be everywhere. They were always 
in the right place at the right time. They marched 
by night and fought by day. He himself was 
everywhere, tireless and indomitable. " In a few 
days," says Thiers, "■ he had killed five horses ; he 
would not intrust any one with the execution of his 
orders ; he was determined to see everything, to 
verify everything, to animate all by his presence." 

In order to understand this Lonato-Castiglione 
part of the campaign from a strategical point of 
view, let us notice the positions of all the forces 
on July 29th, the day before Bonaparte decided 
to concentrate. 

The Austrian right wing, twenty-five thousand 
strong, was before Salo ; the Austrian centre, 



LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 57 

eighteen thousand strong, before Rivoli ; the Aus- 
trian loft wing, seventeen thousand strong, before 
Verona ; and twelve thousand were at Mantua. 

The French left wing, four thousand strong, 
commanded by Sauret, was at Salo ; their centre, 
fifteen thousand strong, commanded by Massena, 
was at Verona and Rivoli; their right, eight thou- 
sand strong, commanded by Augereau, was at 
Legnago ; about eight thousand were in reserve ; 
and Serrurier had ten thousand before Mantua. 

The time had arrived when Bonaparte had either 
to retreat or to fight. He decided to fight. He 
could adopt any one of the following plans : he 
could fall back with all his forces and cover Man- 
tua; or he could concentrate against the Austrian 
left wing at Verona, or against the Austrian centre 
at Rivoli, or against the Austrian right at Lonato. 
Let us examine each one of these plans in the order 
named, that we may see which one would probably 
have procured him the greatest advantages. 

First : Had he fallen back from his position on 
the Adige to cover Mantua, he could not have 
taken advantage of the errors that Wurmser had 
made in separating his columns by impassable 
obstacles ; for as soon as the Austrian armies in 
their advance had passed Verona, Rivoli, and 
Lake Garda, there would have been no further 
obstacles to prevent their uniting against Bona- 



58 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

parte. In this case he would have had the whole 
Austrian army in his front, and twelve thousand 
in his rear. As ten thousand of his own soldiers 
were necessary to hold Mantua, he would have 
had but thirty-five thousand Frenchmen with whom 
to oppose sixty thousand Austrians. 

Second : Had he made his principal attack at 
Verona, he would have concentrated near that 
place and would have crossed the Adige with the 
greater part of his forces. Undoubtedly he would 
have been victorious against the Austrian left ; but 
as he had only sufficient force to act offensively 
against one column at a time, the Austrian right 
and centre, consisting of forty-three thousand sol- 
diers, and the garrison at Mantua, consisting of 
twelve thousand, could meanwhile have united 
upon his rear. Such a movement would have cut 
off his retreat on Milan, and would have led, in 
all probability, to the annihilation of his army. 

Third : There are several strong reasons why 
the concentrated attack upon the Austrians should 
have been made at Rivoli. The French army 
could have been united near there just as easily 
as at Mantua, Verona, or Lonato. A concentrated 
attack there would have hopelessly separated the 
other two Austrian columns. As Verona was a 
fortified town, a small force could have easily held 
the place for a few days, which would have given 



LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 59 

sufficient time for a concentration and attack at 
Rivoli. And, besides, as a battle-field Rivoli 
offered many advantages to Bonaparte. It was 
here that, a few months afterwards, he fought and 
won, with inferior forces, a great battle, — one of 
the greatest tactical battles mentioned in history. 
Let us suppose that Bonaparte had chosen to 
attack the Austrians at Rivoli, and had issued 
orders as follows : the reserve to march on Rivoli ; 
Augereau to leave two thousand soldiers at Leg- 
nago and to ascend the south bank of the Adige 
towards Rivoli ; Massena to withdraw all his force 
from Verona, except four thousand to hold the 
town, and to march to Rivoli ; Serrurier to raise 
the siege of Mantua, to guard the crossings of 
the Mincio with part of his division, and with the 
other part to fall back on Peschiera ; Sauret to fall 
back on Peschiera, to remain there till relieved by 
Serrurier, and then to join Bonaparte at Rivoli. 
In twenty-four hours Bonaparte could in this way 
have concentrated twenty-nine thousand soldiers 
with whom to attack the Austrian centre, eighteen 
thousand strong. Then, by transferring this army 
to Verona, he could have had the same superiority 
of numbers there. In three or four days he could 
have disposed of both the Austrian centre and left. 
Meanwhile, Quasdanovich would have marched to 
Mantua, or would have attempted to force the 



60 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

crossings of the Mincio in Serrurier's front. In 
either case Bonaparte would have had Sauret's, 
Massena's, Augereau's, and Serrurier's divisions 
(probably thirty-five thousand after deducting the 
cavalry sent in pursuit of the Austrian left and 
centre) with which to attack Quasdanovich. This 
plan offered to Bonaparte greater advantages than 
any of the others. In this way, and in this way 
alone, could he fight each Austrian column sepa- 
rately, and prevent the junction of the other two 
columns while he was engaged with the third. 

Fourth : By concentrating against the Austrian 
right, he allowed the Austrian centre and left to 
unite ; and, as we have seen, had Wurmser taken 
advantage of the opportunity offered he could have 
united his forces to those of Quasdanovich before 
Lonato. Why then did Bonaparte choose to con- 
centrate and attack here instead of at Rivoli, where 
the advantages for securing victory would have 
been so much greater? The answer is, that he 
looked not so much to the advantages for securing 
victory as to the results of defeat. Other things 
being equal, he would naturally wish to attack 
first the army that was most endangering his com- 
munications. But the principal reason for this 
choice of attack was his anxiety to preserve his 
line of retreat on Milan in case he were defeated. 
Had he attacked at Rivoli and been defeated, 



LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 6 1 

nothing could have saved him ; for he would then 
have had a victorious army in his front and 
twenty-five thousand on his rear. On the other 
hand, had he been defeated by Quasdanovich, 
he could have fallen back on Milan. The results 
of defeat were more important to him than the 
advantages for securing victory. Notwithstanding 
the fact that he seemed always to take great 
chances in his military career, seemed often to 
stake everything on the fate of a single battle, 
seemed almost to burn his bridges behind him so 
certain was he of success in action, yet a careful 
analysis of his campaigns shows that no great 
military commander has ever looked with more 
anxiety to his lines of retreat than this great 
master of the art of war. At Marengo, where he 
seemed to stake his fate upon a single battle, and 
where defeat apparently meant ruin, he had care- 
fully arranged a line of retreat by the St. Gothard. 
At Austerlitz, where he allowed the enemy to 
envelop his right and cut off his retreat on Vienna, 
and where he was so certain of success that he 
issued a proclamation in advance explaining the 
manoeuvre by which victory would be obtained, 
yet even here he had provided for a retreat into 
Bohemia in case of defeat. 

The Austrians are a brave people ; they fought 
well in this campaign, but courage availed them 



62 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

nothing; they had a superiority of numbers, but 
numbers availed them nothing ; they tried a new 
commander, confided in the genius of one of their 
oldest and most trusted soldiers, but his genius 
availed them nothing. Everywhere they were 
defeated and routed ; were for the second time 
driven out of Italy ; were in six days hurled back 
to the mountains from which they had issued. 
And by whom ? By a boy of twenty-six ; by one 
who seemed to violate all their known rules of 
war, and yet, in spite of this, met with success in 
every movement. Such genius must have seemed 
strange to them. It must have seemed strange to 
their old white-haired marshal, who had won his 
spurs in many a hard-fought and victorious cam- 
paign. It was strange; it seems strange to us, 
even when we know that this boy of twenty-six 
was one of the greatest masters of the art of war 
that the world has ever known. It will seem 
stranger still, when we learn how in the next few 
months he hurled back, routed, and destroyed 
three more large Austrian armies. 



CHAPTER IV. 

BASSANO AND SAN GEORGIO. 

A GAIN the Austrains were re-enforced. Again 
^ ^ they attempted to reheve Mantua and to 
drive the French from Italy. With that fatal per- 
sistency in error that Wurmser had exhibited in 
the previous campaign, he divided his forces ; 
leaving Davidovich with twenty thousand men 
separated into several detachments in the Tyrol, 
while with the remainder of his army, twenty-six 
thousand strong, he was preparing to descend 
the valley of the Brenta. 

The two roads that led from the Tyrol, one to 
Rivoli by the right bank of the Adige, and the 
other to Verona by its left bank, we have already 
described. From Trent a third road led into the 
valley of the Brenta, thence followed the river's 
course as far as Bassano, and then, leaving the 
river, passed through Vicenza into the valley of 
the Adige at Verona. 

On this last road Wurmser was advancing with 
his army. His plan was to cross the Adige if 
possible between Verona and Legnago, and relieve 



64 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

Mantua ; or in case the French advanced into the 
Tyrol, to fall upon their rear, cut off their retreat, 
and, while Davidovich was attacking them in front, 
to pen them up in the narrow gorges of the Adige 
and compel their surrender. 

Having received a re-enforcement of several 
thousand, Bonaparte had altogether about forty- 
two thousand soldiers. He thought himself strong 
enough to make an offensive movement. His 
plan was to penetrate the Tyrol, drive back the 
Austrians, and effect a junction with the Army of 
the Rhine, which was then engaged in fighting 
another Austrian army along the upper course 
of the Danube. He left three thousand soldiers 
in Verona, where the fortifications would enable 
them to hold out for at least two days against 
greatly superior numbers. He left eight thousand 
before Mantua. He directed Vaubois, who was at 
Salo with his division, to march by Riva upon 
Roveredo ; and, with Massena's and Augereau's 
divisions, he himself ascended the Adige. Early 
in September he united these three divisions, 
numbering about thirty thousand, near Roveredo, 
attacked Davidovich, defeated him at Roveredo 
and Caliano, drove him into the Tyrol, and gained 
possession of Trent. Trent was an important 
point, in that it opened to the French the valley 
of the Brenta and allowed them to debouch 



BA^SANO AND SAX CEORGIO. 65 

directly upon Wurmser's rear. Until Bonaparte 
reached this point, he was not aware of Wurmser's 
departure down the 15renta. He therefore unex- 
pectedly found himself in a favorable position. 
The Austrian right wing had been overthrown, 
the left isolated and turned, and he was on its line 
of retreat. With thirty thousand soldiers he was 
directly between Davidovich and Wurmser, and 
the former had already been defeated. It was a 
splendid opportunity for a soldier of Bonaparte's 
genius. He at once renounced his original plan of 
uniting with the Army of the Rhine, and decided 
to march rapidly down the Brenta, in order to 
overtake and crush Wurmser before he should 
reach Mantua. 

Accordingly, Bonaparte left Vaubois in the Tyrol 
to hold back Davidovich, while with Massena's and 
Augereau's divisions he hurried forward to overtake 
the Austrians. Marching fifty miles in two days, 
he came up with them at Bassano. At Bonaparte's 
appearance, Wurmser knew not which way to turn. 
He had expected to find the French in his front ; 
he found them in his rear. He had expected to 
destroy their communications ; he found himself 
trembling for the safety of his own. He was in a 
critical situation. Furthermore, one of his divis- 
ions had been directed upon Verona a day or so 
before, and could not be recalled in time to take 

S 



66 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 

part in a battle. This gave to the French a 
numerical superiority and greatly increased Bona- 
parte's chances of victory. Wurmser, however, 
could not escape ; he had either to surrender or 
fight, and like a brave man he decided to accept 
battle. He was defeated. Quasdanovich's divis- 
ion was nearly cut to pieces, and several thousand 
Austrians were captured. By this battle, known 
as Bassano, the Austrian forces were separated : 
Quasdanovich with the remnants of his division 
retired into the mountainous district of Friuli, 
while Wurmser himself with the remainder of his 
army, numbering about twelve thousand, marched 
for Mantua by way of Legnago. At Legnago he 
rested his troops one day, and left a garrison of 
two thousand soldiers to hold the place. 

These twelve thousand Bonaparte tried hard to 
capture. He ordered Massena to cross the Adige 
at Ronco, and Augereau to march by way of Padua 
and Legnago. At the same time he sent orders to 
Sahuguet, who was commanding Serrurier's di- 
vision, to destroy all the bridges and prevent the 
Austrians from reaching Mantua. Bonaparte's 
measures seemed to be well taken. Wurmser's 
•delay of one day at Legnago should have been 
fatal to him. But Massena, on account of having 
no pontoon train, was delayed in crossing the 
Adige ; and Sahuguet, who had failed to destroy 



BASSANO AND SAN GEORGIO. 6/ 

all the bridges, allowed Wurmser with ten thou- 
sand Austrians to slip through into Mantua. 

Meanwhile, Massena and Augereau had closed 
in on Legnago, and captured the garrison of two 
thousand Austrians left at that place. This hav- 
ing been accomplished, Bonaparte united his 
three divisions and advanced to meet Wurmser, 
who, having united his forces to the garrison at 
Mantua, had marched out of the works to San 
Georgio to meet Bonaparte. Bonaparte attacked 
Wurmser, defeated him in the battle of San Georgio, 
and drove him within the walls of Mantua. 

The advance movements on both sides had 
begun simultaneously early in September. On 
the 13th, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian 
forces, with nearly one fourth of his army, was 
shut up in the fortress of Mantua. In less than two 
weeks the third Austrian army was defeated. It 
had lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners more 
than fifteen thousand soldiers; the French, about 
eight thousand. At the beginning of this part of 
the campaign, Wurmser, with his army of forty- 
six thousand men, had hoped to drive the French 
from Italy, and to raise the siege of Mantua. At 
the end, his army was scattered, routed, almost 
annihilated. Part was in the Tyrol, part in Friuli ; 
ten thousand were shut up in Mantua, and fifteen 
thousand had been, killed, wounded, or captured. 



6S BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 



COMMENTS. 

At the outset, the situation was as follows. The 
Austrians had forty-six thousand soldiers in the 
Tyrol and ten thousand in Mantua. Wurmser was 
free to move with these forty-six thousand against 
the French upon any of the roads leading from the 
Tyrol to the Po. 

The French had forty-two thousand, composed 
of four divisions: one before Mantua, two at 
Rivoli and Verona, and one at Salo. One of these 
divisions it was necessary to keep before Mantua, 
in order to maintain the siege there. Bonaparte, 
therefore, had but three divisions with which to 
manoeuvre and fight. And, even with these three 
divisions, he was not free to move against the 
Austrians in every direction; for he had to ma- 
noeuvre in such a way as always to protect the 
division at Mantua, and prevent it from being iso- 
lated and overwhelmed by superior numbers. 

The fact that Bonaparte was tied to Mantua, 
while Wurmser was free to move upon any point, 
and the additional fact that Bonaparte had but 
thirty-four thousand soldiers with whom to engage 
forty-six thousand, gave to Wurmser a great ad- 
vantage. These numbers are given on the suppo- 
sition that the forces about Mantua neutralized 



BASSAXO AND SAN GEORGIO. 69 

each other. If \vc take them into consideration, 
we have forty-two thousand French opposed to 
fifty-six thousand Austrians. In other words, a 
ratio of 3 to 4 in favor of the latter; but in the 
Lonato-CastigHone part of the campaign the ratio 
had been 5 to 8 in favor of the Austrians. The 
inequahty in this part of the campaign was so 
much less that Bonaparte felt strong enough to 
take the offensive. He beheved in the offensive. • 
To win victories, as he had thus far always done, | 
by bringing a superior force upon the battle-field, / 
the offensive is more favorable than the defensive. \ 
On the offensive, a general can follow his own j 
plan ; on the defensive, he must conform to that I 
of his adversary. On the offensive, the parts of 
an army can be concentrated, and the enemy may 
be surprised and defeated before he can unite the 
necessary force to repel an attack; on the defen- 
sive, the parts of an army must be kept separate, 
in order to guard all the threatened points till the 
enemy's point of attack is developed. The Aus- 
trian commander also believed in the offensive, but 
there was one great difTerence between Bonaparte 
and Wurmser. Bonaparte believed in it as a 
means to an end, as a means of uniting his scat- 
tered army; but Wurmser left this point entirely 
out of the problem. Bonaparte united his forces 
as he advanced to attack; Wurmser separated his 



70 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN; 

forces the moment he commenced an offensive 
movement. Bonaparte, with his forces at the base 
of a triangle, moved towards the apex and there 
won his victory; Wurmser at the apex, moved 
towards the base and there met defeat. Bona- 
parte, beginning active operations with divided 
forces, united them, and step by step gained more 
and more momentum, till at last he overcame all 
opposition and was victorious everywhere ; Wurm- 
ser, beginning active operations with united forces, 
separated them, and step by step became weaker 
and weaker, till at last he found himself a prisoner, 
his army defeated, scattered, and routed. Though 
at the outset the advantages were greatly in Wurm- 
ser's iavor, yet this part of the campaign, from the 
beginning to the end, was one continual triumph 
for Bonaparte. He united his three divisions at 
the head of Lake Garda, outnumbered Davidovich 
and defeated him at Roveredo and Caliano ; then 
like a thunderbolt fell upon Wurmser's rear at 
Bassano, outnumbered him, broke his army in two, 
and hurled a part of it back into the mountains of 
Friuli; then again, without a pause, he rushed 
upon the remnant of the Austrian army, pursued 
it, concentrated, and outnumbered his adversary 
for the fourth time, defeated him at San Georgio, 
and drove him within the walls of Mantua. 

If we glance at the positions of the opposing 



BASSAA^O AND SAN GEORGIO. 7 1 

forces ill this and the preceding part of the cam- 
paign, we shall find that the French were scattered 
before the commencement of active operations and 
united at the close ; that the Austrians were united 
before the commencement and scattered at the 
close. At the end of each victorious campaign, 
Bonaparte scattered his forces to collect his sup- 
plies, hold his line, protect his communications, 
and intimidate his adversary. Genius in the art of 
war cojisists in knowing when to scatter yonr forces 
and when to unite them. This maxim Napoleon 
carried to a perfection never equalled. 

It had been necessary for Bonaparte to station 
Vaubois's division at Salo, in order to prevent the 
Austrians from advancing upon the French com- 
munications by the road on the west side of Lake 
Garda. Though the lake intervened between 
this division and the other two at Rivoli and 
Verona, yet in twenty-four hours Vaubois could 
have joined Bonaparte at Rivoli by the road 
around the south end of the lake. Though Bona- 
parte had but these three divisions with which to 
manoeuvre and fight, and though at the outset 
he was necessarily weakened by the separation of 
Vaubois's division from the other two, nevertheless 
he was determined to take the offensive. At the 
earliest opportunity, he desired to unite all three 
divisions at Roveredo. In only two ways could 



72 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGNS 

this be done : Vaubois could either march around 
the south end of the lake by way of Peschiera, 
or march around the north end by way of Riva. 
Had the first plan been adopted, the French com- 
munications in the vicinity of Brescia would have 
been left unguarded. Furthermore, the distance 
to Roveredo by this route was nearly three times 
as far as the other. Bonaparte, therefore, ordered 
Vaubois to march directly upon Roveredo by way 
of Riva. Though this plan of concentration, on 
the whole, perhaps involved less risk to Bonaparte 
than the other, yet the chances of victory offered 
to Wurmser at this time are worthy of notice. 
He was in the Tyrol with forty-six thousand sol- 
diers. Had he proceeded to the upper end of 
Lake Garda, there detached a containing force 
often thousand to hold Vaubois in check, and then 
fallen with the remainder of his army upon Mas- 
sena and Augereau, the chances of victory would 
have been greatly in his favor. He would have 
had not only superior numbers, but also the advan- 
tage of position. In this way, he would have sep- 
arated Bonaparte's forces, and would have placed 
his own army in a central position, from which he 
could have acted advantageously against the French 
upon either side of the lake. By such a manoeuvre 
he would have played the same game against the 
French that Bonaparte, in the previous part of 



BASSANO AND SAJV GEORGIO. 73 

the campaign, had played against the Austrians. 
Here was offered to Wurmser a great opportunity : 
the opportunity of attacking with superior numbers 
an army which was separated into two parts by an 
impassable obstacle. 

Had Wurmser even kept his army united till 
after the concentration of the French at Roveredo, 
he would have had forty-six thousand Austrians 
with whom to oppose thirty thousand French. 
The chances of victory would still have been 
greatly in his favor. But at the very outset he 
began to separate his forces. He repeated the 
errors that had before caused his own defeat, and 
also that of his predecessor. Experience taught 
him nothing. Brave, fearless, and stubborn, he 
continued to blunder on, neither able to see his 
own past errors, nor able to comprehend the stra- 
tegical combinations of his brilliant adversary. 

After Bonaparte had defeated the Austrian right 
and gained Trent, he was between the two Aus- 
trian armies with his three divisions. To march 
aeainst the Austrian left w^ith all this force would 
have been a hazardous move; for the Austrian 
ridit could then have taken Trent and cut off his 
retreat, which would have enclosed him betw^een 
the two Austrian armies, where, if defeated, his 
army would have been captured or annihilated. 
Bonaparte, therefore, left one division in the Tyrol 



74 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

to hold the Austrians there in check, and to pro- 
tect his Hne of retreat; and with the other two 
divisions he marched against Wurmser. This 
movement, too, was in one sense a hazardous one ; 
for Bonaparte knew that he might meet superior 
numbers. He had but twenty thousand ; Wurm- 
ser, twenty-six thousand. To overcome this ad- 
vantage, Bonaparte trusted to his own skill on the 
battle-field, and to the feeling of his soldiers that 
they had been victorious so often that they could 
not be defeated. If, however, he should be de- 
feated, he could fall back, unite with Vaubois, and 
still present a formidable front. Fortunately for 
him, when he struck the Austrians at Bassano, one 
division of Wurmser's army had been detached 
against Verona ; and though it was recalled, it did 
not return in time to participate in the battle. 

It might seem that, while the French were in 
the valley of the Brenta directly on Wurmser's 
communications, he could have neutralized this 
advantage by rapidly marching to Rivoli, where 
he would have been directly on Bonaparte's com- 
munications ; but Verona barred the way. This 
place was occupied by three thousand soldiers, 
who could easily have held out against superior 
numbers for two or three days ; that is, until Bona- 
parte would have been upon Wurmser's rear. But 
even if Verona had not been occupied by the 



BASS A NO AND SAN GEORGIO. 75 

French, Wurmscr would not, in all probability, 
have attempted this movement upon the French 
communications. In accordance with a maxim of 
war which has been proved by experience, he 
v/ould have abandoned any intended attack upon 
his adversary's communications, in order to fight 
for the recovery of his own. This maxim is stated 
by Hamley as follows: "When two armies are 
manoeuvring against each other's communications, 
that army whose communications are most easily 
threatened will abandon the initiative and conform 
to the movements of its adversary." And he adds 
further these words: '' The importance of this fact 
[meaning the maxim just quoted] is immense; for 
the commander who finds himself on his enemy's 
rear, while his own is still beyond his adversary's 
reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own com- 
munications, and call up every detachment to the 
decisive point, certain that the enemy will abandon 
his own designs in order, if possible, to retrieve 
his position." 

Wurmser's delay of one day at Legnago should 
have been fatal to him, and it would have been 
if Massdna had not been delayed in crossing the 
Adige at Ronco. Here, as at Placentia, Bonaparte's 
want of a pontoon train saved an Austrian army. 

Thus far in his military career, Bonaparte was 
remarkably successful. Part of this success was 



"J^ BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

due to his own genius, and part to his adversary's 
errors. Circumstances, moreover, over which he 
had no control, seemed to favor him. Well 
aware that the goddess of fortune smiled on his 
undertakings, he often spoke of his *' lucky star." 
We see instances of his good fortune in the move- 
ments just described. It was fortunate that he 
was not attacked before he had united his divisions 
at Roveredo ; it was fortunate that he was not 
attacked by the whole Austrian army after he had 
united them there; it was still more fortunate that 
Wurmser's army was divided, and that an Aus- 
trian division was absent from the battle of Bas- 
sano. Thus far, fortune had favored him ; but in 
his next struggle it was to be against him. At 
Arcole we shall see him driven back and almost 
overwhelmed by numbers ; we shall see his sol- 
diers discouraged, and his generals without hope ; 
we shall see the very elements themselves united 
for his destruction: but amidst the turmoil and 
the strife we shall see him, by the force of his 
genius, still unconquerable, still victorious. 



CHAPTER V. 

ARCOLE. 

TIJ^OR the fourth time the Austrian government 
■^ deterniined to make an effort for the posses- 
sion of Italy. The outlook was favorable to the 
Austrians. Two French armies along the Upper 
Danube had met with reverses, and had been 
driven back. Epidemic fevers among the French 
troops about Mantua were rapidly diminishing 
their numbers, and Bonaparte, who now greatly 
felt the need of more soldiers, was asking in vain 
for re-enforcements. 

By the middle of October, the Austrian forces 
outside of Mantua were increased to fifty thousand 
men. Davidovich with twenty thousand was in 
the Tyrol, and Quasdanovich with thirty thou- 
sand was in Friuli. General Alvinzi, who had 
succeeded Wurmser as commander-in-chief, was 
with Quasdanovich. Wurmser with twenty thou- 
sand Austrians was shut up in Mantua. 

To oppose these forces, Bonaparte had barely 
forty thousand men, situated as follows : Kilmaine 
with eight thousand was besieging Mantua ; Mas- 



78 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

sena with ten thousand was at Bassano; Auge- 
reau with nine thousand, at Verona; and Vaubois 
with ten thousand, on the Lavis, near Trent. The 
French had also two or three thousand cavalry in 
reserve. 

Alvinzi and Bonaparte had each a plan of cam- 
paign. Alvinzi's plan was that Davidovich should 
attack Vaubois on the Lavis, while Quasdanovich 
attacked Massena at or near Bassano. By reason 
of his superior numbers, Alvinzi calculated that 
the French would be defeated ; and that Davido- 
vich and Quasdanovich could advance, the former 
down the Adige to Verona, and the latter along 
the road from Bassano to Verona. From Verona, 
with his forces united, Alvinzi purposed to 
advance to the relief of Mantua. 

Bonaparte's plan was to repeat from right to 
left against Alvinzi the same manoeuvre that he 
had made from left to right against Wurmser in 
the preceding part of the campaign. In other 
words, while Vaubois was holding Davidovich in 
check, Bonaparte intended to attack Alvinzi in 
force at or near Bassano and defeat him if pos- 
sible ; then to ascend the Brenta and unite with 
Vaubois for a combined attack against Davidovich. 

Early in November Davidovich advanced from 
his base of operations in the Tyrol to attack 
Vaubois at Trent, and at the same time Alvinzi 



ARCOLE. 79 

advanced from his base of operations in Friuli to 
attack Massena at Bassano. Vaubois was driven 
back towards Corona and Rivoli, and Massena 
retreated towards Verona. By reason of these 
manoeuvres, Alvinzi could now communicate with 
Davidovich by the valley of the Brenta along the 
direct road between Bassano and Trent. By 
means of this road, he could quickly re-enforce 
Davidovich's army by a detachment from his own. 
He did not, however, take advantage of this 
opportunity; but continued to act separately 
against the French with his two armies. 

Bonaparte, having directed Vaubois to prevent 
the further advance of Davidovich, advanced with 
Massena's and Augereau's divisions to meet Al- 
vinzi on the Brenta. He attacked and obtained 
a partial success, and intended to renew the attack 
the next day; but, just at this time learning that 
Vaubois was closely pressed, he renounced his 
plan and fell back on Verona. Meanwhile, Vau- 
bois, having lost a third of his force in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, was driven back to Co- 
rona. Bonaparte himself hastened there, and 
harangued Vaubois's troops for the purpose of 
stimulating their courage. Then he hurriedly 
returned to Verona. 

Meanwhile, Alvinzi had advanced on the Bas- 
sano-Verona road as far as Caldiero, where he had 



80 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

taken up a strong position. Again Bonaparte 
with Massena's and Augereau's divisions advanced 
to attack him. The attack was vigorous ; but the 
enemy's strong position, his superior numbers, the 
muddy roads, and a severe wind and hail storm in 
the face of the French soldiers during the attack, 
were disadvantages that Bonaparte could not over- 
come. He was repulsed with loss. 

He was now in a critical condition. The two 
Austrian armies were closing in upon him ; already 
their plan of campaign seemed about to be real- 
ized, already their cannon could be heard at 
Verona. It seemed almost impossible to hold 
Mantua, and at the same time to prevent the junc- 
tion of the two Austrian armies. If they united, 
they could relieve Mantua in spite of anything 
Bonaparte could do. To save his army, retreat 
seemed almost a necessity. He had been severely 
repulsed ; his force was too weak ; his generals 
were losing hope ; his men were murmuring and 
complaining; even the elements themselves, which 
had so often been favorable to his undertakings, 
now seemed to be united for his destruction. 

In this critical condition he wrote to his govern- 
ment as follows : — 

" All our superior officers, all our best generals, are hors 
de combat. The Army of Italy, reduced to a handful of 
men, is exhausted. The heroes of Millesimo, of Lodi, of 



A R COLE. 8 1 

Castiglione, of Bassano, have died for their country, or 
are in the hospital. Nothing is left to the corps but their 
reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lamare, 
Victor, Murat, Chariot, Depuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Menard, 
Chabrand, are wounded. We are abandoned at the ex- 
tremity of Italy. The brave men who are left me have 
no prospect but inevitable death, amidst chances so contin- 
ual and with forces so inferior. Perhaps the hour of the 
brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, is near at hand. 
If I had received the 83d, numbering three thousand 
five hundred men known to the army, I would have 
answered for the result. Perhaps in a few days forty 
thousand may not be enough." 

Though he complained thus bitterly to his 
government, he affected in the presence of his 
soldiers the utmost assurance. He encouraged 
them. He told them that one m.ore effort must 
be made. He told them that they must not, could 
not, be beaten. " From the smiling, flowery biv- 
ouacs of Italy," said he, ''you cannot return to the 
Alpine snows." 

Rather than yield an inch he decided to risk 
everything. He resolved to throw his army on 
Alvinzi's flank and rear. This was a hazardous 
move ; but it was the only hope left, and if success- 
ful it v/ould show that he could conquer with 
numbers and even fortune against him. 

Alvinzi, who was advancing on the road to 
Verona, had this fortified city in his front. On 

6 



82 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

his right were impassable mountains. On his 
left was the river Adige, deep and unfordable. 
Directly to his rear was the defile of Villa Nova, 
which he had already passed, and which was the 
only outlet by which he could retire. To his left 
and rear was the river Alpon, which rises near 
Villa Nova and flows south into the Adige. On 
the left bank of the Alpon, about three miles from 
its mouth, is the village of Arcole, from which 
this battle takes its name. The ground between 
the Adige and the Alpon was marshy. Two 
causeways crossed the marsh: one, leaving the 
Adige at Ronco, led to Porcil ; the other, leaving 
Ronco, led to the bridge of Arcole. 

Before proceeding to execute his plan, Bona- 
parte ordered Kilmaine to withdraw from Mantua 
with two thousand soldiers, to take command at 
Verona, and to hold it to the last. Then, on 
November the 14th, Bonaparte, with Massena's and 
Augereau's divisions and the reserve of cavalry, 
in all about twenty thousand soldiers, marched out 
of Verona by its west gate, descended the Adige, 
and threw a bridge across the river at Ronco 
opposite the defile of Villa Nova. On the 15th 
he crossed the river and began the celebrated 
battle of Arcole. Massena advanced upon the 
causeway towards Porcil, and Augereau upon the 
one towards Arcole. The attacks were vigorously 



A R COLE. 83 

made and vigorously repulsed. Bonaparte had 
his eye on Villa Nova. As it was the only out- 
let for Alvinzi's army he was anxious to gain 
possession of it. By so doing he would enclose 
Alvinzi's army, and might be able to destroy it 
But before he could gain the defile, it was neces- 
sary to carry the bridge at Arcole. He therefore 
redoubled his efforts ; he urged forward his troops 
again and again, — even placed himself at their 
head, where he nearly lost his life by being thrown 
from the causeway into the marsh. But his efforts 
were ineffectual; his soldiers were repulsed; the 
Austrians held the bridge. At night he crossed 
back with his army to the right bank of the 
Adige. 

Meanwhile, Alvinzi, who had already begun to 
fear that his retreat might be cut off, was with- 
drawing his army through Villa Nova. Bonaparte 
saw this movement, he saw the hope of great 
results slipping from his grasp. Still he was not 
discouraged ; he could still act advantageously 
upon Alvinzi's flank. 

Alvinzi re-enforced his troops at Arcole, and 
near there, on the left bank of the Alpon, drew 
up his main army ready for battle. On the i6th 
Bonaparte again crossed the Adige and attacked 
Alvinzi along the causeway leading to Arcole. He 
was again repulsed. At night he again recrossed 



84 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

to the right bank of the river. Here he learned 
that Vaubois had been driven from RivoH, but was 
retiring slowly and in good order. He realized 
that he must now retreat, or at once force back 
Alvinzi. 

On the 17th he crossed the Adige for the third 
time, and after vigorous fighting succeeded, with a 
part of his force, in driving back the Austrians 
who had advanced beyond Arcole. With the other 
part, he crossed the Alpon near its mouth and 
took Arcole in reverse. This was the critical 
period ; the Austrians were taken by surprise, and 
gave way. Then Bonaparte debouched upon the 
open plain with all his force, and drove them back 
towards Bassano. After having fought for three 
days more desperately than he had ever fought 
before, he was again victorious. 

Bonaparte had expected to follow Alvinzi ; but, 
learning that Vaubois was hard pressed, he sent 
the French cavalry to pursue Alvinzi, and with 
Massena's and Augereau's divisions' hastened 
through Verona to re-enforce Vaubois. He 
entered the city by the east gate three days 
after having left it by the west gate. Massena 
and Augereau joined Vaubois, and together they 
drove Davidovich into the Tyrol. 

Meanwhile, Alvinzi, who had found out that he 
was pursued by cavalry only, was again advancing 



ARCOLE. 85 

towards Verona; but learning that Davidovich 
had been defeated, he faced about his columns 
and retired behind the Brenta. 

Alvinzi was beaten at all points. The fighting 
on both sides had been desperate, the loss heavy. 
In prisoners, killed, and wounded the Austrians 
had lost about thirteen thousand ; the French, 
about the same number. 

During the three days of fighting at Arcole, 
Wurmser remained quiet at Mantua. Alvinzi did 
not expect to arrive before the place till Novem- 
ber 23d, and had asked Wurmser not to make a 
sortie till then. Before that time, Kilmaine was 
again besieging Mantua; before that time this 
part of the campaign was ended, and the fourth 
Austrian army defeated. 

COMMENTS. 

At the outset, the Austrians had thirty thousand 
soldiers in Friuli, twenty thousand in the Tyrol, 
and twenty thousand shut up in Mantua. If on our 
map we connect by three straight lines the three 
Austrian armies, we shall find that Bonaparte had, 
within the triangle thus formed, all the divisions of 
his army. Massena was at Bassano ; Augereau, at 
Verona; Kilmaine, before Mantua; and Vaubois, 
at Trent. The French, thus centrally situated, 



86 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

could concentrate more rapidly than the Austrians. 
At the outset, therefore, they had the advantage 
of interior Hnes. But during the campaign this 
advantage did not always remain with the French. 
In fact, as we proceed, we see that, owing to pe- 
culiarities in the topography of the country, the 
advantage of interior lines changed several times 
from one side to the other. 

Communication between Bassano and Trent by 
the direct road along the Brenta was of course 
much more speedy than by the circuitous route 
through Verona. The country enclosed by these 
two roads is mountainous, and Impassable for sol- 
diers. As long as the French occupied Bassano 
and Trent, there could not, therefore, be any direct 
communication, by either of these roads, between 
Alvinzi in" Friuli and Davidovich in the Tyrol. 
But, at the start, the French were driven from 
Bassano and Trent, and these places were occupied 
by the Austrians. By these simple movements 
Alvinzi had changed strategically the relative posi- 
tions of the opposing forces. Occupying Bassano 
with one army and Trent with the other, he could 
concentrate by the direct road along the Brenta 
more quickly than could Bonaparte, who in 
his operations was restricted to the longer road 
through Verona. The Austrians now had the 
advantage of interior lines. 



ARCOLE. Sy 

Here was offered to Alvinzi an opportunity 
which, if he had boldly seized it, would undoubt- 
edly have brought success to his arms. He should 
have recalled ten thousand soldiers from Trent to 
Bassano by forced marches, and should have left 
Davidovich in the Tyrol with the remaining ten 
thousand to act against Vaubois. Then, with his 
own army thus increased to forty thousand, he 
should have marched rapidly against Bonaparte. 
To oppose these forty thousand, Bonaparte could 
not have had more than twenty thousand soldiers. 
By adopting such a plan, Alvinzi would have been 
almost certain of success. With ten thousand less, 
he came within a hair's breadth of victory. With 
ten thousand less, he drove Bonaparte from Bas- 
sano, almost crushed him at Caldiero, and amid the 
marshes of Arcole repulsed him again and again. 

But instead of uniting both armies when the 
opportunity was offered, he continued to act sep- 
arately against the French along two roads, which 
were separated by impassable mountains. And 
Bonaparte at Verona, where these two roads met, 
had again the advantage of interior lines. From 
his central position he was enabled to repeat the 
manoeuvre that had brought him victory at Mon- 
tenotte and Millesimo, at Lonato and Castiglione; 
to throw a strong force against Alvinzi, then 
against Davidovich, and, finally, to defeat both. 



88 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

In his letter to his government asking for re- 
enforcements, Bonaparte said : " If I had re- 
ceived the 83d, numbering thirty-five hundred men 
known to the army, I would have answered for 
the result. Perhaps in a few days forty thousand 
may not be enough." These words show clearly 
what Bonaparte thought. In his mind victory was 
certain if he could receive this re-enforcement; it 
was doubtful, if he could not receive it. With 
such a small addition to his force as this would 
have been, it seems strange to us that he should 
have been so confident of success. What disposi- 
tion could he have made of this re-enforcement 
that would have changed doubtful success to cer- 
tain victory? Though this question does not 
admit a categorical answer, there are neverthe- 
less good reasons for believing that Bonaparte 
would have used this re-enforcement to strengthen 
Vaubois. 

Vaubois's division, which was attempting to hold 
Davidovich in check, was not strong enough to 
perform this duty. It fought hard, it lost nearly a 
third of its strength in killed, wounded, and pris- 
oners ; but it was compelled to fall back from 
position to position. When Bonaparte attacked 
Alvinzi at Bassano, he expected that Vaubois 
would be strong enough to hold Davidovich in 
check. But at the very time that Bonaparte 



ARCOLE. 89 

was succeeding against Alvinzi, Vaubois was fall- 
ing back before Davidovich. Bonaparte, having 
learned that Davidovich was likely to overthrow 
Vaubois and raise the siege of Mantua, saw that a 
complete victory over Alvinzi would under these 
circumstances have little or no effect upon the 
result of the campaign. He saw, too, that his own 
communications were already endangered, and 
therefore fell back on Verona. The direct cause 
of his retreat was the weakness of Vaubois. Un- 
doubtedly, then, if Bonaparte had received the 
re-enforcement that he so urgently asked for, he 
would have used it to strengthen Vaubois. 

Let us suppose that it had been received and so 
used. This re-enforcement, added to the ten 
thousand that Vaubois had at Trent, would have 
increased his force to thirteen thousand five hun- 
dred. With this force we believe that, by acting 
on the defensive, and by taking advantage of the 
mountainous country, the defiles, and the passes, 
he could have maintained himself there. Let us 
suppose that he could have done so, and was doing 
so, when Bonaparte made his successful attack 
against Alvinzi at Bassano. Let us suppose that 
Bonaparte had attacked the next day, and had 
been again successful. Alvinzi's army would then 
have retreated to its base of operations in Friuli. 
Then, we can imagine Bonaparte giving these 



90 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

orders : '' Augereau to watch Alvinzi ; Massena 
to join Vaubois at Trent by forced marches." 
Massena's division of ten thousand and Vaubois's 
division of thirteen thousand five hundred would 
have given Bonaparte*twenty-three thousand five 
hundred with which to attack Davidovich's army 
of twenty thousand. Who can doubt what the 
result would have been, when we remember that 
Napoleon never lost a battle in which he was 
superior to his adversary in numbers? 

At Verona, after the battle of Caldiero, Bona- 
parte might have taken any one of four courses. 

First: He could have remained at Verona. 

Had he shut himself up in the fortified town of 
Verona, he could in all probability have held out 
as long as his provisions lasted. In this case 
Alvinzi, who was already at the gates of Verona, 
would undoubtedly have laid siege to the place. 
By taking such a course Bonaparte could have 
prolonged the conflict; but it would have been 
only a question of time when he would be com- 
pelled to surrender. He refused to shut himself 
up in Verona; and in this connection it is worthy 
of notice that during all of his military operations 
he never allowed himself to be besieged in any 
place. 

When the commander of an army is hard pressed, 
and there is near at hand a strongly fortified place 



ARC OLE, 91 

with outlying works of great strength, and provis- 
ions and water within, the temptation is great to 
seek security there. Second rate generals accept 
such opportunities, but in doing so they make 
fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art of war 
manoeuvre for position, and become themselves 
the besiegers ; or decide upon the open battle-field 
the fate of their fortresses and their armies. 

Second : He could have united with Vaubois to 
attack Davidovich. 

Had he united his forces with those of Vaubois, 
he could easily have defeated Davidovich; but 
meantime Alvinzi could have crossed the Adige 
and relieved Mantua, or could have fallen on the 
French communications with Milan. In either case 
the difficulties surrounding Bonaparte would have 
been greatly increased. 

Third: He could have retreated with all his 
forces. 

To follow this course would have been to yield 
up Mantua, to give up the greater part of Italy, 
and to acknowledge himself beaten. 

Fourth : The course he chose, namely, to attack 
Alvinzi in flank, was the only course left in which 
there was any hope of success. When he threw 
his army upon Alvinzi's flank and rear, he hoped 
to gain possession of the defile of Villa Nova 
before Alvinzi should withdraw his army through 



92 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

it towards Bassano. Had Bonaparte succeeded 
in doing this, he would have been directly on 
Alvinzi's communications, and would have held 
the only outlet for his army. Once in possession 
of this outlet, he expected to annihilate or capture 
Alvinzi's army. But, in order to gain such com- 
plete success as here set forth, three conditions 
must be fulfilled. First, that during the flank 
movement Kilmaine should hold Verona. Other- 
wise, Alvinzi could unite with Davidovich, which 
was the very thing that Bonaparte was fighting 
to prevent. Second, that, until Bonaparte had 
destroyed Alvinzi, Vaubois should hold Davido- 
vich in check. Bonaparte's anxiety on this point 
led him, after each day's unsuccessful attack at 
Arcole, to cross the Adige to the right bank. He 
wished to be where he could, if necessary, march 
to Vaubois's assistance ; and he was unwilling 
to be enclosed in the marshes about Arcole, 
which might happen if Vaubois should be driven 
back and Davidovich should gain possession of 
the crossing at Ronco. Third, that Bonaparte 
should reach Villa Nova in time to cut off Alvinzi's 
retreat. 

The conditions were not all fulfilled. The three 
days' fighting at Arcole allowed Alvinzi to with- 
draw his army through Villa Nova. In this way 
he preserved his communications, and saved his 



ARCOLE. 93 

army from capture or annihilation ; but he could 
not save it from defeat ; nor could he stay the 
progress of that genius who, though having infe- 
rior numbers, brought to his aid the mountains 
and the marshes, the defiles and the causeways, 
and with these as re-enforcements marched on to 
victory. 

The battle of Arcole as planned shows in a re- 
markable way what extraordinary confidence Bona- 
parte had in his own military abilities. While his 
generals were ready to give up Italy, while his 
soldiers were murmuring and complaining, he was 
unyielding, courageous, and decided. While every- 
thing around him seemed to portend his destruc- 
tion, he, with an extraordinary assurance of victory, 
was planning Alvinzi's defeat ; nay, more, was plan- 
ning the capture or annihilation of his army. 

Hitherto in this campaign, Bonaparte, though 
inferior to his adversary in numbers, had never- 
theless succeeded in bringing superior numbers 
upon every battle-field. At Montenotte, Millesimo, 
the two Degos, Mondovi, the second Castiglione, 
Roveredo, Caliano, the first Bassano, and San 
Georgio, he outnumbered his adversary. At Lodi, 
though he may not have attacked with a force 
superior to that of the Austrians, he had practi- 
cally the whole of his army close by and ready for 
action at a moment's notice. At Lonato and the 



94 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

first CastigHone, which were fought on the same 
day, though at times the Austrians outnumbered 
the French, yet he had superior numbers near at 
hand with which by rapid manoeuvring he won 
these battles. But in the part of the campaign 
now under consideration, the odds between the 
opposing forces were much greater than before. 
Here, for the first time, Bonaparte was outnum- 
bered upon every battle-field. No combination 
was possible by which he could bring a superior, 
or even an equal, force against Alvinzi. He asked 
for re-enforcements, but received none. He left 
only eight thousand soldiers before Mantua. He 
gave to Vaubois only ten thousand with which to 
hold back twenty thousand in the Tyrol. Even 
then, he had only twenty thousand with which to 
oppose the thirty thousand on the Brenta. Such 
odds were too great. He fell back from Bassano ; 
was driven from Caldiero. Though almost sur- 
rounded, almost crushed by numbers, still he did 
not despair. In the midst of surroundings so dark 
and gloomy, he saw one chance for success. His 
mind grasped every detail of the situation. He 
saw how the marshes, the defiles, and the cause- 
ways could be turned to his advantage. He with- 
drew two thousand soldiers from Mantua, and in 
this way strengthened his small force as much as 
he could. Then he marched down the Adige; 



ARCOLE. 95 

plunged Into a swamp, and fought along the cause- 
ways, where victory depended upon the bravery of 
the heads of his columns, and where the supe- 
riority of his adversary was almost totally annulled. 
After three days of desperate fighting, the French 
eagles were victorious. The battle of Arcole was 
won. In no other battle has Bonaparte shown 
himself a greater master of the art of war. In no 
other battle has he fought more desperately, or 
shown greater personal courage. In no other 
battle, among all his splendid victories, has he 
added greater lustre to his name. 



CHAPTER VI. 



RIVOLI. 



T70UR Austrian armies had been defeated and 
^ hurled back into the mountains of FriuH 
and the Tyrol ; still, the Austrians persevered and 
hoped for success. Mantua still held out; and 
twenty thousand starving Austrians there hoped 
for a victory that would open the gates and allow 
them to march forth. 

By the ist of January, 1797, Alvinzi's forces in 
Friuli and the Tyrol were increased to forty-five 
thousand soldiers ; and he determined to make 
another effort for the relief of Mantua and the 
possession of Italy, His forces consisted of two 
corps : the first, seventeen thousand strong, com- 
manded by Provera, was in Friuli ; the second, 
twenty-eight thousand strong, commanded by Ah 
vinzi in person, was in the Tyrol. 

In the previous part of the campaign Alvinzi 
had, from his base in Friuli, made his principal 
attack upon the French in the vicinity of Verona; 
this time he purposed to try a new plan. It was 
to advance with his main force, the second corps, 



RIVOLL 



97 



from his base in the Tyrol down the Adige upon 
Rivoli, while Provera with the first corps advanced 
from his base in Friuli upon Verona and Legnago. 
Both corps were to be entirely independent, and 
each was to strive, by defeating the French in its 
front, to reach Mantua. By this plan Alvinzi cal- 
culated^ that, while the first corps was attacking 
the Frdich on the line of the Adige from Verona 
to LegrSago, the second corps would defeat Bona- 
parte, ndar Rivoli, cut off his communications, and 
open the gates of Mantua. Accordingly, on the 
lOth of January, Alvinzi began to descend the 
Adige with twenty-eight thousand men; while 
Provera, having divided his corps of seventeen 
thousand men into two parts, marched upon Ver- 
ona and Legnago. 

Bonaparte had forty-four thousand soldiers. His 
divisions occupied the following positions : Serru- 
rier with ten thousand soldiers was besieeing- 
Mantua ; Augereau with ten thousand was on the 
Adige from Verona to Legnago ; Massena with ten 
thousand, at Verona ; Joubert with ten thousand, at 
Corona and Rivoli ; and a reserve of four thousand, 
commanded by General Rey, was at Desenzano. 

Bonaparte, informed that the Austrians were 
about to take the offensive, hastened to Verona. 
He had at the time no definite plan of operations; 
but was awaiting developments in order to learn, 

7 



98 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

if possible, at what point Alvinzi would make his 
main attack. 

On January 1 2th Provera, having approached 
Verona with one division of his corps, was attacked 
and repulsed by Massena's division. Nearly one 
thousand Austrian prisoners were captured. The 
ease with which the Austrians were repulsed con- 
vinced Bonaparte that Alvinzi was not making his 
main attack from this direction. On the afternoon 
of the next day, January 13th, Bonaparte learned 
that Joubert was hard pressed and had been com- 
pelled to fall back from Corona upon Rivoli. On 
the same day Rey sent word from Desenzano that 
no Austrians had been seen on the west side of 
Lake Garda, and Augereau sent word from Leg- 
nago that there appeared to be only a small force 
of the enemy in that direction. These facts con- 
vinced Bonaparte that the main Austrian attack 
would be made down the Adige. He at once 
made his plans accordingly. He knew the advan- 
tages that the plateau of Rivoli possessed for a 
battle-field, and he determined to hold it with 
Joubert's division, and concentrate other forces 
there as soon as possible. He sent orders to 
Joubert to hold the plateau at all hazards. Having 
already sent orders to Rey to march to Castel 
Novo, he now sent him orders not to delay there, 
but to continue his march upon Rivoli. Bonaparte 



RIVOLI. 99 

himself, having left two thousand soldiers of Mas- 
sena's division to hold Verona, set out with the 
remainder of this division for Rivoli. At midnight 
Bonaparte's orders reached Joubert, then in full 
retreat. He immediately retraced his steps, and 
by daybreak of the 14th reoccupied the plateau 
of Rivoli. 

This plateau, which was to be the memorable 
battle-field of Rivoli, is on the right bank of the 
Adige between the river and Lake Garda. On the 
north side of the plateau is Monte Baldo and a 
chain of mountains and hills, part of the main 
chain that extends eastward from Lake Garda to 
the north of and beyond Verona. The Adige 
cuts through these mountains just before arriving 
opposite the plateau of Rivoli, flows past the town 
of Rivoli, and thence past Verona and Legnago 
towards the sea. The two main roads on which 
Alvinzi marched lie on opposite sides of the Adige, 
cramped by the mountains within narrow spaces. 
Between the river and Monte Baldo several roads 
and trails, impassable for artillery, lead over the 
mountains, separated from the main road on the 
right bank by the heights of San Marco. This 
road leaves the river at Incanale, just above Rivoli, 
ascends the series of hills that at this point rise 
abruptly from the river's bank, and passes on over 
the plateau of Rivoli towards Verona. 



100 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Owing to these facts, and in accordance with his 
plan of battle, Alvinzi had, before passing the 
mountains, divided his forces into six parts. By 
his numerical superiority he had forced Joubert 
to retire from position to position. He expected, 
however, to find the French strongly posted at 
Rivoli, and he intended to give battle there and 
to defeat them. He gave orders that Vukassovich, 
with about five thousand men, should descend the 
Adige along the road on the left bank of the river, 
and attack any French columns on that side; that 
Quasdanovich, with nine thousand men and the 
greater part of the artillery and cavalry, should 
follow the road along the right bank of the river, 
ascend the heights to the plateau of Rivoli, and 
attack the French right; that three other columns, 
unencumbered with artillery or wagons, should 
pass over the mountain roads and trails and attack 
the French front ; that a sixth column, four thousand 
strong, commanded by Lusignan, should march 
around the western slope of Monte Baldo and 
attack the French left and rear. By examining 
these several positions on the map, we see that 
Vukassovich and Quasdanovich were separated by 
the Adige; that the three columns forming the 
Austrian centre were separated from Quasdano- 
vich's column on their left by the heights of San 
Marco, and from Lusignan's column on their 



RIVOLI. 10 1 

right by Monte Baldo itself. By these disposi- 
tions Alvinzi expected to surround the French, 
and, by making simultaneous attacks upon their 
front and both flanks, to overwhelm and crush 
them. 

On January 13th these fractions of Alvinzi's 
army were marching towards Rivoli. They camped 
that night within sight of the battle-field. Vukas- 
sovich and Quasdanovich camped on the river; 
the other columns, on the southern slope of the 
Monte Baldo mountains. 

During the night, while the Austrians were sleep- 
ing, Joubert was returning to occupy the plateau ; 
Massena and Rey were hurrying forward ; and 
Bonaparte himself, having pushed ahead of Mas- 
sena's column, was riding rapidly towards Rivoli. 
He arrived there after midnight; he saw the lights 
from the six Austrian camps ; he saw that Alvinzi 
had separated his columns by impassable obstacles ; 
and he saw that, if he could collect his own forces 
and hold the plateau, he could probably prevent 
the Austrian columns from arriving simultaneously 
upon the battle-field, and, by so doing, could de- 
feat them in detail. In his front were twenty-eight 
thousand Austrians. He had only Joubert's divis- 
ion of ten thousand ; but Massena would soon 
bring eight thousand more upon the battle-field, 
and perhaps Rey might arrive with his four thou- 




102 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 

sand in time to take part in the struggle. At once 
Bonaparte began to arrange the troops and artil- 
lery for battle. Early in the morning Joubert 
advanced. The Austrians in his front having no 
artillery, he succeeded at first in driving them back ; 
and, by directing a part of his artillery upon Quas- 
danovich's column, he held it in check. But the 
Austrians soon rallied; the fighting became des- 
perate. An Austrian column attacked furiously 
the French left and succeeded in turning it. Bona- 
parte himself rearranged his shattered left, then 
hurried to the town of Rivoli to bring up Mas- 
sena's division which had just arrived there. These 
troops were hurried forward, and Massena hurled 
them against the Austrian right, drove it back, and 
succeeded in re-establishing the French left. But 
the French right was still hotly engaged. Quas- 
danovich, after hard fighting, had overcome the 
resistance in his front and was urging his column 
up the winding road to the battle-field. Already 
his advanced troops were deploying on the plateau. 
Lusignan, too, could be seen in the distance de- 
ploying upon Bonaparte's rear. In fact, Bona- 
parte was surrounded; twenty-eight thousand Aus- 
trians were advancing upon him. He had but 
eighteen thousand soldiers. For a moment suc- 
cess seemed impossible, defeat inevitable ; but his 
clear eye took in the whole field : he saw that 



■ RIVOLI. 103 

none of the Austrian columns had yet united ; he 
saw at a glance where the blow must be struck in 
order to turn disaster into victory; and, with 
remarkable coolness, he gathered his troops and 
prepared to throw them, in succession, against the 
several Austrian columns. 

Joubert, in advancing against the Austrian cen- 
tre, had passed with his right beyond the ascending 
road over which Ouasdanovich was marching to 
reach the plateau. Bonaparte ordered Joubert to 
face about his troops and charge Quasdanovich in 
flank. The latter was overwhelmed ; he retreated 
in confusion down the hill. Bonaparte then hurled 
the troops of Massena's and Joubert's divisions 
against the Austrian columns in their front, routed 
them, drove them into the mountains and captured 
many prisoners. Meanwhile, Lusignan, knowing 
that Bonaparte was surrounded, and believing that 
the Austrians were already victorious, was advan- 
cing to take part in the capture of the French 
forces. But Bonaparte, having disposed of the 
Austrians in his front, faced about a part of his 
victorious troops and advanced to attack Lu- 
signan. Meanwhile, Rey, who was just arriving 
from Castel Novo, finding Lusignan in his front, 
also attacked him from that side. At the very 
time that Lusignan believed the French to be 
surrounded, he found himself entrapped. Between 



I04 BONAPARTE'S FIRST- CAMPAIGN, 

the two fires he could not escape. He was com- 
pelled to surrender his entire force as prisoners 
of war. 

On all sides the Austrians were defeated. Al- 
vinzi's army was almost destroyed. On January 
14th nearly eight thousand Austrians were killed, 
captured, or wounded ; and on the next day Jou- 
bert, who was sent in pursuit of Alvinzi's army, 
captured nearly seven thousand more. Out oT 
twenty-eight thousand Austrians with whom Ah 
vinzi began the battle, he had left, on the night of 
the 1 6th, but thirteen thousand two hundred and 
thirty soldiers. Thus ended the battle of Rivoli, 
which by military men is pronounced to be one of 
Bonaparte's greatest tactical battles. 

Even this astonishing success did not satisfy 
Bonaparte. Though he had just gained the most 
remarkable tactical victory in his already remarka- 
ble career, still nothing escaped him. His eye 
took in the whole theatre of operations. He was 
anxious about his right, anxious for Augereau, 
anxious that Provera should not reach Mantua and 
attack Serrurier on one side, while Wurmser, issu- 
ing from the gates of Mantua, should attack him 
on the other. 

In fact, while these operations were taking place 
at Rivoli, Provera with eight thousand Austrians, 
about half of his corps, forced the centre of Auge- 



RIVOLI. 105 

reau's line along the Adige, and crossed the river 
a few miles above Legnago. Augereau, however, 
fell upon the rear-guard of this force before it 
crossed the river, cut it to pieces, and captured 
two thousand prisoners. Provera with the remain- 
der of his force marched rapidly towards Mantua, 
arid Augereau followed in pursuit. The battle of 
Rivoli had scarcely ended when Bonaparte learned 
that Provera had crossed the Adige. Leaving 
Joubert and Rey to pursue Alvinzi, Bonaparte 
started at once with Massena's division for Mantua. 
Though this division had been marching and fight- 
ing continuously for the last twenty-four hours, 
still, under Bonaparte's direction, it marched all 
night on the 14th, and the whole of the next day, 
and on the morning of the i6th was ready for battle 
in front of Mantua. 

Provera arrived before Mantua on the 15th, and 
the next morning began to attack Serrurier; while 
Wurmser, issuing from the gates of Mantua, at- 
tacked him from that side. But Bonaparte's divis- 
ions were near at hand ; while Serrurier was driv- 
ing Wurmser back, Bonaparte closed in upon 
Provera. The latter, attacked on one side by 
Serrurier and on the other by Massena and Auge- 
reau, could not escape, but was compelled to sur- 
render his entire force. 

In this battle, known as La Favorita, more than 



I06 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

five thousand Austrians surrendered. Nearly fif- 
teen thousand had been killed, wounded, or cap- 
tured at Rivoli; nearly one thousand had been 
captured by Massena near Verona, and two thou- 
sand by Augereau near Legnago. In three days 
Bonaparte had, therefore, captured or destroyed 
more than half of Alvinzi's army. 

Meanwhile, Wurmser at Mantua was in a critical 
condition. For days the garrison of twenty thou- 
sand there had been living on horse flesh. Over 
seven thousand were sick, many had already died, 
many more were dying. Even the horses were 
almost consumed. Wurmser could hold out no 
longer. The victories of Rivoli and La Favorita 
had destroyed his last hope. He had long and 
heroically held Mantua, but was at last by force 
of necessity compelled to yield. He signed the 
capitulation of the fortress, and on February 2d 
the starving garrison surrendered. Thus ended 
this part of the campaign, in which Bonaparte with 
only forty-four thousand soldiers killed, wounded, 
or captured nearly forty-three thousand Aus- 
trians. The fifth Austrian army was annihilated. 
For the first time Mantua was in possession of the 
French. Bonaparte was at last complete master 
of Italy. 



RIVOLL 107 

COMMENTS. 

** To invade a country," says Napoleon, " with a 
double line of operations is a faulty combination." 
Alvinzi, defeated on a double line of operations 
at Arcole, repeated the same error in this part of 
the campaign. His own corps, having its base in 
the Tyrol, marched down the Adige to attack at 
Rivoli. Provera's corps, having its base in Friuli, 
marched from Bassano to attack Verona and 
Legnago. Impassable mountains separated the 
two corps, so that after the movement began 
there could be no communication between them. 
This was Alvinzi's greatest error. It gave to 
Bonaparte the advantage of interior lines, and 
allowed him to concentrate his forces in succes- 
sion against the two Austrian corps. 

Alvinzi could, at the start, have easily avoided 
this error. In fact, there were two plans, either 
of which would have been better than the one he 
adopted. Had he left a small force to act on the 
defensive against Joubert along the upper Adige, 
and united the rest of his army at Bassano by the 
direct road along the upper Brenta, he could then 
have made an attack on the lower Adige which 
would have had great chances of success. By so 
doing he would have adopted a single line of 
operations, and his forces would have been united 



I08 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

into one powerful army, which would have greatly 
outnumbered the forces that Bonaparte could, by 
any possibility, have brought against it. Had 
Alvinzi left ten thousand to act against Joubert, 
he could then have concentrated thirty-five thou- 
sand at Bassano. As Serrurier's division was 
absolutely necessary before Mantua, and Joubert's 
division absolutely necessary at Rivoli, the only 
troops that Bonaparte could have united to oppose 
such an army coming from Bassano would have 
been Augereau's and Massena's divisions and Key's 
force of four thousand. With these forces Bona- 
parte would have had an army of only twenty-four 
thousand with which to hold Verona and to oppose 
Alvinzi's army of thirty-five thousand. The odds 
against Bonaparte would, in this case, have been 
greater than they were at Arcole. Such a plan, 
to say the least, offered Alvinzi great chances of 
success. 

But the other plan which Alvinzi might have 
adopted offered also great chances of success. He 
might have left a containing force of ten thousand 
at Bassano to act against Augereau, and united 
the remainder of his army for an attack down the 
Adige upon Rivoli. Such a plan would likely 
have been successful: for with twenty-eight thou- 
sand the result at Rivoli for a time seemed doubt- 
ful ; perhaps with thirty-five thousand men Alvinzi 



RIVOLL 109 

would have won the battle. Had he adopted this 
plan, Bonaparte could not have concentrated a 
o-reater force at Rivoli than he did actually con- 
centrate there on January 14th; for to withdraw 
Serrurier from Mantua would have allowed Wurm- 
ser to escape, and to withdraw Augereau from the 
lower Adige would have allowed Serrurier to be 
crushed between Provera and Wurmser. Further 
on it will be shown that Alvinzi at Rivoli with 
twenty-eight thousand soldiers should have been 
victorious, and would have been, had he not com- 
mitted error upon error. There is therefore good 
reason for believing that with thirty-five thousand 
he would have overwhelmed and crushed Bona- 
parte. 

This plan had one great advantage over the 
plan previously discussed. An Austrian victory 
at Rivoli would have left Alvinzi within a short 
march of the French communications. By march- 
ing to the Mincio he could have intercepted the 
remaining French forces, and by so doing could 
have ended the campaign. This advantage, how- 
ever, was more than counterbalanced by the dis- 
advantages which this line of operations offered. 
The upper Adige flows through a mountainous 
country, which becomes more mountainous to- 
wards Rivoli. In marching down the Adige 
Alvinzi was compelled to follow the two roads 



no BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

which are separated by the river, and which are 
confined by the mountains within a narrow valley. 
In this mountainous country, especially near Rivoli, 
there was not room to manoeuvre a large army. In 
fact, it was with the greatest difficulty that troops 
could be deployed at all, and then only in such 
a way that impassable obstacles necessarily inter- 
vened between the several organizations. 

On the other hand, a small force acting on the 
defensive could, by taking advantage of the moun- 
tains and defiles, hold in check a greatly superior 
force. 

These topographical peculiarities, therefore, 
made this route difficult for offensive operations, 
and excellent for defensive ones. From these 
facts it follows that, though an Austrian victory 
at Rivoli promised great results, yet so great 
were the difficulties there that only under the 
most favorable circumstances could a victory be 
expected. 

But the other route from Bassano towards the 
lower Adige, lying in an open country where a 
large army could be easily deployed, is excellent 
for offensive operations and difficult for defensive 
ones. Though a victory here would not have al- 
lowed Alvinzi to cut Bonaparte's communications, 
and would not therefore have led to such great 
results as a victory at Rivoli, yet the advantages 



RIVOLI. 1 1 1 

here outbalanced all other considerations, and 
should have led Alvinzi to choose this route for 
his main attack. He did choose it in the Arcole 
part of the campaign, and, though he committed 
many errors, he came within a hair's breadth of 
victory. In none of these campaigns did the 
Austrians come so near victory as at Arcole ; in 
none did they experience such a crushing defeat 
as at Rivoli. 

In this connection it is worthy of notice, that, 
when the commander of an invading army has 
two lines of operations offered to him, one promis- 
ing great results under great difficulties and the 
other offering great promise of an early victory, 
it is better to select the latter, because a first 
success encourages the soldier to greater effort. 
Nothing rouses his enthusiasm like victory. Ob- 
stacles, which might at the beginning of a cam- 
paign seem insurmountable, appear, after several 
victories, insignificant to him. His hopes .rise, 
his blood quickens, he feels that hf can overcome 
all difficulties, and, in the future as in the past, 
march on to victory. 

"The defects of Alvinzi's plan," says Derrecagaix in 
criticising this campaign, " had given to Bonaparte one of 
his most brilliant triumphs. Again the latter had manoeu- 
vred upon interior lines of operations, while his enemies 
followed two exterior lines. Nor was this their only mis- 



112 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

take. They made their principal attack in a mountainous 
region abounding in strong positions favorable for defence, 
while upon the lower Adige they would have deprived the 
French of this advantage. 

" Moreover, the march of Provera's corps could have 
led to no profitable result. A victory for Alvinzi at Rivoli 
would have sufficed, indeed, to save Mantua; his defeat, 
on the contrary, made certain the loss of Provera, without 
the possibility of bringing any advantage in return. 

"The direction which the Austrians should have fol- 
lowed was quite plain. It was that which Prince Eugene 
adopted against Catinat in 1701, and which Napoleon 
himself, indeed, afterwards pointed out in referring to the 
march of Wurmser upon the Brenta. They ought then 
to have left only a detachment at the entrance to the 
Tyrol, and have debouched upon the lower Adige with 
the entire army." 

In choosing a double line of operations Alvinzi 
not only committed the errors which have been 
pointed out, but in the execution of his plan he 
continued to multiply mistakes. In his march 
down the Adige, just before arriving at Rivoli he 
separated his army into six columns. He in- 
tended to have them arrive simultaneously upon 
the plateau of Rivoli, where he expected to find 
the French strongly posted. When it is remem- 
bered that the Adige separated Vukassovich's 
column from Quasdanovich's column, that the 
heights of San Marco separated the latter from 
the Austrian centre, and that Monte Baldo sepa- 



RIVOLL 



113 



rated the centre from Lusignan's column, the 
absurdity of these movements becomes apparent 
to every soldier. 

Under the most favorable circumstances, it is an 
error to separate an army even into two columns 
just before a battle; for so many unforeseen con- 
ditions arise, or may arise, that it is almost impossi- 
ble for the columns to attack simultaneously, and 
only by attacking simultaneously can success be 
expected from such a plan. Muddy roads, high 
water, rough country, mountains, defiles, and vari- 
ous other obstacles may delay one column, and by 
the time it arrives on the battle-field the other 
column will probably have been defeated. If a 
commanding general could always foresee all the 
conditions which would arise, he could so arrang-e 
the marches that his columns would arrive simul- 
taneously upon the battle-field ; but this being an 
impossibility, it has come to be a maxim in war 
that, unless absolutely unavoidable, an army in the 
face of an enemy should never be separated into 
parts by impassable obstacles. This, being true of 
two columns, applies with still greater force to 
more than two. As the number of columns 
separated by impassable obstacles increases, the 
chances for simultaneous attacks decrease in a 
very rapid ratio. 

But this was not Alvinzi's only error. He 



114 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

ordered five thousand soldiers under Vukasso- 
vich to march on the east side of the Adige, 
where they were unable to take part in the bat- 
tle. In fact, they could not by any possibility 
reach the battle-field. They were witnesses to 
Alvinzi's defeat, without being able to raise a help- 
ing hand. They pointed their guns in the direc- 
tion of the battle, and fired a few shots, which had 
no effect whatever upon the result. They might 
better have been in the Tyrol, where they would at 
least have been safe from capture. 

Alvinzi made another error in requiring his 
cavalry and artillery to march with Quasdano- 
vich's column along the river road, where they 
were enclosed by the mountains on one side and 
by the river on the other. In this situation, his 
•cavalry could not be deployed, nor his artillery be 
brought into action. As a result, Alvinzi, who 
needed cavalry badly, was for the want of it com- 
pletely ignorant of the whereabouts of the French 
forces, and the Austrian centre for the want of 
artillery could make no headway against Joubert's 
division. 

Notwithstanding all these errors, had Alvinzi on 
the night of January 13th gained possession of the 
plateau of Rivoli, he would still have had great 
chances of success. He could easily have done 
this ; for his columns were camped within an 



RIVOLI. 1 1 5 

hour's march of the plateau which Joubert had 
already abandoned. Having once gained posses- 
sion of this plateau, Alvinzi would have been past 
the critical point in his march ; he would have 
had room to manoeuvre his army; his columns 
could have united ; his artillery could have been 
distributed to the different organizations, and his 
cavalry moved to the front and flanks, where it 
belonged. In fact, he could, by an hour's march, 
have reached a strong position for battle, where Bo- 
naparte with his inferior numbers would hardly have 
dared to attack him. That Alvinzi did not seize 
upon this position was his greatest error. It was 
the crowning act of that series of errors which 
together caused his defeat at Rivoli, — one of the 
most crushing defeats ever experienced by Aus- 
trian arms. 

It is easy to point out Alvinzi's mistakes after 
this battle ; but owing to the unfavorable situation 
of his army, and to the obstacles in its immediate 
front, it is not so easy to set forth in detail the 
exact manoeuvres which he should have made in 
his advance down the Adige upon Rivoli. At one 
day's march from the plateau of Rivoli, where he 
expected to meet the French in force, his army of 
twenty-eight thousand was confined within a nar- 
row valley; Monte Baldo and a chain of moun- 
tains were in his front, and the only road leading 



Il6 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

directly to Rivoli was through a long and narrow- 
defile. The problem before him was to reach this 
plateau and unite his forces there before the 
French could occupy it ; or in case it was already 
occupied, then so to manoeuvre in his advance as 
to present a united front to the enemy. His cav- 
alry should have been sent forward in advance of 
his army, and should have received orders to seize 
if possible the plateau of Rivoli. The greater part 
of the cavalry should have marched by the trails 
between Monte Baldo and the Adige, while a small 
column might have marched around the western 
slope of Monte Baldo, and a still smaller column 
' — a mere scouting party — should have marched 
by the river road. Following these troops, Alvinzi 
should have sent a small column of infantry down 
the Adige, and should have pushed forward his 
infantry and artillery along the trails and over the 
hills between Monte Baldo and the river. Having 
adopted such a plan, his cavalry could have seized 
the plateau, and the infantry and artillery follow- 
ing could have occupied it ; his front would at all 
times have been protected by cavalry ; his right, 
by Monte Baldo and a column of cavalry ; his left, 
by the Adige and a column of infantry ; and, what 
is still more important, his forces would have been 
united during the advance. 

To this plan it may be objected that the country 



RIVOLI. 1 1 7 

between Monte Baldo and the Adige was so hilly, 
and the trails were so few, that this route was im- 
passable for cavalry and artillery. In a measure 
this is true ; still, by dismounting the cavalry and 
by hauling the guns by hand, the obstacles could 
easily have been overcome. These obstacles, 
which seemed impassable to Alvinzi, would not 
have hindered Bonaparte's advance an hour. To 
a soldier " impassable " is a relative term ; to 
mediocrity it means much; to a genius it means 
little. A hill is impassable to an Alvinzi ; the Alps 
themselves are not impassable to a Napoleon. 

In this discussion it is a pleasure to turn from 
the mistakes of Alvinzi to the brilliant operations 
of Bonaparte. 

" It is an easy matter," says Captain Wagner, 
*' to criticise military operations after the event; 
but it should be borne in mind that the conditions 
and relative positions of the forces, always set forth 
with clearness by a good historian, are matters of 
doubt to the commanders while the operations are 
in progress." 

These words are particularly applicable to the 
case now before us. When the Austrians began 
their advance Bonaparte was completely in the 
dark as to where their main attack would be made. 
He did not know whether the stronger Austrian 
column was advancing from the Tyrol upon Rivoli, 



Il8 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

or from Bassano upon the lower Adige. In fact, 
he was not certain that an Austrian column was 
not advancing on the west side of Lake Garda. It 
was of the utmost importance that he should know 
at the earliest possible moment where the main 
Austrian attack would be made, in order that he 
might concentrate his forces to meet it. Every 
moment of uncertainty increased Alvinzi's chances 
of success. Bonaparte realized this, and was there- 
fore in a very anxious state of mind. Couriers 
were riding rapidly from every part of his scattered 
army to his headquarters. All kinds of informa- 
tion — rumors, facts, the reports of spies and 
deserters, the opinions of his marshals and his 
subordinates — were laid before him. He learned 
that no Austrians had been seen on the west side 
of Lake Garda; that Massena had succeeded in 
repulsing an Austrian attack from Bassano, and 
that Joubert had been driven back upon Rivoli. 
At once he concluded that the main Austrian 
attack would be made at Rivoli. 

When it is remembered that a commander nearly 
always attempts to deceive his adversary, that the 
information received at headquarters is often un- 
reliable, that it is frequently made up of rumor, 
hearsay, and facts, all jumbled together, it is 
remarkable that Bonaparte should have been so 
uniformly correct in his deductions and conclu- 



RIVOLI. 119 

sions. Not only at Rivoli, but at Montenotte, 
Castiglione, and Arcole, his. unerring mind de- 
duced from the mass of uncertain information 
at hand the true movements of his adversary. 

In the choice of the plateau of Rivoli for a 
battle-field, Bonaparte displayed excellent judg- 
ment. Though he was in Verona at the time, he 
had previously passed through Rivoli, and the 
peculiarities of the surrounding country had pho- 
tographed themselves indelibly upon his mind. 
He realized the importance of the position. He 
could see in the surrounding hills, in the defile, in 
the river, and in the plateau, the advantages which 
they offered for tactical manoeuvres. The faculty of 
seeing and remembering the features of a country 
through which he passed, and of understanding 
their value from a military point of view, was one of 
the distinguishing peculiarities of Napoleon's mind. 

At Rivoli, he realized that an hour's delay might 
lose him the battle-field and the victory. For this 
reason, every moment of time was utilized in rap- 
idly concentrating his troops. Again, after the 
battle, he saw the necessity of arriving before 
Mantua at the earliest possible moment, in order 
to prevent Serrurier's division from being crushed 
between Provera and Wurmser. Accordingly, 
Massena s division, which had marched all night 
and fought all day at Rivoli, was required to march 



I20 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN'. 

all the next night and all the next day. The min- 
utes and hours which Bonaparte gained in these 
forced marches, decided the conflict in his favor. 
Time with him was equivalent to re-enforcements. 
In every mihtary undertaking, it was an important 
factor in his calculations. 

In these forced marches, the exertion of his 
soldiers was almost beyond their endurance ; but 
the hope of victory and the presence of Bonaparte 
himself at their head urged them on. Under his 
eye they could endure almost any "hardship and 
march almost any distance. The enthusiasm 
which he could instil into the minds of his men 
was remarkable. He had that magnetic power 
which filled his soldiers with enthusiasm and cour- 
age, and which in an emergency could call forth 
all their reserve energy. In this respect he sur- 
passed every one of his subordinate commanders, 
if not every master of the art of war that the world 
has ever known. 

As we have previously stated, Alvinzi's errors in 
separating his forces at the outset gave to Bona- 
parte the advantage of interior lines, by which he 
could easily keep the Austrian columns separated, 
and at the same time could combine against each 
column in succession. In carrying out this plan 
two of his divisions acted on the defensive, while 
with the remainder of his army he acted offensively 



RIVOLL 121 

and in force against Alvinzi at Rivoli. It was one 
of Bonaparte's maxims to take the offensive only 
on one point at a time. But every exertion was 
made to collect at this point every spare man. To 
bring in the shortest possible time upon the vital 
point — the battle-field — as great a superiority of 
force as he possibly could, was his great endeavor. 
He could not by any possibility bring superior 
numbers upon the battle-field of Rivoli ; but by 
his tactical manoeuvres and combinations he placed 
his adversary at a disadvantage, and overcame his 
great superiority in numbers. 

His tactical manoeuvres at Rivoli were very 
similar to his strategical manoeuvres within the 
theatre of operations. In both cases he brought 
a stronger force against his adversary at the vital 
point, while he held back with small forces the 
enemy's isolated columns. 

The strategy and tactics which Bonaparte dis- 
played in these three days' fighting in Italy give 
us, perhaps, a clearer insight into his system of 
war than any other single campaign in his remark- 
able career. His divisions were centrally situated. 
Strategically, the Austrians almost surrounded him ; 
twenty-eight thousand were marching from the 
Tyrol upon Rivoli, seventeen thousand from Bas- 
sano upon the lower Adige, and twenty thousand 
were in his rear at Mantua. Having decided that 



122 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

the main Austrian army was approaching Rivoli, 
he concentrated there his available forces, took the 
offensive, and, though actually surrounded upon 
the battle-field, succeeded by his superior tactics 
in crushing Alvinzi's army; then, before the smoke 
of battle had died away, he led his weary but 
heroic troops towards Mantua, where he con- 
centrated once more his forces, took again the 
offensive, overwhelmed and captured Provera's 
army, drove Wurmser within the walls of Mantua, 
and forced him to capitulate. 

Such was the end of these remarkable manoeu- 
vres, which for brilliancy and completeness remain 
unsurpassed by any single military operation in 
history. Manoeuvres such as these are the foun- 
dation of Napoleon's military glory. Not isolated 
and occasional were they, but repeated again and 
again in this campaign, till five Austrian armies 
were successively hurled back before his victorious 
eagles. Such deeds call forth the admiration of 
every military student and every soldier. They 
should encourage us to greater exertion, and to 
deeper study of our profession, in order that we 
may gain a better knowledge of those great prin- 
ciples of war which, if correctly applied, would 
to-day be as certain in their strategical results as 
they were at Montenotte, Arcole, and Rivoli a 
hundred years ago. 



CHAPTER VIL 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 



T3EF0RE entering upon a detailed description 
of this part of the campaign, it is necessary 
to point out the important topographical features 
of the theatre of operations. 

In general terms, the theatre of war embraced 
Northern Italy and a large part of Austria. The 
theatre of operations for both armies extended 
north from the Adriatic to the upper Inn, upper 
Salza, and upper Mur, and east from Lake Garda 
to a few miles beyond the eastern slope of the 
Julian Alps. 

Except along the shores of the Adriatic, the 
country which is comprised within this theatre of 
operations is very mountainous. These moun- 
tains belong to the great chain of the Alps. 
Over a wide country they spread out in an irreg- 
ular way into a great number of smaller chains 
and spurs. , Near the water-sheds formed by 
these mountains several rivers rise; some flow 
south into the Adriatic, others north and east into 
the Danube. In the Tyrol these mountains are 



124 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

known as the Tyrolese Alps; farther east, in 
Northern Friuli, as the Carnic Alps; and still 
farther east, as the Julian Alps. Between Italy 
and Austria these three chains form a barrier 
which is impassable for soldiers except through 
the passes where the great highways have been 
constructed. 

Within this territory are the rivers Adige, 
Brenta, Piave, Tagliamento, Isonzo, upper Drave, 
and their tributaries. The Adige and the Brenta 
we have already described. The Piave, Taglia- 
mento, and Isonzo rise in the Carnic Alps, and 
flow south into the Gulf of Venice. Their 
courses, which are about thirty miles apart, are 
nearly parallel with one another. The Drave 
rises in the eastern part of the Tyrol, and flows 
almost due east along the foot of the northern 
slope of the Carnic Alps. 

From Verona on the lower Adige three roads 
lead into Austria. The first, on the left, is the 
great highway of the Tyrol. This road ascends 
the Adige, passes through Trent and Brixen, 
crosses the divide at Brenner Pass, descends 
upon Innspruck, and thence passes into the val- 
ley of the Danube. The second, in the centre, 
passes through Vicenza and Udine, crosses the 
Carnic Alps at Pontebba, descends upon Villach 
in the valley of the Drave, and thence passes 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 25 

through Klagenfurt, Judenberg, and Leoben to- 
wards Vienna. The third, on the right, passes 
through Vicenza, Treviso, Goricia, and Adels- 
berg; thence, turning towards the north, it passes 
through Laybach and Krainberg to Klagenfurt. 
Between the last two roads just described an 
important cross-road passes along the narrow 
valley of the Isonzo from Goricia through Capo- 
retto to Tarwis. Another important cross road 
leaves the highway of the Tyrol at Brixen, passes 
through Brunecken, crosses the divide near In- 
nichen, descends on Lienz in the valley of the 
Drave, and thence passes down the valley to 
Villach. 

Such are the general topographical peculiari- 
ties of the country in which the French and Aus- 
trians were, for the last time in this campaign, 
to struggle for the mastery. 

The fall of Mantua had alarmed Austria. Thus 
far, Bonaparte had shown himself irresistible in 
war. Neither numbers, nor obstacles, nor for- 
tune itself, seemed to stop for a moment his 
progress. He had crossed the Apennines and 
passed over Italy like a cyclone. Might he not 
cross the Alps and advance to the very gates of 
Vienna.^ Would the Alps be insurmountable to 
the veterans of Montenotte, Arcole, and Rivoli? 
These questions Austria was pondering. She 



126 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

realized her danger, and determined to re-enforce 
her soldiers in Italy, and to send her ablest gen- 
eral to command them. 

The Archduke Charles ^ was given command of 
these forces. He established his headquarters at 
Innspruck, and asked that forty thousand soldiers 
be sent to re-enforce the remnants of Alvinzi's 
army in Italy. Bonaparte concluded from this 
that the Archduke intended to assemble his 

1 The Archduke Charles (Louis de Lorraine) of Austria, son of 
the Emperor Leopold IL, was born at Florence, in 1771. Already 
at the age of twenty-two he had acquired a high military reputa- 
tion under the Prince of Coburg, in the campaign of 1793. In 
1796 he was made Field-Marshal of the German Empire, and took 
command of the Austrian army on the Rhine. When he was sent 
against Napoleon, in 1797, the latter remarked to Maesfield : 
" Your cabinet has sent against me three armies without generals ; 
now it sends a general without an army. " After the campaign of 
1799, the Archduke was, by intrigue, removed from the army, and 
sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile. After the disas- 
ters of Hohenlinden and Marengo, he was recalled to favor and 
placed at the head of the War Department. In 1805 he opposed 
Massena in Italy, but was absent from Germany at the overthrow 
of the Austrian monarchy on the field of Austerlitz. In the 
campaign of 1809, he commanded the Austrian army and was 
wounded at the battle of Wagram. He was afterward made 
Governor and Captain General of Bohemia, and retired to the 
country. He was the ablest of all the generals that opposed 
Napoleon. His many virtues and noble character endeared him 
even to his enemies. Napoleon always spoke of him in terms of 
high admiration. He ranks high as a military writer. His " Prin- 
ciples of Strategy," illustrated by the campaigns of 1796 and 1799, 
were published in Vienna in 1813 and 18 19, in seven volumes, with 
valuable maps and plans. — Biographie UniverseUe. 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 12/ 

forces in the Ty;;ol, and from that point make 
his principal attack against the French. But the 
Austrian government, failing to see the advan- 
tages of this plan, ordered the Archduke to con- 
centrate the greater part of his forces in Friuli, 
in order to protect the seaport of Trieste and 
preserve that section of country from invasion. 

On February nth, 1797, there were under arms 
in the Tyrol ten thousand Austrian soldiers and 
ten thousand Tyrolese militia, and on the Piave 
twenty-two thousand Austrian soldiers. On the 
same date the Archduke Charles arrived on the 
Piave. The following re-enforcements were to 
have joined him : twenty-four thousand five hun- 
dred soldiers from the Austrian Army of the 
Rhine, thirteen thousand from the various Aus- 
trian provinces, eight thousand exchanged Mantua 
prisoners, and thirteen thousand five hundred 
recruits. These re-enforcements, added to the 
forces already in the Tyrol and on the Piave, 
would, if we include the ten thousand Tyrolese 
militia, have increased his army to more than 
one hundred thousand soldiers. 

A few words here in regard to the Archduke 
Charles will not be out of place. During the 
time that Bonaparte was contending against 
Wurmser and Alvinzi in the brilliant engage- 
ments already described, the French and Aus- 



128 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

trians were fighting each other in the vicinity of 
the upper Danube and the upper Rhine. The 
French Army of the Rhine, commanded by 
Moreau, and the French Army of the Sambre 
and Meuse, commanded by Jourdan, were op- 
posed to the Austrian Army of the Rhine, which 
was commanded by the Archduke Charles. In 
this campaign the Archduke Charles had been 
successful. He had defeated both French armies 
and had driven them across the Rhine. He had 
already shown himself to be a great soldier. He 
was a young man, — younger even than Bona- 
parte, — and his views upon war were largely the 
outgrowth of his own successes. He was not 
wedded to the past. He saw the errors to which 
in Italy the Austrian commanders had so firmly 
clung, and he perceived the reasons for many of 
Bonaparte's brilliant triumphs. In short, he was 
an able soldier, well worthy to try the fortune of 
war against Bonaparte as an adversary. 

Before the capitulation of Wurmser at Mantua, 
Bonaparte had conceived a plan for future opera- 
tions against the Austrians. From the Mincio 
as a base of operations, he purposed to march 
against the Austrians, to defeat them, cross the 
Alps, and invade Austria. For the accomplish- 
ment of this undertaking, he calculated that he 
would need a re-enforcement of thirty thousand 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 29 

soldiers. With this re-enforcement and the co- 
operation of the armies of the Rhine and the 
Sambre and Meuse, he believed that he could 
carry the war into the very heart of the Austrian 
dominions. Accordingly, he wrote to the Di- 
rectory, explained his plan, and asked for a re- 
enforcement of thirty thousand soldiers. The 
Directory ordered Delmas's division from the 
Army of the Rhine, and Bernadotte's division 
from the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, to 
cross the Swiss Alps and join Bonaparte. These 
two divisions, which numbered a little more than 
twenty thousand, increased the Army of Italy to 
seventy thousand soldiers. 

Before the commencement of active operations, 
two facts caused Bonaparte to weigh carefully his 
chances of success. First: His army was too 
small for a successful invasion of Austria. The 
re-enforcements which he received were nearly 
ten thousand less than the number for which he 
had asked. Second : The political state of affairs 
in Italy was unfavorable to the undertaking. 
The revolutionary governments which he had 
favored, the opinions which he had disseminated, 
and the contributions which he had levied in 
Italy, had caused much discontent in several of 
the Italian states. Thus far during the cam- 
paign, the discontented states had been com- 

9 



130 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

pelled to submit to his will; but it was plain 
that, upon the least reverse to his army, they 
would not only be willing, but anxious, to take up 
arms against him. The governments of Turin, 
Genoa, Naples, Tuscany, Rome, and Venice were 
all more or less dissatisfied; and the last two, in 
particular, felt very bitter towards Bonaparte. 

In fact, the Papal soldiers had risen against 
the French, and had planned to attack the rear of 
the French army. These facts being disclosed 
to Bonaparte, he at the head of several thousand 
troops set out, immediately after the fall of 
Mantua, to march upon Rome in order to chas- 
tise the Pope. In the face of the French soldiers 
the Pope was compelled to yield, but his hatred 
of Bonaparte and of his opinions remained no 
less bitter than before. 

But the Republic of Venice gave Bonaparte 
the greatest uneasiness. He was unable to con- 
clude a treaty of alliance with her. She hated 
the French. She had sufficient population to 
maintain a large army, and was already organiz- 
ing and arming her soldiers. Moreover, Bona- 
parte's line of communication with France, his 
only line of retreat, passed directly through her 
territory. Surely, if he should be defeated be- 
yond the Alps, Venice would declare war against 
him. Nothing could then save him. These 



THE TAGLTAMENTO. 131 

facts did not dishearten him, but they caused 
him to exercise great caution in carrying out his 
undertaking. 

Early in March, while the Alps were still 
covered with snow, Bonaparte began his advance. 
The disposition of the Austrian forces at this 
time was as follows: in the Tyrol behind the 
rivers Noss and Lavis there were ten thousand 
Tyrolese militia, and seventeen thousand Aus- 
trian soldiers commanded by Generals Kerpen 
and Laudon ; at Feltre, three thousand com- 
manded by General Lusignan; and on the Piave, 
twenty-two thousand commanded by the Arch- 
duke Charles. It will be seen that the Archduke 
had altogether in position forty-two thousand Aus- 
trian soldiers and ten thousand Tyrolese militia. 
Inasmuch as the latter, however, were organized 
for the defence of their firesides, and fought only 
on their mountains, they should not be considered 
as forming a permanent part of the Austrian 
army. 

In her instructions to the Archduke Charles, 
Austria had insisted that he should take posi- 
tion on the Piave with the main portion of his 
army, so as to cover the seaport of Trieste. This 
position was faulty, and was difficult to defend. 
Owing to these instructions, he had not been 
able to form a plan of campaign in accordance 



132 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

with his own views, but was compelled to carry 
out, as best he could, the erroneous views of 
his government. Moreover, Austria was slow in 
sending forward the promised re-enforcements. 
Only a few thousand had arrived in the Tyrol ; 
most of the remainder were on their way to join 
the Archduke; but as they were still north of the 
Alps, and had to march by way of Klagenfurt, 
Villach, and Pontebba, it would still take some 
time for them to arrive. 

Upon these facts the Archduke Charles based 
his plans. He purposed to act on the defensive. 
His object was to delay matters as long as pos- 
sible, so as to give time for his re-enforcements 
to arrive. 

On the other hand, Bonaparte, not being able 
to form an alliance with Venice, determined to 
leave Generals Victor and Kilmaine in Italy with 
eighteen thousand soldiers in order to protect his 
rear, and with the remaining fifty-two thousand 
to take the offensive against the Austrians before 
their re-enforcements should arrive. He had 
the choice of two lines of operations. He could 
advance either to the north through the Tyrol, 
or to the east through Friuli. But as both of 
these lines were occupied by the Austrians, he 
could not confine himself to either one without 
exposing his rear to an attack from the enemy 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 133 

occupying the other. He therefore decided that 
he would send a strong force into the Tyrol to 
hold the enemy there in check, while with the 
main portion of his army he would advance by 
way of Friuli to attack the Austrians on the 
Piave. His plan was to attack the right of the 
Archduke, throw his army back towards Laybach 
or drive it into the sea; then, to march rapidly 
towards the north, cross the Carnic Alps at 
Pontebba or Tarwis into the valley of the Drave, 
unite his divisions there, and march on Vienna. 

Accordingly, he sent the divisions of Delmas 
and Paraguay d'Hilliers to join Joubert's divis- 
ion in the Tyrol, and on the lOth of March took 
the field in person with the divisions of Massena, 
Serrurier, Guyeux, and Bernadotte. The three 
divisions in the Tyrol numbered eighteen thou- 
sand, and the four under Bonaparte's imme- 
diate command thirty-four thousand. Bonaparte 
gave the command in the Tyrol to General Jou- 
bert, and ordered him to hold the Austrians in 
check at all hazards; and, if possible, to drive 
them beyond the mountains which separate 
Brixen from Innspruck. He directed Massena' s 
division, ten thousand strong, to march on Feltre 
in order to drive back Lusignan; and with the 
remaining three divisions he advanced towards 
the Piave. 



134 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Upon the arrival of Massena at Feltre, Lu- 
signan fell back on Longaro, where, on March 
13th, Massena attacked and defeated him. In 
this engagement nearly one thousand Austrians, 
among whom was General Lusignan, were cap- 
tured. Having thrown back the remainder of 
the Austrian division upon Cadora, Massena 
then marched towards Spilimbergo, near which 
place he crossed the Tagliamento on the i6th. 
After crossing the river he marched by way of 
Gemona upon Pontebba, so as to threaten the 
Archduke's right wing and cut off his retreat in 
this direction. 

On the 13th of March, the same day that Mas- 
sena defeated Lusignan, Bonaparte crossed the 
Piave with his three divisions. The Archduke 
retreated towards the Tagliamento, and Bo- 
naparte followed him by way of Valvasone, 
where he arrived on the morning of the i6th 
of March. Opposite this town on the left bank 
of the Tagliamento, the Austrians were drawn up 
for battle. The river at this point is fordable. 
Leaving Serrurier's division in reserve at Val- 
vasone, Bonaparte ordered the divisions of Ber- 
nadotte and Guyeux to ford the river and attack 
the enemy. These two divisions tried to surpass 
each other in acts of bravery. They forded the 
river under fire, attacked the Austrians furi- 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 35 

ously, defeated and routed them, and took five 
hundred prisoners. This battle, in which Bona- 
parte and the Archduke Charles met for the first 
time, is known as the Tagliamento. 

Meanwhile the remnants of Lusignan's division, 
which at this time was commanded by General 
Ocskay, had succeeded in forcing their way across 
the mountains to Pontebba; but Massena, arriv- 
ing soon afterwards in the gorges of the Alps 
near that place, attacked and routed them, and 
drove them back upon Tarwis. 

After the battle of the Tagliamento, the Arch- 
duke divided his forces. Falling back upon 
Gradisca . with the bulk of his command, he 
directed Bayalitsch with his division, twenty-five 
cannon, and a convoy containing a large part of 
the material for the Austrian army, to march by 
Cividale and Caporetto upon Tarwis, hoping that 
he might anticipate Massena, and, by uniting with 
Ocskay, be strong enough to hold the passes at 
Pontebba and Tarwis. The possession of these 
passes was very important to the Archduke 
Charles ; for the re-enforcements on their way 
to join him had either to cross the Alps at these 
points, or to take the circuitous route by way of 
Krainberg, Laybach, and Adelsberg. 

Upon the crossings of the Isonzo the Arch- 
duke attempted to make a stand. The town of 



136 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Gradisca, which was intrenched, covered his left. 
Against this place Bonaparte directed his prin- 
cipal attack. He ordered Bernadotte to assault 
the intrenchments, and ordered Serrurier to cross 
the Isonzo below the town in order to cut off 
the retreat of the garrison. The movement was 
successful. The garrison of three thousand sur- 
rendered, and the Archduke retreated across the 
river. 

Bonaparte then manoeuvred against the left 
wing of the Archduke, so as to push him into 
the valley of the Isonzo. The Archduke, seeing 
the danger of falling back into the valley, re- 
treated towards Laybach by way of Adelsberg. 
Bonaparte sent Bernadotte in pursuit. He then 
directed Guyeux to march by way of Cividale and 
Caporetto in order to overtake Bayalitsch, and 
set out himself, at the head of Serrurier's divis- 
ion, to ascend the Isonzo. 

Meanwhile Massena had advanced from Pon- 
tebba towards Tarwis, and after a brief action had 
gained possession of the pass there. The posses- 
sion of this pass closed the only outlet by which 
Bayalitsch' s division, ascending the narrow valley 
of the Isonzo, could reach Villach. 

The Archduke was in a critical condition; his 
forces were greatly scattered. The greater part 
of his own immediate command, pursued by Ber- 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 37 

nadotte, was retreating upon Laybach ; Ocskay 
was in front of Massena; and Bayalitsch was 
enclosed in the narrow valley of the Isonzo, 
where, with Massena in his front and Bonaparte 
with the divisions of Guyeux and Serrurier in his 
rear, he could hardly hope to escape capture. 

The Archduke had not yet learned that Massena 
held the pass of Tarwis, but he anticipated 
that such might be the case; for he knew that 
Ocskay was not sufficiently strong to hold it 
unless his numbers had already been increased 
by the re-enforcements that should, by this time, 
have reached that vicinity. He realized, too, 
that as the large convoy accompanying Bayalitsch 
would cause him to march slowly, Massena would 
have plenty of time to attack and drive back 
Ocskay before the arrival of Bayalitsch. On the 
possession of this pass now depended the safety 
of a division of the Archduke's army, and that of 
a large part of his cannon and material of war. 
He therefore determined to make every effort to 
hold the pass ; or to recapture it, if it was already 
in Massena's possession. Accordingly, giving 
orders for his troops to follow him as rapidly as 
possible, he hurried forward by way of Laybach 
and Krainberg to Villach, where his re-enforce- 
ments were just beginning to arrive. 

Upon his arrival at Villach he hastily collected 



138 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

five or six thousand fresh troops that had just 
arrived there, united them with Ocskay's division, 
and attacked Massena at Tarwis. In this engage- 
ment the Archduke was successful; he drove 
back Massena and gained possession of the pass. 
But the latter, realizing the importance of this 
point, collected his entire division and returned 
to attack the Archduke. The battle was furi- 
ously fought on both sides. It took place on 
Mount Tarwis, above the clouds and amidst the 
snow and ice of the Alps. Both sides realized 
that great results depended upon the success or 
failure of the battle. Both commanders showed 
great personal courage, but the Archduke was 
compelled to yield to his stubborn adversary. 

Massena held the pass. Bayalitsch, attacked 
in front by Massena and in rear by Guyeux and 
Serrurier, was forced to surrender. His division 
was doomed ; about four thousand Austrians were 
captured, together with twenty-five cannon and 
an immense amount of baggage and material of 
war. 

Bonaparte had reached the summit of the Alps. 
The first great step in his undertaking was ac- 
complished. He was on the point of entering 
Austria. At the start the four divisions under 
his immediate command had numbered thirty- 
four thousand. By casualties they had been con- 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 39 

siderably reduced, so that for this momentous 
undertaking he had only about thirty thousand 
soldiers. Such an army was too small. The 
Austrian re-enforcements were rapidly arriving; 
in fact, several thousand had already arrived. In 
a few days he might find himself outnumbered, 
even overwhelmed, at the very threshold of the 
Austrian dominions. Bonaparte had foreseen all 
this before he crossed the Alps. In fact, from 
the very start, he had calculated that, in case 
he succeeded in defeating the Archduke, and 
Joubert succeeded in driving the Austrians from 
the Tyrol, he would order Joubert to join him in 
the valley of the Drave. 

Accordingly, after the battle of the Taglia- 
mento, when Bonaparte began to see his way 
clear for the accomplishment of his plans, he sent 
Joubert orders to march, by way of Brunecken, 
Lienz, and the valley of the Drave, upon Villach, 
at which place Bonaparte expected to unite Jou- 
bert's divisions with the divisions of Massena, 
Guyeux, Serrurier, and Bernadotte. 

As the execution of this plan depended as much 
upon the success of Joubert as upon the success 
of Bonaparte, we will, for the present, leave the 
latter in the midst of his victorious troops, while 
we describe the operations of his lieutenant in 
the Tyrol. 



140 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Joubert ascended the Adige with his three 
divisions, and, upon crossing the Lavis, found 
that the Austrians were occupying both sides of 
the Adige. He pushed forward, attacked them 
on March 20th at St. Michael, and defeated them. 
In this battle he killed and captured more than 
three thousand five hundred of the enemy. The 
Austrians, followed by Joubert, retreated up the 
Adige. On March 22d he attacked them again 
at Neumark, captured one thousand more pris- 
oners, and forced Generals Laudon and Kerpen 
to separate their commands. The former fell 
back to the left on Meran; the latter, to the 
right towards Brixen. Joubert followed Kerpen, 
who, being re-enforced by a division from the 
Rhine, made a stand at Klausen, where Joubert 
defeated him and forced him still farther back 
towards Sterzing. At Mittenwald Kerpen was 
re-enforced by a second division from the Rhine. 
Again he made a stand ; again Joubert defeated 
him, and drove him across the divide towards 
Innspruck. 

Joubert, having disposed of Kerpen, faced 
about his columns and marched to Brixen. At 
this place he learned that Bonaparte had reached 
the valley of the Drave. Joubert could now fall 
back and crush Laudon ; but as this would take 
several days, and as it was already the beginning 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. I4I 

of April, he thought it time to carry out Bona- 
parte's instructions. He therefore set out to 
join Bonaparte by way of Brunecken, Lienz, and 
Villach. 

The Tyrol being now evacuated by the French, 
Kerpen set out to join the Archduke by way of 
Innspruck, Rattenberg, the valley of the Salza, 
and Murau; and Laudon, being joined by the 
Tyrolese militia, descended the Adige, over- 
threw the few French detachments in his front, 
and advanced towards Verona in order to join 
his forces to the Venetian insurgents. 

Bonaparte had grave cause for anxiety. After 
crossing the Alps he learned that the Venetians 
had risen in arms against the French, and that 
the two French armies along the Rhine had made 
no advance into Austrian territory. This news 
was discouraging. With his communications 
threatened, Bonaparte could hardly hope to reach 
Vienna unless supported by the armies along the 
Rhine. Nevertheless, he determined to put on a 
bold front. If he could not enter the Austrian 
capital at the head of his victorious soldiers, he 
might, perhaps, succeed in making a treaty of 
peace which would redound to his own and to 
their glory. With this end in view, on March 
31st he wrote a letter to the Archduke Charles, 
in which he deplored the calamities of war and 



142 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

suggested a treaty of peace. The Archduke 
replied that he had no authority to make treaties. 
He did not, however, let the matter drop there, 
but forwarded Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor 
at Vienna. 

From the summit of the Alps Bonaparte 
descended into the valley of the Drave. On 
March 31st he was at Klagenfurt, at which 
place he wrote the letter to the Archduke 
Charles. At this time Joubert was about to 
leave the Tyrol in order to unite his forces with 
those of Bonaparte; and Bernadotte, who had 
marched by way of Laybach in pursuit of the 
Archduke's forces, was approaching Klagenfurt 
by way of Krainberg. 

On the road to Vienna, a few miles north of 
Klagenfurt, the Archduke had assembled his 
army. That part of it which had marched by 
way of Laybach and Krainberg had succeeded in 
passing Klagenfurt before the arrival of Bona- 
parte; so that the Archduke had the greater part 
of his forces well in hand, prepared to dispute the 
advance of Bonaparte into Austria. 

On March 31st Bonaparte set his columns in 
motion. On the morning of April ist he attacked 
the advance-guard of the enemy at St. Veit and 
overthrew it. On the same day he encountered 
the enemy in force at Neumark. Here the Arch- 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 43 

duke had assembled all the remnants of his army, 
together with four divisions just arrived from 
the Rhine. Both sides fought furiously. The 
Austrians were stubborn, the French impetuous. 
Finally, after losing about one thousand in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners the Archduke was com- 
pelled to retreat. At Unzmark he again made a 
stand, but, after losing about one thousand more 
of his command, was again overthrown. He fell 
back on the road to Vienna. Bonaparte followed 
him, and on April 7th entered Leoben. 

Meanwhile, at Vienna the Imperial Court was 
in consternation. The Emperor himself was 
alarmed. In less than a month Bonaparte had 
driven the Austrians from Friuli and the Tyrol ; 
had crossed the Alps and invaded Austria; and 
now, at the head of his victorious army, was 
rapidly approaching the Austrian capital. The 
onward rush of these impetuous soldiers was 
enough to strike terror to the strongest mind 
and stoutest heart. 

The Emperor, realizing the danger, believed the 
time had come when he should treat for peace. 
He had already received Bonaparte's letter, which 
encouraged him to believe that proposals for 
peace would be favorably received. With this 
end in view he sent two Austrian officers to Bona- 
parte's head-quarters at Leoben to ask for a sus- 



144 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 

pension of arms for ten days. Bonaparte granted 
an armistice of five days, at the end of which time 
Generals Bellegrade and Meerfeld arrived with 
instructions to sign preliminaries for a definitive 
peace. On April i8th these preliminaries were 
signed; the campaign was ended. 

During these events Victor and Kilmaine, who 
were fighting in Italy the Venetian insurgents 
and Laudon's forces from the Tyrol, had suc- 
ceeded in preserving Bonaparte's communica- 
tions. After the armistice of Leoben, Laudon 
retired into the Tyrol, and the Venetian insur- 
gents were speedily overthrown. Thus ended 
Bonaparte's first campaign. In less than a 
month, more than twenty thousand Austrians 
had been killed, wounded, or captured. The 
sixth Austrian anny, commanded by the ablest sol- 
dier Austria has ever produced^ had been beaten in 
every battle. 

COMMENTS. 

From a strategical point of view the operations 
which we have just described are well worthy the 
study of every military man. The abilities of the 
opposing commanders, the peculiar topographical 
features of the country in which the operations 
were conducted, and the situations of the opposing 



^ 



? T H 






n T ^ L Y 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 145 

armies with respect to each other, give to this part 
of the campaign an unusual interest. 

At the outset the two principal parts of the 
Austrian forces were widely separated. The sev- 
enteen thousand in the Tyrol were more than fifty 
miles distant from the twenty-two thousand on the 
lower Piave, and between the two, at Feltre, was a 
small Austrian division of three thousand. Along- 
the lower Adige, in the vicinity of Verona and 
Legnago, Bonaparte had fifty-two thousand to 
oppose these forces. 

The line of communication with Austria for the 
force in the Tyrol extended towards the north in 
the direction of Innspruck; that for the force on 
the Piave extended towards the northeast across 
the Alps in the direction of Vienna. These two 
lines of communication were therefore divergent. 

Several rivers and mountain chains separated the 
Austrians in the Tyrol from those on the Piave. 
The only communication between them was by 
the road along the Piave to Feltre, thence by 
Primolano and the upper Brenta to Trent on the 
Adige. But as this road was in front of the Aus- 
trian line, it could not be used by the Austrians 
after Bonaparte began his advance. At the very 
commencement of active operations, therefore, the 
two principal Austrian forces became hopelessly 
separated. Moreover, as they were forced back 

10 



146 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

towards Austria along divergent lines of communi- 
cation, they became farther and farther separated. 
In fact, each was a separate army, having its own 
line of operations and its own line of retreat. 
From the nature of the country which separated 
the army in the Tyrol from that on the Piave, and 
from the plan of campaign which Austria adopted, 
it is evident that she' intended that these two 
armies should act independent^. 

Why did Austria separate her forces into two 
armies? Why did she station one in the Tyrol 
and the other on the Piave? What are the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of such an arrangement? 
A discussion of the situation should enlighten us 
on these points. 

To prevent Bonaparte from Invading her terri- 
tory was the problem before Austria. Neither of 
the two Austrian armies w^as strong enough to 
take the offensive. Until their numbers should be 
greatly increased, Austria could not expect to 
drive Bonaparte from Italy. She might stop his 
further progress ; but she could not expect to do 
more than this, for aided by superior numbers and 
the possession of Mantua she had not been able 
even to hold Italy. 

By two routes only could Bonaparte invade 
Austria. One was by the great highway of the 
Tyrol to the valley of the upper Danube; the 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 47 

other was by several roads across the Alps to 
Klagenfurt, thence by the single road to Vienna. 
By stationing one army in the Tyrol and another 
on the Piave, so as to cover these two routes, 
Austria expected to prevent the advance of Bona- 
parte. There was also an additional reason for 
this arrangement. The army on the Piave covered 
the roads which lead directly to Trieste. This 
place was the only important Austrian seaport. 
It was a large and flourishing city, surrounded by 
a fertile country. As a considerable part of the 
supplies for the Austrian forces came from this 
city, it was important that it should be protected. 
Furthermore, an army on the Piave, if defeated, 
could fall back first on the Tagliamento and then 
on the Isonzo, and there find good defensive 
positions. - 

Did these reasons justify Austria in such an 
arrangement of her forces? Were the two armies 
advantageously situated for preventing the invasion 
of her territory? This arrangement was certainly 
faulty ; in adopting it, Austria committed many 
errors. 

First: Had the two Austrian armies been united, 
they would have constituted a strong force ; sepa- 
rated, they were both weak. 

Second : With an Austrian army in the Tyrol 
and another on the Piave, Bonaparte could with a 



148 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN 

small force hold one in check, while he brought 
an overwhelming force against the other. 

Third : As soon as active operations began, 
Bonaparte could re-enforce Joubert in the Tyrol, or 
Joubert could re-enforce Bonaparte on the Taglia- 
mento, by the road through Feltre and Trent, 
while neither of the Austrian armies could re- 
enforce the other by the strength of a single man. 

Fourth: As a division of only three thousand 
soldiers covered the direct road into Austria by 
way of Pontebba pass, Bonaparte could, by de- 
feating this division, easily gain possession of this 
important point. 

Fifth : It was impossible for the Austrian re- 
enforcements, coming from the upper Danube, to 
join the army on the Piave without making a cir- 
cuitous march by way of Klagenfurt. Had the 
two armies been united in the Tyrol, these re- 
enforcements could have arrived there two weeks 
earlier. 

Sixth : Instead of allowing the Archduke Charles 
to form his own plan of campaign, the Austrian 
government insisted that he should carry out plans 
which were faulty, and which he did not approve. 
He was hampered by the instructions of his gov- 
ernment, and committed from the start to a system 
of errors sufficient to discourage the ablest soldier. 
He was well worthy the confidence of his govern- 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 149 

ment, had already proved this, and should have 
been allowed to conduct the entire campaign in 
his own way. 

Seventh : To prevent Bonaparte from invading 
Austria by way of Klagenfurt it was not necessary 
to station an army directly on this route. The 
Austrian forces united into one army in the 
vicinity of Trent would have answered the same 
purpose ; for in that case Bonaparte could not 
advance eastward beyond the Adige without ex- 
posing his flank and rear. Bonaparte would never 
have attempted to invade Austria by way of Kla- 
genfurt while the entire Austrian army at Trent 
remained undefeated. Such a manoeuvre would 
have carried him from, instead of towards, his 
enemy; would have lengthened and weakened his 
line of communications; and would have exposed 
his flank and rear to the enemy's attack. Such a 
manoeuvre would have been the height of folly, 
and would in all probability have resulted in the 
capture or annihilation of the Army of Italy. 

The efl'ect produced by stationing an army on 
the Piave was, then, exactly contrary to what the 
Austrian government expected. An army there 
did not prevent invasion, but encouraged it. 

For similar reasons it was not necessary, in order 
to protect Trieste, for the army on the Piave to 
cover the roads which lead to that city. In fact, 



150 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

an army of forty-two thousand in the Tyrol would 
have protected Trieste more effectually than the 
same army could have done had it covered the 
roads which lead directly to that place. Perhaps 
this paradoxical statement needs proof. It will be 
conceded, for the reasons given above, that Bona- 
parte would not have advanced upon Trieste while 
an Austrian army of forty-two thousand remained 
undefeated in the Tyrol. In either case, then, 
whether the Austrian army were on his flank in 
the Tyrol, or directly in his front covering Trieste, 
it would be necessary to defeat it before advancing. 
But the Tyrol was favorable for defence. For this 
purpose, the rivers, mountains, and defiles gave to 
it great strength. Moreover, an army there would 
directly cover its communications with Austria. If 
defeated, it could fall back to another good posi- 
tion, fight again, and still present a formidable 
front. The reverse of this was true for an army 
covering Trieste. The country was more open 
and the rivers were fordable. Moreover, as in 
this position the communications would extend to 
the right and rear of the Austrian army, Bonaparte 
could, by defeating the right wing, cut off and 
seize these communications. 

In this connection it is worthy of notice that 
when a government sends forth an army to pro- 
tect a capital, a portion of country, a large city, 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 151 

or an important seaport, it is not always neces- 
sary that the army should cover the roads which 
lead directly to the place; in fact, it is often ad- 
vantageous to take up a flanking position where 
the communications of the army are protected, and 
where it can attack the flank of the enemy if he 
advances. But these questions should be decided 
by the commander of the army, and not by the 
government. The best results will invariably be 
obtained by leaving the diagnosis of disease to 
doctors, politics to politicians, and military mat- 
ters to military men. 

We have pointed out with considerable detail 
the errors due to the arrangement of the Aus- 
trian forces. Was there no advantage arising 
from such an arrangement? As the situation of 
the two Austrian armies compelled Bonaparte to 
divide his forces, it might seem that this was an 
advantage to the Austrian side ; for in dividing 
his army he must necessarily have weakened his 
side. This is true ; nevertheless, after the division 
of his forces, he still had the advantage of interior 
lines; so that the disadvantage to him arising 
from a division of his forces was not so great 
as the disadvantage to the Austrians arising from 
the same cause. 

It is evident from what has already been said that 
the two Austrian armies should have been united 



152 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

in the Tyrol. The plan of campaign should have 
been to act on the defensive till the Austrian re- 
enforcements arrived ; then to take the offensive 
against Bonaparte, either down the Brenta towards 
Arcole, or along the west side of Lake Garda 
towards Brescia. Had this plan been adopted, 
the Austrian re-enforcements could have joined the 
Archduke two weeks earlier than they did; and 
while awaiting their arrival, the ten thousand 
Tyrolese militia would have materially strength- 
ened the Austrian army. By the middle of March 
the Archduke could have been ready to take the 
offensive with an army of more than eighty thou- 
sand soldiers. To oppose such an army Bonaparte 
had but seventy thousand. The advantages would 
have been with the Archduke ; and though he 
would probably have been defeated and driven 
back into the Tyrol, yet even then he might 
have saved Austria from invasion. 

Starting from the vicinity of Verona and Leg- 
nago on the Adige, Bonaparte had the choice of 
two lines of operations. As previously stated, he 
could operate towards the north against the Aus° 
trians in the Tyrol, or towards the east against the 
Archduke Charles in Friuli; but if he confined 
himself entirely to either line, the Austrian army 
occupying the other could fall upon his rear. He 
was, therefore, compelled to divide his forces. He 



THE TAGLIAMENTO, 153 

decided to send a strong force into the Tyrol 
to hold the Austrians there in check, while he 
marched in person with the main part of his 
army against the Archduke. Three reasons led 
him to choose the route through Friuli as his 
principal line of operations. First: The shores of 
the Adriatic were better suited for offensive opera- 
tions ; a large army there could be easily manoeu- 
vred. On the other hand, the Tyrol was better 
suited for defensive operations ; a containing force 
there could operate to advantage. Second : As the 
line of communications of the Archduke's army 
was to the right and rear of his right wing, Bona- 
parte could, by defeating it, seize the Archduke's 
line of retreat, and by so doing might be able 
either to capture his army or drive it into the sea. 
Third: This route led directly towards the Austrian 
capital. To an invading army the possession of 
the capital of a country is always of the utmost 
importance; as a rule, when it is taken the war 
ends. " A capital city," says Dufour, " is a stra- 
tegic point of great importance, because it regu- 
lates or greatly influences the public opinion of the 
nation, contains abundant resources of every kind, 
the loss of which may greatly paralyze the enemy; 
and to the minds of a large portion of the people 
all hope of successful defence is lost when an 
invading army has reached the heart of the state." 



154 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Having noticed the reasons why Bonaparte chose 
this route for his main line of operations, we will 
now point out some of the distinguishing features 
of this part of the campaign. For the first time 
since taking command of the Army of Italy Bona- 
parte was stronger numerically than his adversary. 
Omitting for the present the eighteen thousand 
French soldiers left in Italy to protect the French 
rear, and also the re-enforcements on their way to 
join the Austrian armies, there remained at the 
beginning of active operations fifty-two thousand 
French soldiers with whom to oppose forty-two 
thousand Austrians and the Tyrolese militia. 
Though the militia numbered ten thousand, only 
a part joined the Austrians at the beginning of 
active operations. Moreover, the value of the 
militia as a fighting force, for reasons already 
given, was considerably less than that of the same 
number of Austrian soldiers. At the outset, Bona- 
parte had, therefore, a numerical superiority of 
several thousand. To this superiority in numbers 
is due the absence of those brilliant combinations 
and manoeuvres which were such distinguishing 
features in the operations previously described. 
It will be noticed, however, that, had Bonaparte 
been hard pressed at this time, his forces were 
favorably situated for concentrating overwhelming 
numbers against either Austrian army. On March 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 55 

13th, the day Massena attacked Lusignan, the 
opposing forces were situated as follows : Bona- 
parte on the Piave had twenty-four thousand 
soldiers, and the Archduke Charles in his front 
had twenty-two thousand; Massena at Longaro 
had ten thousand to oppose Lusignan's division 
of three thousand ; and Joubert in the Tyrol had 
eighteen thousand to oppose seventeen thousand 
Austrians and ten thousand militia. In this situa- 
tion Bonaparte's army consisted of two strong 
wings and a centre. Had Joubert been hard 
pressed, Massena could have joined him. This 
junction would have given Joubert twenty-eight 
thousand soldiers with whom to oppose seventeen 
thousand Austrians and ten thousand militia. Had 
Bonaparte been hard pressed, he could have called 
Massena to him ; and would then have had thirty- 
four thousand soldiers with whom to oppose twenty- 
two thousand Austrians. In fact, though not at 
all hard pressed, he exercised the caution of hav- 
ing Massena near him at the battle of the Taglia- 
mento. It will be noticed that, on the very day of 
this battle, Massena crossed the Tagliamento near 
Spilimbergo only a short distance from the battle- 
field. Though his objective at that time was the 
pass at Pontebba, yet he so regulated his marches 
that, had it been necessary, he could have' joined 
Bonaparte before the battle. In the detailed orders 



156 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

sent on the afternoon of March 13th by Bonaparte 
to Massena are the following paragraphs bearing 
upon this point: — 

" The enemy is retiring, and appears to have decided 
to take position behind the Tagliamento. The general- 
in-chief hopes to deliver a blow which shall decide the 
fate of the camj)aign, and cover the Army of Italy 
with new laurels. He is certain that Prince Charles 
commands. . . . 

" The general- in-chief orders General Massena to set 
out to-morrow for Belluno, and move towards the Tagha- 
mento ; he desires him to be at Aviano to-morrow even- 
ing, where he will receive new orders. . . . 

"Although the general-in-chief presumes that the 
forces which he has at this moment are sufficient to 
insure victory, he may think it well to delay his attacks 
for a day in order that the brave Masse'na division may 
participate.'' 

When Bonaparte began his advance against 
the Archduke, the latter fell back towards Trieste. 
Undoubtedly, the orders of his government caused 
him to retreat in this direction. Had he taken 
a position directly covering the roads to Klagen- 
furt by way of Pontebba and Tarwis, he would 
have been better able to prevent the invasion of 
Austria. His right flank could not then have 
been so easily turned ; and though he must have 
been defeated, he could have fallen back across 
the Alps, and could have held the passes at Pen- 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 157 

tebba and Tarwis with strong detachments long 
enough to receive the greater part of the Austrian 
re-enforcements. Had the Archduke united in 
this way all his available forces near Villach, and 
held at the same time the passes, Bonaparte would 
have found great difficulty in forcing his way 
across the Alps ; and even had he succeeded in 
doing this, the Archduke was still in a position to 
defeat the heads of the French columns as they 
debouched from the passes into the valley of the 
Drave. 

It is evident, too, that, if this plan had been 
adopted, Bonaparte would not have attempted to 
invade Austria by way of Laybach and Krain- 
berg; for the moment he passed the Isonzo, the 
Archduke could have descended from Pontebba 
and Tarwis upon the French rear, and could have 
cut off their communications without in the least 
endangering his own. 

After the battle of the Tagliamento, the Arch- 
duke Charles divided his army. He sent Baya- 
litsch's division by way of Udine and Caporetto 
towards Tarwis, while with the remainder of his 
army he fell back on the Isonzo so as to cover 
Trieste. When the Archduke detached this di- 
vision, he expected that it would gain the pass at 
Tarwis and hold it, thus insuring the retreat of his 
immediate command by the valley of the Isonzo. 



158 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 

Bonaparte saw in this situation a chance to entrap 
his adversary. He directed Massena to seize the 
pass at Tarwis, and then with Serrurier's and Ber- 
nadotte's divisions he crossed the Isonzo below 
the Archduke, and manoeuvred to turn him into 
the valley of the Isonzo. Had Bonaparte suc- 
ceeded in doing this, the Archduke could not 
have escaped. Enclosed within this narrow valley 
by Massena's division in his front and by Berna- 
dotte's, Serrurier's, and Guyeux's divisions in his 
rear, the Archduke would have been compelled to 
surrender his army. Fortunately for him he saw 
the danger in time to avoid it by retreating 
towards Laybach. 

It was at this time that he hurried to Villach in 
order to collect a force to attack the pass at Tar- 
wis. The possession of this pass had become of 
the greatest importance. In fact, it was the key 
to the situation. If the pass were held by Mas- 
sena, Bonaparte could not only destroy Baya- 
litsch, but he could also debouch from the pass 
upon Villach with the divisions of Massena, Ser- 
rurier, and Guyeux, drive back the Austrian re- 
enforcements, gain possession of Klagenfurt, and 
in this way cut off, capture, or destroy the Austrian 
forces marching by way of Laybach and Krain- 
berg. On the other hand, if the pass were held by 
the Archduke, he could unite his scattered forces 



THE TAGLIAMENTO, I 59 

in the vicinity of Tarwis or Villach, and present a 
formidable front to Bonaparte's advance. More- 
over, Bayalitsch would escape capture, and the 
immense amount of supplies and material of war 
with him would be saved to the Austrian army. 
It is to the credit of the Archduke Charles that he 
comprehended the situation, and hurried to Tarwis 
to fight for the possession of this important point. 
It is to his credit that, under such unfavorable cir- 
cumstances, he fought so desperately and showed 
such personal courage. Though he could not 
save Bayalitsch, nor stop the progress of Bona- 
parte, he had the satisfaction of knowing that 
this battle, fought so furiously, delayed his ad- 
versary long enough to allow the Austrian divis- 
ions coming from Laybach to escape capture or 
annihilation. 

Though at the start Bonaparte had in his mind 
the plan of drawing Joubert to him by the valley 
of the Drave, yet this movement depended not 
only on Bonaparte's success in Friuli, but also on 
Joubert's success in the Tyrol. Had not Bona- 
parte crossed the Alps, Joubert would not have 
entered the valley of the Drave. There was, in 
fact, but one distinct line of operations; for the 
force in the Tyrol under Joubert was essentially 
a containing force. Joubert's object was not to in- 
vade Austria, but to protect the rear of the Army 



l60 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

of Italy. As Bonaparte advanced farther and 
farther into Austria, it became of the utmost im- 
portance that Joubert should hold in check the 
Austrians and militia in the Tyrol. For this pur- 
pose Bonaparte had given him eighteen thousand 
soldiers. There were at this time in the Tyrol 
seventeen thousand Austrians and ten thousand 
Tyrolese militia. Though the result showed that 
Joubert was stronger than his enemy, yet at the 
beginning of active operations there was nothing 
to indicate that he would win such success against 
such odds. In fact, Bonaparte himself was doubt- 
ful whether Joubert could hold in check the forces 
of the enemy in the Tyrol. This fact is clearly 
shown in the following orders : ~ 

" Headquarters, Sacile, 
March 15th, 1797. 

'^To General Joubert: — In order to form a junc- 
tion of the divisions which are in the Tyrol and those in 
Friuli, it is necessary for the latter to cross the Tagliamento, 
seize the position at Osoppo, force the passes of Ponteb- 
bana (Pontebba), and reach the valley of the Drave. 

"The Tyrol divisions should arrive at Brixen and 
drive the enemy beyond the high chain of mountains 
separating Innspruck from Brixen. But events may 
occur which the contingencies of war require should be 
provided for in advance. 

" First : The Tyrol divisions may be beaten and 
obliged to fall back upon the Mori line, or even that of 



THE TAGLTAMENTO. l6l 

Rivoli ; be forced into the intrenched can:ip of Castelnuovo 
(Castel Novo), and reduced to the defence of the Mincio ; 
or even be compelled to shelter thenaselves in Mantua. 

" Second : The enemy may endeavor to penetrate by 
Feltre and Primolano, in an attempt to break our com- 
munications j this, in the present condition of things, 
appears to me very difficult. 

" Third : It may happen that, by one movement or 
another, the divisions which are in Friuli may be out- 
flanked on the right or left, and that a head of column 
of the enemy may hence gain the Piave, and even the 
Brenta, before the Friuli divisions. 

" Should the first hypothesis prove correct, but only in 
this case, you will make use of the order which I send 
you, giving you command of the divisions located in the 
district of Mantua, as well as in Lombardy and the whole 
of the country comprised between the Oglio and the 
Adige. 

" In every case, you must provision and hold Peschiera, 
Porto-Legnago, Mantua, and Pizzighettone ; place your- 
self between Mantua and the Po, in a position to supply 
yourself by this river and to fall upon the rear of the 
enemy if he dare to advance into the Milanese ; inform 
General Sahuguet that he is to concentrate all his forces 
in the castle of Ferrara. I shall give you, moreover, as 
the exigencies of events demand, all necessary instruc- 
tions, not doubting that, under all circumstances, you will 
act conformably to the spirit of the war which we are now 
waging. 

" You understand that it is essential, in case you are 
beaten, to dispute every position, and to make use of all 
resources of art, and of all natural features of the ground, 

II 



1 62 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

in order to give the Friuli divisions time to take proper 
measures. 

"You will find enclosed herewith, Citizen General, 
detailed instructions upon the different cases which may 
arise. 

^' Prepare to attack Botzen by the most convenient 
direction, taking the snows into consideration. 

" To-morrow we shall make a crossing of the Taglia- 
mento, which it is said the enemy intends disputing. I 
desire you to begin your movement on the 27th or 28th. 
If the weather continues as fine as to-day, and fortune 
favors us, I calculate upon being in the defiles of Pon- 
tebbana (Pontebba) on the 30th ; that is, upon the road 
leading from Udine to Klagenfurt. I shall write from 
Udine in greater detail. 

" You will find enclosed instructions for your future 
government, should you succeed in seizing a part of the 
Tyrol. 

" Bonaparte." 

Says Derrecagaix : — 

" In his combination, Bonaparte seemed to adopt two 
lines of operations : one through Friuli, the other through 
the Tyrol and the Pusterthal. But this was only in ap- 
pearance. The line indicated to Joubert was to be fol- 
lowed only in case of the success of the main forces. It 
extended through a country impracticable for the enemy, 
and was to be connected by means of Massena's division 
with the operating line of the principal army. 

"We should not, moreover, forget that in moving 
toward the Noric and Julian Alps, Bonaparte had upon 
his left a hostile corps, established in the midst of the 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 63 

Tyrol, and ready to cut his communications by the valley 
of the Adige, aided by the warlike inhabitants of this 
country. Joubert's corps had then a special mission. 
It was a necessary detachment, but it was only a detach- 
ment. The line of operations was that pursued by the 
bulk of our forces. 

" In reality, the decisive movement, that of the army 
proper, was to take place upon a single line of operations, 
the line in Friuli." 

Though Bonaparte was everywhere successful 
in his combinations, he has nevertheless been 
severely criticised for having adopted in this part 
of the campaign two distinct lines of operations. 
In his own language he has stated these criticisms 
and his replies to them as follows : — 

''Was not the march into Germany by two lines of 
operations, those of the Tyrol and Pontebba, a violation 
of the principle that an army should have but one line of 
operations? Was not the union of these two corps in 
Carinthia, so distant from the point of departure, contrary 
to the principle of never joining columns in the face of 
the enemy? Would it not have been preferable to have 
left from seven thousand to eight thousand men before 
Trent upon the defensive, and to have collected ten 
thousand or twelve thousand more upon the Piave? 
This plan would have avoided the necessity of carrying 
on the war in the Tyrol, a difficult theatre ; it would not 
have been exposed to chances unfavorable for a junction 
of the columns ; and at the outset of the campaign all 
the forces would have been concentrated. 



1 64 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

" Neither of the principles above cited has been violated. 
If only eight thousand men had been left with Joubert 
upon the Avicio (Lavis), he would have been attacked, 
and the corps of Davidovich (Kerpen's and Laudon's 
forces) would have reached Verona before the French 
army arrived at Villach. For 'the purpose of maintaining 
himself upon the Avicio, Joubert required at least four- 
teen thousand men. It seemed preferable to leave his 
forces undiminished, thus giving him a numerical supe- 
riority which would enable him to defeat Davidovich, 
shatter and demoralize him, and drive him beyond Jhe 
Brenner. The Tyrol is a difficult region, but it is fatal to 
the conquered. The French troops had acquired a 
great superiority over the Germans. 

" Germany was not entered by two lines of operations, 
since the Pusterthal is on this side of the crest of the 
Alps, and as soon as Joubert had passed Lienz, the line of 
operation was that of Villach and Pontebba. Junction of 
the two corps was not made in front of the enemy, for 
when Joubert left Brixen to move to the right upon 
Spittal by the Pusterthal or the valley of the Drave, the 
main army had arrived at Klagenfurt, and had patrols as 
far as Lienz. The Archduke, then, could devise no 
manoeuvre to prevent this junction. Joubert, up to the 
time of the battle of the Tagliamento, remained upon 
the defensive. After this battle he attacked, beat, and 
destroyed the greater part of David ovich's corps, and 
threw it back beyond the Brenner ; all this without risk, 
since, had he been beaten, he would simply have fallen 
back from position to position in Italy. When he 
learned that the army had passed the Juhan Alps and the 
Drave, he made his junction movement by way of the 



THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 65 

Pusterthal, which was also without inconvenience. This 
operation, rapidly executed, was indeed conformable to 
all rules ; it should have had, and indeed did have, every 
•kind of advantage.'' 

Everywhere victory had crowned the Army of 
Italy. Bonaparte had crossed the Alps ; Joubert 
was about to join him. With all his available 
forces about to unite into one army, Bonaparte 
was ready to march on the Austrian capital. His 
generals were confident of further success; his 
soldiers were filled with enthusiasm. In an army 
where all had tasted victory, none dreamed of 
defeat. Bonaparte alone saw the difficulties of 
the undertaking. He knew that his rear was in 
danger; he knew that his line of communication 
was weak, and would become weaker and weaker 
the farther he advanced towards Vienna; he knew 
that the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre and 
Meuse could not co-operate with him in his bold 
undertaking. It seemed almost folly to march into 
the heart of the Austrian dominions, and expect 
to conquer the Austrian monarchy at the head of 
only fifty thousand soldiers. Moreover, as he 
advanced, his army was constantly diminishing in * 
numbers, while the Austrian army was being con- 
tinually re-enforced. The Hungarians were about 
to rise and join their forces to those of the Arch- 
duke Charles. Volunteers for the defence of the 



1 66 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Austrian capital were already organizing. Soon, 
Bonaparte would find himself in the presence of 
superior numbers ; soon, he might be crushed by 
overwhelming odds. Against odds sufficiently 
great, the greatest must eventually fall. 

Under these circumstances, Bonaparte offered 
peace ; he agreed to the armistice, and signed the 
preliminaries for a treaty of peace. His caution 
decided him in this course. His caution caused 
him to halt his victorious army almost within 
sight of the Austrian capital. His caution ena- 
bled him to end with brilliancy one of the most 
wonderful campaigns ever planned and fought. 

Had he been as cautious in after years, he might 
have died Emperor of^France, " in the midst of the 
French people whom he loved so wf 11." ^ Had he 
been as cautious in after years, he might never 
have fallen at Waterloo, — might never have been 
banished to that lone rock made famous by his 
great name. 

1 " It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the 
Seine, in the midst of the French people whom I have loved so 
well." — The will of Napoleon. 



CHAPTER VIII. 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 



A T the beginning of this campaign the outlook 
■^^^ was most unfavorable to Bonaparte. Tak- 
ing command of the Army of Italy when it was 
ill fed and ill equipped, when it was deficient in 
siege artillery, in pontoon equipage, and means 
of transportation, he surmounts all these diffi- 
culties, crosses the Apennines in the face of his 
enemies, drives the Austrians before him, and 
defeats them again and again. Yet his ambi- 
tion is not satisfied. More marvellous purposes 
crowd upon his brain. He will cross the Alps. 
He vv'ill carry the French eagles into the Aus- 
trian dominions. Proud Austria shall tremble 
for the security of even her hereditary posses- 
sions. 

In these marvellous successes the odds against 
which he successfully contended will perhaps be 
better appreciated by referring to the following 
table, which gives the strength of the opposing 
forces, and the losses on both sides. 



1 68 



BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 



Parts of Campaign. 



Forces. 



Forces. 



1st. 


Montenotte . 


French, 


40,000. . 


. Allies, 50,000. 


2d. 


Lodi .... 


French, 


40,000. . 


. Austrians, 42,000. 


3d- 


Lonato and 










Castiglione . 


French, 


45,000. . 


. Austrians, 72,000. 


4th. 


Bassano and 










San Georgio 


French, 


42,000. . 


. Austrians, 56,000. 


Sth. 


Arcole . . . 


French, 


40,000. . 


. Austrians, 70,000. 


6th. 
7th. 


Rivoli . . . 
The Taglia- 


French, 


44,000. . 


. Austrians, 65,000. 




mento . . . 


French, 


70,000. . 


. Austrians, 72,000. 


Average strength to 








fall of Mantua 


French, 


42,000. . 


. Allies, 60,000. 


Average strength 








during campaign . 


French, 


46,000. . 


. Allies, 61,000. 


Loss 


during cam- 


French, 




Allies, 


paign 


about 


40,000. . 


about 120,000. 



These numbers include the French soldiers left 
in Italy to protect the French rear, and the re- 
enforcements that joined the Austrian armies 
after the battle of the Tagliamento. The losses 
include killed, wounded, and captured on both 
sides, but not the Austrian soldiers who died in 
the fortress of Mantua. 

By a reference to the above table it will be 
seen that the average strength of the French 
forces prior to the capitulation of Mantua was 
forty-two thousand, while that of the opposing 
forces was sixty thousand, — a ratio of seven to 
ten. During this time more than one hundred 
thousand Austrians were killed, wounded, or cap- 



GENERAL COMMENTS, 169 

tured by the Army of Italy, while the French 
lost less than thirty five thousand. 

Throughout the campaign, the average strength 
of the French forces was forty-six thousand and 
that of the opposing forces sixty-one thousand, — 
a ratio of about three to four. With these num- 
bers Bonaparte defeated one Sardinian army and 
six Austrian armies; and killed, wounded, or 
captured, one hundred and twenty thousand men. 
During the entire struggle, each French soldier 
put hors de combat^ on an average, two and a 
half Austrians; and forty-six thousand French- 
men were more than a match for sixty-one thou- 
sand Austrians. 

By skill in strategy and tactics Bonaparte was 
constantly successful in the face of these odds. 
By skill in strategy he outnumbered the enemy 
upon all the prominent battle-fields except Arcole 
and Rivoli; and by skill in tactics he won these 
two battles. 

At times the odds against him were almost too 
great to be overcome. In the Arcole part of the 
campaign the inequality between the opposing 
armies was greatest, and here he came nearest 
to defeat; here, after desperate fighting, forty 
thousand Frenchmen, guided by his genius, 
defeated seventy thousand Austrians. 

It was said by Napoleon that Massena's 



170 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

presence on a battle-field was equivalent to a 
re-enforcement of twenty thousand men. Surely, 
when we consider Bonaparte's marvellous suc- 
cesses in the face of such great odds, we are 
led to reckon the value of his presence by still 
greater numbers. 

It is difficult to conceive of any standard by 
which to measure the power of intellect. Mind 
cannot be measured with a foot rule. Only by 
comparison can we form a correct estimate of its 
power. By comparing the odds and the results 
in these operations, we can imagine Bonaparte's 
intellect exerting itself as a physical force, more 
powerful in the conflict than thousands of re- 
enforcements. In imagination we can see two 
opposing armies advancing to begin a great 
battle. We can see the brave soldiers of Austria, 
their glittering arms, and their old white-haired 
commander. We can see the French divisions 
and their eagles. We can see Massena, Lannes, 
Augereau, Joubert, and in their midst Napoleon. 
The battle begins. The brave meet the brave. 
All are determined to conquer or die; all fight 
desperately, furiously. We can see the wavering 
lines, hear the roar of the cannon, the rattle of 
the musketry. We can see the troops hurrying 
hither and thither, and amidst confusion and 
death hear the shouts of victory. In the smoke 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 171 

of the battle we can now and then catch a glimpse 
of Napoleon galloping over the battle-field. He 
commands- He does not blanch in the face of 
great odds. He is master of the situation. His 
eagle eye takes in the whole field. He sees 
where the blow must be struck to decide the 
struggle. He gives the word. The reserves 
move forward ; they charge ; the crash comes. 
The Austrians waver and fall back; the French 
rush on with cheers. The smoke clears away; 
the conflict is ended; the battle is won. 

Bravery did not decide this battle; for the 
Austrians and French were equally brave. Num- 
bers did not decide it; for the Austrians out- 
numbered the French. It was the intellect of 
Bonaparte which turned the scale. Was not his 
intellect all-powerful at Rivoli, Austerlitz, and 
Friedland.? 

To conduct a campaign to a successful termi- 
nation is a worthy task for a great intellect. It 
is difficult to conceive of any undertaking which 
requires greater and more diverse powers of 
mind. Hundreds of matters must be carefully 
considered. Not only the strategical and tactical 
manoeuvres by which he concentrates his forces 
and wins his victories, but his communications, 
his means of transportation, the supplies for his 
army, the equipment and discipline of his troops. 



1/2 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

the abilities of his subordinate commanders, the 
topography and resources of the country, give 
him the greatest anxiety. He must give careful 
attention to all these matters; for the neglect 
of a single one may lead to disaster. He must 
be brave, clear-headed, cool, cautious, and fear- 
less; and be able to make a quick decision in 
critical times. He must have an eye for facts. 
He must weigh correctly all reports and rumors, 
and from the doubtful information at hand sift 
the true from the false. He must see everything 
that is going on around him. His glance must 
penetrate the enemy's line, his vision sweep the 
whole theatre of operations. Says Napoleon : — 

" The first quality of a commander-in-chief is the pos- 
session of a cool head, which receives correct impressions 
of things, which never becomes over-excited, which does 
not permit itself to be intoxicated by good nor bewildered 
by bad news, — a mind in which the successive or simul- 
taneous impressions received during the course of a day 
classify themselves, and take the only place they should 
properly occupy ; for good sense and reason are the 
result of comparing several sensations, weighed with 
equal consideration. 

" There are men who, by reason of their physical and 
moral constitutions, interpret every event in the same way ; 
whatever may be their wisdom, spirit, courage, and other 
qualities, nature has not called them to the command of 
armies and the direction of great military operations. 



GENERAL COMMENTS, 173 

'' The commander-in-chief is the head ; he is every- 
thing for the army. It was not the Roman army which 
conquered Gaul, but Caesar ; it was not the Carthaginian 
army which, at the gates of Rome, made the Eternal City 
tremble, but Hannibal ) it was not the Macedonian army 
which marched as far as the Indus, but Alexander; it 
was not the Prussian army which defended Prussia for 
seven years against the three most powerful states of f 
Europe, but Frederick." I 

By studying the campaigns of great soldiers 
during different periods of the world's history, it 
is found that their successes are due, in great 
measure, to the correct application of certain 
unchangeable laws. These laws are the prin- 
ciples of strategy. They have been formulated 
after careful study of the manoeuvres and com- 
binations of the great masters of war Born of 
long and varied experience, and found immutable 
in all ages, they are the basis for all future 
successes. 

Several of the most important of these prin- 
ciples are given here. The first three embrace 
almost the whole subject of strategy; and con- 
sequently include several of those which follow 
them. 

First : Be stronger than the enemy on the 
battle-field. 

Second : Operate upon the communications of 
the enemy without exposing your own. 



174 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Third : Operate upon interior lines. 

Fourth : Engage your masses with the frac- 
tions of the enemy's forces. 

Fifth : Divide the forces of the enemy, and 
beat them in detail. 

Sixth : Operate offensively and in force along 
but one line at a time. 

Seventh: Do not advance to attack with the 
main parts of an army separated by impassable 
obstacles. 

Eighth: Concentrate an overwhelming mass 
upon the vital point of the enemy. 

This last principle reaches into the domain of 
tactics, for it is applicable also on the battle-field. 
But on the battle-field tactics and strategy blend, 
so that it is not always possible to determine 
exactly the dividing line between them. 

Owing to improved weapons of warfare, to 
better means of transportation, and to discoveries 
in electricity, changes in the method of applying 
these principles have resulted; but the prin- 
ciples themselves are immutable. They are the 
same to-day as in the days of Alexander, of 
Hannibal, of C9esar, and of Napoleon. They are 
the foundations of all great military successes. 
They are the test of generalship. No commander 
can long violate them without bringing disaster 
and ruin upon his army. 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 175 

Mankind is apt to measure a soldier's ability 
by his successes. As victory is the aim of all 
strategy and tactics, it is proper that generalship 
should be judged by the results attained. But 
this test is not always infallible. When a com- 
mander wins battle after battle and campaign 
after campaign under many difficulties, his suc- 
cesses are almost a sure proof of great general- 
ship; not becausethey themselves are an infallible 
test of his military ability, but because they can 
be attained only by carrying out correctly the 
principles of war. But if we consider single 
manoeuvres, or single battles, the test of victory 
does not necessarily apply; for the commander 
may blunder into a victory; he may win a battle 
by tactical skill while his strategical manoeuvres 
have been a series of errors. He may even meet 
defeat without having committed a single fault 
in either tactics or strategy How then are we 
to determine whether a battle or a manoeuvre was 
conducted correctly or incorrectly? What is the 
infallible test of generalship? The answer is, 
The immutable principles of war. He who fol- 
lows them as far as possible in every step that he 
takes shows good generalship. To this it may be 
replied that the principles sometimes conflict, 
and that it is impossible to proceed without vio- 
lating one of them ; or that no general has ever 



176 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

conducted a campaign without sometimes violat- 
ing some principle of strategy or tactics. This 
is true; a commander has often no alternative 
but to take up a faulty position, or to carry out 
a plan which violates some principle of war. 
Taking into account these facts, the following 
rule may be taken as the test of generalship: 
To carry out the imnmtable principles of war wJie^i 
it is possible to do so; when they conflict, to cany 
out those which offer the greatest advantages. 

To operate always upon interior lines may be 
impossible; but if a commander carries out this 
principle when it is possible to do so, he is doing 
all in this respect that any soldier can do to win 
success. 

In order to illustrate this subject by a par- 
ticular case, let us refer to one of Bonaparte's 
manoeuvres in the Bassano and San Georgio part 
of the campaign. It will be remembered that 
he had two divisions at Rivoli, and one at Salo 
on the other side of Lake Garda. He had 
decided to take the offensive; he wished to 
advance upon Roveredo with these three divis- 
ions. In only two ways could this be accom- 
plished: the division at Salo could either march 
around the north end of Lake Garda and unite at 
Roveredo with the divisions coming from Rivoli ; 
or it could march around the south end of the 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 77 

lake, unite with the two divisions at Rivoli, and 
march on Roveredo. Bonaparte adopted the first 
plan, and in doing so violated the principle of 
strategy that, in advancing to attack, the main 
parts of an army should not be separated by 
impassable obstacles. Had he adopted the 
second plan, he would have violated another 
principle. He would have exposed his commu- 
nications to an attack in the vicinity of Brescia; 
and the Austrians could have descended on the 
west side of Lake Garda, and have attacked his 
communications without exposing their own. 
He had to choose which plan to adopt, which 
principle to violate. He chose the first, because 
of the two plans, both of which were faulty, the 
first offered the fewest disadvantages. Judged 
then by the test of generalship, the manoeuvre 
was correct. But the commander who violates 
a principle of war, whether by neglect or neces- 
sity, always gives to his opponent a certain ad- 
vantage. In other words the enemy may always 
profit by the mistakes of his adversary, whether 
they are unavoidable or due to poor generalship. 
Referring again to the case just mentioned, it 
has been pointed out in a former chapter how 
the Austrian general could have concentrated his 
army at the head of Lake Garda, and by this 

means have not only outnumbered Bonaparte 

12 



178 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

upon the battle-field, but have defeated in detail 
the separated parts of his army. The unavoidable 
violation of a principle of strategy by Bonaparte 
gave to the Austrian commander great chances 
of success. The latter, however, did not have 
sufficient military ability to take advantage of 
the opportunity offered, but made the mistake of 
dividing his own forces, thus allowing Bonaparte 
not only to unite his divisions at Roveredo, but 
to defeat separately the two Austrian armies. 

Let us illustrate this subject still further by 
taking other examples from this campaign. 

On the morning of April 12, 1796, Bonaparte 
had La Harpe's and Massena's divisions at Mon- 
tenotte ready to begin the battle. These two 
divisions, numbering sixteen thousand soldiers, 
were opposed to the Austrian centre under 
Argenteau, numbering ten thousand soldiers. 
Beaulieu, the Austrian commander-in-chief, was 
between Genoa and Voltri with seventeen thou- 
sand Austrians. The remainder of the Army of 
Italy was watching and holding in check the 
twenty thousand Sardinians at Mondovi, Ceva, 
and Millesimo. This was the situation when 
Bonaparte fought the battle of Montenotte, and 
broke through the centre of the allies. Before 
the manoeuvres were executed leading up to 
this battle, he perceived that the Austrians and 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 79 

Sardinians were widely separated, and that the 
centre was the vulnerable spot in their long line. 
By political and strategical skill he enticed 
Beaulieu through the Bochetta pass towards 
Genoa andVoltri; then, before he could return 
to aid Argenteau, Bonaparte concentrated an 
overwhelming force at Montenotte, and crushed 
through the Austrian centre. 

In these operations Bonaparte carried out the 
following principles of strategy. 

First : He brought a stronger force upon the 
battle-field of Montenotte than the enemy. He 
had sixteen thousand soldiers, Argenteau but ten 
thousand. 

Second : He attacked offensively and in force 
along only one line at a time. His remaining 
divisions were in front of the Sardinians acting 
defensively to prevent them from re-enforcing 
Argenteau. No French force was left in front of 
Beaulieu, because none was needed there. "The 
sole use of a containing force," says Hamley, "is 
to prevent a reunion of the enemy's parts. If it 
is not necessary to this purpose, it will be better 
employed at the point of attack." As has been 
shown in the first chapter, Beaulieu could not aid 
Argenteau by advancing from Genoa towards 
Montenotte; neither could he aid him in time by 
returning through the Bochetta pass, for such a 



l80 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

movement would take several days. Before this 
time elapsed, not only Montenotte, but the battles 
of Millesimo and Dego, were fought and won. 

Third : At Montenotte Bonaparte divided the 
forces of the enemy. Afterwards he beat them 
in detail at Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. 

Fourth: Montenotte was the vital point in 
the long line of the allies. By concentrating an 
overwhelming mass against Argenteau, Bonaparte 
broke through the line, and thereafter from his 
central position had the advantage of interior 
lines in operating against the allies. 

Every principle of strategy which Bonaparte 
carried out Beaulieu violated. The latter had 
under his command fifty thousand soldiers; yet 
he so scattered his troops that he brought upon 
the decisive point — the battle-field of Monte- 
notte — but one fifth of his army. What made 
the matter still more humiliating was the fact 
that, under his immediate command and within 
hearing of the guns of Montenotte, were seven- 
teen thousand brave Austrians, who were march- 
ing and countermarching in the vicinity of Genoa 
to no purpose, neither able to re-enforce Argen- 
teau, nor able to hold in check any fraction of 
the Army of Italy. 

If, in the Lodi part of the campaign, Bona- 
parte had not been delayed in crossing the Po 



GENERAL COMMENTS. l8l 

at Placentia, he would have had great chances of 
success; for the Austrians, having to form front 
to a flank ^ in order to fight, would upon the least 
reverse have lost their communications. On the 
other hand, Bonaparte could have been driven 
back across the Po without endangering in the 
least his communications. His object was to 
place his army in such a position as to enable 
him to destroy the Austrian communications 
without endangering his own. 

In the Arcole part of the campaign, Bonaparte 
attempted a manoeuvre very similar to this: he 
crossed the Adige at Verona, descended the 
river to Ronco, recrossed the Adige there, and 
attempted to throw his army upon the flank and 
rear of Alvinzi. In this position, as at Placentia, 
he threatened the communications of the Aus- 
trians without exposing his own to Alvinzi's 
attacks. 

In gaining a favorable position for attacking 
the flank and rear of the enemy, Bonaparte had 
to make a flank march, and consequently had 
to expose his own flank to the enemy's attacks. 
But in each of these cases his flank was protected 
by an unfordable river; and because he marched 
rapidly, he was able to effect a crossing before 
his adversary discovered his plan. Nevertheless, 

1 See foot-note on page 45. 



1 82 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

these flank marches were attended with consider- 
able danger. In fact all flank marches in the 
vicinity of an active enemy are dangerous; for a 
commander who gains a position upon the ene- 
my's flank must necessarily expose his own flank 
to the enemy's attacks. Even when his flank 
is protected by a river, as in the cases just 
mentioned, he cannot cross it in the face of the 
enemy without taking considerable risk. Had 
the Austrian army been assembled in force near 
Placentia, it could have defeated the divisions 
of the Army of Italy in detail as they crossed 
the Po. 

That flank marches are always attended with 
more or less danger is probably the reason why 
Napoleon seldom made them in his campaigns. 
As a rule, he preferred to strike at the centre of 
the enemy rather than at his flank. By striking 
at the centre, he could separate the enemy's 
army into parts and then defeat them in detail. 
By striking at the flank, he gave the enemy an 
opportunity to concentrate. Even if he defeated 
one flank, he might drive it back upon the other, 
and thus have to meet both in a single engage- 
ment. Thus at Waterloo, had Napoleon attacked 
the right of the English, as Wellington un- 
doubtedly expected him to do, he would prob- 
ably have driven Wellington back upon Blucher, 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 183 

and would have had to fight them united. As 
it was, after defeating Blucher, he had to fight 
them united; but this was not due to any fault in 
Napoleon's plan. It was due to the inefficiency 
of Grouchy. 

At Marengo and at Ulm Napoleon made a flank 
march, and struck at the rear of the Austrians, 
and at Jena he struck at the flank of the Prus- 
sians; but these cases were exceptional. There 
were excellent reasons for his adopting this plan 
in each case. 

In the Marengo campaign, Bonaparte crossed the 
Alps over the Great St. Bernard pass, marched / 
to Milan, and threw his army from the north f 
upon the Austrian communications near Marengo. \ 
This was undoubtedly a hazardous movement; 
nevertheless, it offered, on the whole, more 
decisive results and greater chances of success 
than any other plan of operations. By adopting 
this plan he was enabled to receive a re-enforce- 
ment of fi.fteen thousand soldiers from the Army 
of the Rhine. They marched through the St. 
Gothard pass and joined him near Milan. 

Nor was this flank march of Bonaparte, after 
all, so hazardous as it would at first seem to be; 
for though his communications by the St. Ber- 
nard were exposed to the enemy's attacks, he 
had a line of retreat to the north by way of the 



1 84 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

St. Gothard, which he could have utilized had he 
been beaten at Marengo. 

In the Ulm campaign, Napoleon was opposed 
to the Austrians and Russians. The Austrian 
army was on the Danube in the vicinity of Ulm, 
with its front facing France. A Russian army, 
several marches distant, was on its way to join 
the Austrians at Ulm. In numbers Napoleon's 
army was greatly superior to the Austrian army. 
By a series of remarkable marches, the divisions 
of Napoleon's army proceeded from the English 
Channel, and from other points in the theatre 
of war, towards Ulm. Napoleon was anxious to 
destroy the Austrians before their Russian allies 
should arrive. Had he attacked the Austrian 
army in front, it might have been driven back 
upon the Russian army, and he would have found 
them united in his front. He therefore decided 
to march his army around the right of the Aus- 
trians. By making this flank march, he suc- 
ceeded in cutting the Austrians from their 
communications, and at the same time inter- 
posed his own army between them and the ad- 
vancing Russians. In this case a flank march 
was necessary in order to divide the allies and 
beat them in detail. In this manoeuvre Napo- 
leon was wonderfully successful. He captured 
almost the entire Austrian army before the Rus- 



GENERAL COMMENTS, 185 

sian army could unite with it. The danger of 
these manoeuvres was lessened by the age and 
character of the Austrian commander, General 
Mack. Napoleon, however, took the greatest pre- 
cautions. In order to screen his divisions while 
they were making the flank march around the 
Austrian right, he directed a cavalry corps and 
part of an infantry corps to march directly to- 
wards Ulm. Mack, who had learned that large 
bodies of cavalry and infantry were in his front, 
was expecting an attack from that direction. He 
was greatly surprised when he learned that the 
greater part of the French army had slipped by 
his right and had cut off his communications 
with Vienna. The superiority in numbers of 
Napoleon's army over the Austrian army, and 
the great results obtained by throwing his army 
between the allies, certainly justified him in mak- 
ing this flank march. 

It has already been said that these flank 
marches are always dangerous, and especially so 
in the presence of an active adversary. During 
the whole of Napoleon's career, none of his 
numerous adversaries ever succeeded in defeating 
him by such a movement. At Austerlitz the allies 
attempted just such a movement against him; 
and they were annihilated in the most remarkable 
tactical battle which has ever been fought. 



1 86 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

In the Austerlitz campaign, Napoleon was 
/ opposed to the Russians and Austrians. He 

i 

i had marched directly north from Vienna to Aus- 
terlitz. His line of communications extended 
1^ back through Vienna. His line of battle faced 
; the east, and was parallel to, and but a short dis- 

'i 

I tance from, the road to Vienna. In order to face 
\ the allies he had been obliged to form front to 
a flank, and upon the least reverse would have 
lost his communications with Vienna. 

I The allies, who had just been strongly im- 
pressed by Napoleon's flank march around the 

i Austrian right at Ulm, conceived the plan of 

^ making a similar march around Napoleon's right 
at Austerlitz. They expected to cut the com- 
munications of Napoleon as he had cut the com- 

; munications of Mack. This being accomplished, 
they hoped to destroy or capture the French 

; army Since Napoleon had won such a great 
I victory by a flank manoeuvre, why should not 
they also win by a similar manoeuvre.'* They 
purposed to do so. They believed that, by fol- 
lowing in the footsteps of Napoleon, they could 
beat him at his own game. 

Napoleon was quick to discover their inten- 
tions. From the movements of the allies, he 
saw that their object was to cut him off from 
his communications with Vienna. In fact, they 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 187 

undertook to carry out this plan within sight of 
the French army. Napoleon saw that they were 
making a fatal blunder by weakening their centre. 
He did not even strengthen his right to meet 
the attack of the enemy's left. He waited until 
the movements of the allies had progressed suffi- 
ciently, then he ordered his divisions forward. 
With his own centre strongly re-enforced, he 
threw -his army forward, like a wedge, upon 
the centre of the allies, crushed through their 
weakened lines, and actually cut them in two. 
They were beaten on all sides. Great numbers 
were killed, captured, and wounded. It was a 
splendid victory for Napoleon. It was a terrible 
defeat for the allies. 

During the battle. Napoleon showed but little 
anxiety about losing his communications with 
Vienna. The reason for this was that he had 
another line of communications with France 
through Bohemia. This line was perpendicular 
to the front of his arm.y at Austerlitz, and was 
shorter than the line through Vienna. If the 
allies had succeeded in their plan, and had even 
beaten Napoleon at Austerlitz, he could have 
fallen back through Bohemia without losing his 
communications with France. 

Why was the flank march of the allies so disas- 
trous, while that of Napoleon at Ulm was so sue- 



1 88 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

cessful? The principal reason was that the allies 
attempted to do tactically what Napoleon had 
done strategically. The allies attempted this 
manoeuvre in the immediate vicinity of the bat- 
tle-field. They were within sight of the French 
army. Their movements were seen by Napo- 
leon. The intentions of the allies were almost 
as plain to him as if he had ordered their 
movements. At the very time that they should 
have kept their forces concentrated, they began 
to separate them by directing a large force to 
their left against Napoleon's communications. 

At Ulm, when Napoleon marched his army 
strategically round the right of Mack, he was, 
during the critical part of the manoeuvre, fully 
a day's march from the right of the Austrian 
army; and his divisions were in supporting 
distance of each other. Had Mack marched 
against Napoleon at this time, the latter would 
at once have united his divisions for battle. 

To conduct a strategical flank march success- 
fully requires great skill, and to conduct a tacti- 
cal flank march successfully requires still greater 
skill. Both are dangerous operations when con- 
ducted in the presence of an active enemy. By 
a flank march on the battle-field, or in its imme- 
diate vicinity, Frederick was often successful 
against an adversary whose principal aim was 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 189 

to take up a strong position and hold it; but 
against a Napoleon, all the skill of the great 
Prussian would have availed naught. 

In the Jena campaign, Napoleon made a flank 
march against the left of the Prussian army^ 
somewhat similar to that which he made against 
the left of the Austrians at Arcole. At the time, 
his army was superior to the enemy in numbers. 
A Russian army was on its way to re-enforce the 
Prussian army. He wished to annihilate the 
Prussians before they were re-enforced by their f 
allies. Against the Russians and Austrians com-l 
bined, he had just won the battle of Austerlitz.| 
He was flushed with victory. He decided thatf 
he would take the risk of making a flank marchl 
in order to gain such great results. His wisdom| 
in thus deciding was shown by his successes: inl 
one month he annihilated the military power of| 
Prussia. 

Having digressed somewhat upon the subject 
of flank marches, let us return to the subject of 
strategical principles as illustrated by the opera- 
tions of the Lonato and Castiglione part of the 
campaign. It will be remembered that Wurm- 
ser had divided his forces into two armies : 
one, twenty-five thousand strong, commanded by 
Quasdanovich, was marching on the west side of 
Lake Garda towards Mantua; the other, thirty- 



190 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

five thousand strong, commanded by Wurmser 
himself, was descending the Adige in two 
columns, one on each side of the river. In addi- 
tion to these forces there were twelve thousand 
Austrians shut up in the fortress of Mantua. 

To oppose these seventy-two thousand Austrians 
Bonaparte had only forty-five thousand soldiers. 
Massena with fifteen thousand was at Verona and 
Rivoli ; Augereau with eight thousand was at 
Legnago ; Sauret with four thousand was at Salo; 
eight thousand were in reserve; and Serrurier 
with ten thousand was besieging Mantua. 

To meet the advancing Austrians, Bonaparte 
made his first concentration at the foot of Lake 
Garda, in the vicinity of Lonato. Here he con- 
centrated all his available men. Even the di- 
vision which had been besieging Mantua was 
directed to this point. Why did Bonaparte se- 
lect this point for concentration.-* and why did 
he raise the siege of Mantua .-^ By pointing out 
some of the strategical principles carried out and 
violated in these operations, we shall be able 
to answer satisfactorily these questions. In 
advancing to attack with the main parts of the 
Austrian army separated by impassable obstacles, 
Wurmser was violating a principle of strategy; 
while his lieutenant, commanding his right wing, 
in advancing upon the French communications 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 191 

without exposing his own, was carrying out a 
principle of strategy. At the outset, therefore, 
Bonaparte had two important problems to solve : 
he must, if possible, defeat the separated parts 
of the Austrian army before any of them unite; 
and must also prevent Ouasdanovich from cutting 
the French communications in the vicinity of 
Brescia. As has been shown in Chapter III., in 
only one way could Bonaparte solve the first prob- 
lem. By making his first concentrated attack 
at Rivoli, he could have succeeded in defeating 
separately the three parts of the Austrian army. 
But to attack at Rivoli, instead of at Lonato, 
would have allowed Ouasdanovich to cut the 
French communications in the vicinity of Brescia. 
Bonaparte therefore decided to make his first 
concentration at the foot of Lake Garda. By 
concentrating at this point, he believed that he 
could drive back Quasdanovich, make secure 
his communications, and prevent the twenty-five 
thousand Austrians on the west side of Lake 
Garda from uniting with the thirty-five thousand 
on the east side. 

In the execution of this plan there was still 
another important problem which he had to 
solve. He could hardly expect to be successful 
unless he could bring superior numbers against 
Quasdanovich at Lonato. To do this, it would 



192 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

be necessary to raise the siege of Mantua, in 
order to unite Serrurier with Massena and 
Augereau. To withdraw Serrurier's division 
from Mantua would allow the twelve thousand 
Austrians there to unite with the thirty-five 
thousand Austrians on the east side of Lake 
Garda, and together they would outnumber the 
entire French army: nevertheless, this was the 
best plan to adopt; for if Bonaparte were de- 
feated while Serrurier was in front of Mantua, 
the Austrians would undoubtedly capture this 
division. To withdraw Serrurier, when the Aus- 
trians in Mantua were nearly starved out and 
almost ready to surrender, was a great sacrifice 
for victory; but in this way only could Bonaparte 
outnumber the enemy upon the battle-field; in 
this way only could he hope to make headway 
against such great odds. 

The first principle of strategy is to be stronger 
than the enemy on the battle-field. This prin- 
ciple is the foundation of all military success. 
As the commander who wins a victory is neces- 
sarily stronger than the enemy, it might seem 
that this maxim means simply to be victorious. 
But it means more than this. It means that he 
should engage his masses with the fractions of 
the enemy; it means that he should make every 
effort to outnumber him upon the battle-field; 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 



193 



and when this cannot be done, it means that he 
should take every possible chance to strengthen 
himself and weaken the enemy. That Bonaparte 
outnumbered the enemy upon all the important 
battle-fields except Arcole and Rivoli shows how 
well he applied this maxim. But what shows it 
still better is the fact, that, when he fought his 
battles, he had every soldier there who could 
be spared from other important points in the 
theatre of operations. When he won the battles 
of Arcole and Rivoli, he had brought there every 
available man in his army. This is the test of 
strategical ability. He who fights and wins a 
battle with inferior numbers may show himself 
to be a great tactician ; but if he has idle troops 
in the theatre of operations at the time, he shows 
poor generalship. Contrariwise, he who concen- 
trates on the battle-field all his available forces, 
and outnumbers the enemy there, may show him- 
self to be a great strategist ; but if he is then 
beaten, he likewise shows poor generalship. 

In the manoeuvres and combinations of Bona- 
parte throughout this campaign, the freedom from 
error strikes us with wonder. It is generally an 
easy matter for one with a fair knowledge of the 
science of war to discover and point out, after a 
campaign is ended, the mistakes that were made; 

to show how such or such a plan would have 

13 



194 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

been better than the one adopted ; or how, by a 
different tactical formation, or a different stra- 
tegical manoeuvre, different results might have 
been obtained. In this campaign there is no 
chance for such criticisms. Bonaparte made no 
avoidable errors. From a strategical as well as 
from a tactical point of view this campaign is 
almost perfect. It was by following the prin- 
ciples which he displayed here that he afterwards 
defeated coalition after coalition formed for his 
destruction; and it was by committing the errors 
which he avoided here that he brought upon him- 
self those disasters which caused his fall. 

The only criticism which can be made — and 
that only in the minor details of the campaign — 
is that Bonaparte did not at the outset supply 
his army with pontoon equipage. Had he done 
so, he would not have been delayed in crossing 
the Po at Placentia, or the Adige at Ronco, and 
thus have been prevented in each case from 
capturing an Austrian army. It will be remem- 
bered, however, that in the earlier part of the 
campaign it was almost impossible for him to 
provide his army with pontoons. At the outset 
his soldiers had great difficulty to obtain even 
bread and shoes. Until these were supplied, 
other matters of less importance had to wait. 
Furthermore, the crossing of the Apennines was 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 95 

at this time engaging Bonaparte's thoughts; he 
did not realize that the Army of Italy would, in 
a few months, cross the Po, the Mincio, and the 
Adige. In this connection it is worthy of notice 
that in his subsequent campaigns he provided his 
army with pontoon equipage, by means of which 
he crossed some of the largest rivers of Europe. 

On the Austrian side, all the commanders 
except the Archduke Charles not only committed 
many errors, but continued to repeat them again 
and again. The Austrians were always either 
too much extended, or separated by impassable 
obstacles. Throughout the campaign they ad- 
vanced to attack the French with divided forces. 
This was their greatest error. It would seem 
that, after one or two crushing defeats, they 
ought to have discovered their error, and have 
abandoned this system of war. But the victories 
of Bonaparte taught them no lesson. They were 
wedded to the past. In the face of defeat and 
annihilation they clung to old military ideas. 
Even the campaigns of Frederick the Great had 
taught them no new military truths. Their 
whole system of war was faulty. They believed 
in scattering their forces. By occupying all the 
principal roads and prominent points within their 
theatre of operations, they expected to hold mili- 
tary possession of the country. Their system was 



196 BONAPARTE S FIRST CAMPAIGN 

to form a chain of posts, — a cordon, — extending 
along the line to be occupied, and by this means 
they expected to prevent the advance of the 
enemy. Their plan of conducting active opera- 
tions was based upon the same faulty method. 
They supposed that the enemy would, like them, 
scatter his army to hold his line; and would 
advance with it divided into centre and wings, 
or into several parts, widely separated, perhaps, 
by intervening obstacles. Their plan was to 
meet centre with centre, wing with wing, part 
with part. In their view, should the enemy be 
so foolish as to advance in force along only one 
line, their several armies would outflank him, 
cut off his retreat, surround him, and, by attack- 
ing him from different directions, force him to 
surrender. To surround the enemy was regarded 
by them as the height of military achievement; 
to allow themselves to be surrounded bv him 
seemed to them the height of military folly. 
Such were their theories; such was their system 
of war. Though in this system there are some 
truths; yet on the whole it is one of the most 
faulty systems ever advocated by military men. 

Diametrically opposite to this system of war 
is that of Bonaparte. Instead of scattering his 
forces he concentrated them. His plan was to 
mass them against some vital point of the enemy, 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 97 

and to attack him on one line, and in such a di- 
rection as to place him at a disadvantage. With 
one division, sometimes two, as a containing 
force, he held in check a part of the enemy's 
forces, and then concentrated superior numbers 
against his remaining forces at some decisive 
point. If the enemy's line was too much ex- 
tended, he struck at the centre, and broke through 
it; then attacked and defeated in detail the sep- 
arate parts. If the enemy advanced to attack 
with his army separated into parts by impassable 
obstacles, Bonaparte manoeuvred so as to crush 
in succession these isolated parts before they 
could unite. In this way, by fighting a part of 
the enemy's army at one time, he was nearly 
always stronger than the enemy on the battle- 
field. With him this was the important point. 
His rapid marches, his strategical manoeuvres, 
his combinations, were all made with this object 
in view. He believed that success in battle 
depended principally on numbers. "God," said 
he, "is on the side of the heaviest battalions." 
It is worthy of notice that throughout his career 
he never lost a battle in which he had a numerical 
superiority over, the enemy. 

Sometimes it was impossible for him to out- 
number the enemy on the battle-field; then, by 
taking advantage of the topography of the coun- 



198 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN, 

try, as at Arcole, or by skilful manoeuvring, as 
at Rivoli, he was able to overcome the odds 
against him. In these battles he showed great 
tactical ability. It was there, with fate against 
him and disaster near at hand, that his military 
genius shone forth with its greatest lustre. 

Bonaparte depended in great measure for his 
successes upon the rapidity of his concentrations. 
Had the Army of Italy been organized into one 
complete whole, instead of into divisions of about 
ten thousand soldiers each, it would have been 
unwieldy and difficult to handle. But as the di- 
visions were independent, and were commanded 
by able soldiers, they had great manoeuvring 
power. By his rapid marches Bonaparte made 
his concentrations; by his concentrations he won 
his battles. It was the marching as well as the 
fighting of his soldiers that won for him so many 
victories against such overwhelming odds. 

The Austrians could not comprehend the 
manoeuvres and combinations of Bonaparte. 
They could not understand the reasons for his 
triumphs and their disasters. It seemed to them 
that he was violating every known principle of 
war, and in spite of this was everywhere victo- 
rious. He defeated their scattered forces in such 
rapid succession that he seemed to be every- 
where. In the midst of the Austrian armies he 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 99 

would unexpectedly appear in force, crush the 
enemy with superior numbers, and in a few 
hours afterwards mass his divisions to strike him 
another blow at some unexpected point. To be 
surrounded by the enemy did not mean defeat 
to him. At Rivoli he was surrounded on the 
battle-field by one army, and in the theatre of 
operations by three armies; nevertheless, he 
annihilated the enemy. In this part of the cam- 
paign, with only forty-four thousand soldiers, he 
killed, wounded, or captured forty-three thou- 
sand Austrians. His movements were so rapid, 
his blows so terrible and unexpected, that the 
Austrian commanders could neither fathom his 
designs, nor understand his combinations. To 
them he seemed to have no system of war, and no 
method in his undertakings. He seemed rather 
to be the incarnation of force, moving like light- 
ning, and hurling thunderbolts of war against his 
enemies, till they were crushed, overwhelmed, 
annihilated. 

In former chapters we have shown how Bona- 
parte, by following these principles, gained his 
victories; how at Montenotte he cut in two the 
allies, then held in check with small containing 
forces their isolated columns, while he concen- 
trated an overwhelming mass, first against the 
Sardinians, and then against the Austrians; how 



200 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

at Lonato and Castiglione he took up a central 
position at the foot of Lake Garda, united his 
forces there and drove back Quasdanovich towards 
Salo, then concentrated superior numbers against 
Wurmser, crushed him, and pursued him towards 
Rivoli; how at Roveredo he united his three 
divisions, defeated Davidovich and threw him 
back into the mountains of the Tyrol, then fell 
upon Wurmser' s rear, cut his army in two at 
Bassano, pursued him, and shut him up in 
Mantua; how at Arcole, with fortune against 
him, he threw his army in desperation upon 
Alvinzi's flank, and after three days of terrible 
fighting against fearful odds won the hardest 
fought battle in this campaign; how at Rivoli in 
the midst of his enemies he, by tactical ability, 
turned disaster into victory, then without a pause 
hurried his tired troops towards La Favorita, 
where he won another battle, and then forced 
Mantua to capitulate; how on the Tagliamento 
he met and defeated his ablest adversary, forced 
him across the Alps, united the French divisions 
in the valley of the Drave, marched them towards 
the Austrian capital, and in the very heart of 
the Austrian dominions ended this remarkable 
campaign. 

In these operations Bonaparte left nothing to 
chance. Fortune sometimes favored him j it was 



GENERAL COMMENTS, 201 

sometimes against him; but calculation entered 
into all of his undertakings. He planned his 
manoeuvres and combinations with the greatest 
care. He studied the topography of the country. 
Upon a map of the theatre of operations he would 
stick pins of different colors to represent his own 
divisions, and the enemy's forces in their sup- 
posed positions. Then by moving these pins 
about he would represent the movements of the 
troops, and in this way would make his calcula- 
tions and study out his combinations. 

"Napoleon," says Jomini, "possessed in an eminent 
degree the art of concentrating, with admirable precision, 
upon the decisive point of the zone of operations, col- 
umns which had begun the march from the most diver- 
gent stations. 

" Provided with a pair of compasses opened to a scale 
of seven or eight leagues^ in a right Ime (which always 
implies nine or ten leagues on account of the sinuosities 
of the roads), leaning and sometimes lying upon the map, 
where the positions of his army corps and the presumed 
positions of the enemy were indicated by pins of different 
colors, Napoleon ordered his movements with an assur- 
ance of which we can scarcely form an idea. Passing 
the compasses quickly over his map, he judged at a 
glance the number of marches necessary for each corps 
to arrive upon a fixed day at the point where he desired 

1 A league is about two and one half miles ; so that the com- 
passes, as opened, extended to about one day's march on the 
map. 



202 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

to have it ; then, sticking the pins in these new positions 
and co-ordinating the rapidity of the march that it was 
necessary to assign each column and the probable date of 
its departure, he dictated those instructions which would 
be, of themselves, a title to glory." 

Having once decided upon a plan of operations, 
every effort was made, every energy aroused, 
every nerve strung, to make the plan a success. 
Rivers were forded, mountains were crossed, 
forced marches were made, obstacles were brushed 
aside, everything was done that could be done to 
carry out his orders and accomplish his under- 
takings. He planned so carefully and calculated 
so accurately that he foresaw many of the obsta- 
cles which would be likely to arise in his path- 
way, and in advance provided means to surmount 
them. He had a wonderful foresight into future 
events. His mind seemed to comprehend the 
entire situation; seemed to grasp all the facts, 
and understand them in all their bearings; 
seemed to see just how certain results were to 
be reached, just what difficulties were to be 
expected and overcome. At Austerlitz he issued 
a proclamation to his soldiers, not only promis- 
ing them victory, but even explaining to them 
in advance the manoeuvre by which he was to 
obtain it. On March 15, 1797, the day before 
the battle of the Tagliamento, he wrote to 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 203 

Joubert as follows : *' I calculate upon being in 
the defiles of Pontebba on the 30th." At this 
time he had in his front the Archduke's unde- 
feated army and the great chain of the Alps. He 
defeated the Archduke, surmounted the Alps, 
and on March 30th was at Pontebba with the 
Army of Italy. 

The proclamations which Bonaparte addressed 
from time to time to his soldiers in this cam- 
paign are, for the purpose for which they were 
written, model productions. In these comments 
they deserve at least some notice. We give 
here the principal parts of two, the first of 
which was published to the army after the defeat 
of the Sardinians, the second after the battle of 
Lodi. 

First : " Soldiers ! in fifteen days you have gained six 
victories, taken twenty-one colors, fifty pieces of cannon, 
several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Pied- 
mont ; you have captured fifteen thousand prisoners, and 
killed or wounded ten thousand men. Destitute of every- 
thing, you have supplied all ; you have gained battles 
without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made 
forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy, 
and often without bread. Republican phalanxes alone 
are capable of actions so extraordinary. The two armies 
which so lately attacked you with audacity are flying be- 
fore you ; the perverse men who laughed at your distress, 
and rejoiced at the idea of victory to your enemies, are 



204 BON-APARTKS FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

confounded and trembling. But, soldiers ! you have 
done nothing since more remains to be done. Neither 
Turin nor Milan is yours : your enemies still trample on 
the ashes of the conquerors of the Tarquins. There are 
said to be some among you who would prefer to return 
to the summits of the Apennines and of the Alps. No ! 
I cannot believe it ! The conquerors of Montenotte, 
Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi are impatient to carry 
the glory of the French people to distant countries." 

Second : " Soldiers ! you have descended like a torrent 
from the summit of the Apennines ; you have overthrown 
and dispersed everything that opposed your progress. 
Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has returned 
to her natural sentiments of peace and friendship for 
France. Milan is yours, and the republican flag waves 
throughout all Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and 
Modena owe their political existence to your generosity. 
The army which menaced you with so much pride no 
longer finds a barrier to protect itself against your arms. 
The Po, the Ticino, and the Adda have not checked your 
progress for a single day ; these boasted bulwarks of Italy 
have been crossed as rapidly as the Apennines. Yes, 
soldiers ! you have indeed done much ; but much still 
remains to be done. Shall posterity say that we knew 
how to conquer, but not how to profit by victory? I 
already see you run to arms. Let us march. We have 
yet forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels 
to gather, injuries to revenge. Those who have whetted 
the daggers of civil war in France, who have basely 
assassinated our ministers, who have burned our ships at 
Toulon, — let them tremble ! The hour of vengeance has 
struck." 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 205 

These proclamations refer principally to the 
recollections of former victories, and to the wel- 
fare and honor of France. They are forcible 
and eloquent. Though exaggerated in statement, 
their burning words filled the French soldiers 
with enthusiasm. In them may be discerned 
some of the fire of Napoleon's genius. *' Napo- 
leon has words in him," says Carlyle, "which are 
like Austerlitz battles." 

Did Bonaparte follow in the footsteps of Alex- 
ander, of Hannibal, and of Cassar.? or did he 
discover new principles of strategy unknown to 
these great masters 1 What was the secret of 
his successes.'* By a brief review of the methods 
of warfare prior to his time, we shall perhaps 
be able to answer satisfactorily these questions. 
By this means we shall certainly gain a more 
comprehensive view of the distinguishing pecu- 
liarities of his system of war. 

In the days of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of 
Csesar, formations for battle were in large masses 
several ranks deep. The weapons of warfare 
were axes, pikes, javelins, swords, and shields. 
The tendency was then to take up strong posi- 
tions, adapted to the numbers engaged, and fight 
there great battles, upon which often depended 
great results. The skill of the commander con- 
sisted in bringing a stronger force upon the 



206 BOI^APARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

battle-field, and in arranging his troops so as to 
present a formidable front to the enemy. From 
this time on the battle became a great tactical 
encounter between the opposing commanders. 
Each strove to detect a weak point in the adver- 
sary's line, and, by skill in tactical manoeuvres, 
to strike a fatal blow there that would shatter 
his formation. Having broken the line, the 
cavalry would pour through the gap and attack 
the enemy in flank and rear. In these battles, 
in which the soldiers fought hand to hand, the 
important point for the commander was to hold 
his ranks firm, and either be ready to receive and 
repulse the attacks of the enemy, or to advance 
with immense momentum against him. During 
these battles it was dangerous to withdraw or 
weaken any portion of the line; for a vigilant 
adversary could detect the weakened part, break 
through, and in detail destroy the forces of the 
enemy. 

These great tactical encounters were always 
preceded by important strategical manoeuvres. 
The genius of the commander was displayed not 
only on the battle-field, but in the theatre of opera- 
tions also. It was necessary that he should give 
the most careful attention to his communications, 
to the direction and rapidity of his marches, and 
to the concentration of his troops. His object 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 20/ 

was SO to manoeuvre as to gain some advantage 
over his adversary. He might cut off the com- 
munications of the enemy, while he preserved his 
own; might surprise him by an attack at some 
unexpected point; or might force him to fight 
under such a disadvantage that defeat meant ruin 
to his army. Strategy played an important part 
in the campaigns of these great soldiers. The 
marching powers of Caesar's legions were as 
necessary to his successes as their fighting qual- 
ities. It was the strategical knowledge possessed 
by Hannibal, in addition to his tactical ability, 
which enabled him to maintain for fifteen years 
his position in Italy against the legions of Rome. 

The principles of strategy have never under- 
gone any change. The methods of applying them 
vary from time to time; but the results obtained 
from their correct application are the same at 
all times. Bonaparte made no discoveries in 
strategy; he simply applied successfully the prin- 
ciples already known. To divide the forces of 
the enemy and beat them in detail was correct 
strategy in his time; it was correct strategy when 
the great Carthaginian general crossed the Alps 
and struck terror into the heart of Rome. 

The invention of fire-arms increased greatly 
the importance of strategical manoeuvres. Fire- 
arms increased the defensive strength of troops. 



208 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

and enabled the commander with small numbers 
to hold in check, for a time, large bodies of the 
enemy. He was thus enabled to mass his other 
forces upon some important point on the battle- 
field, or in the theatre of operations, where great 
results could be obtained by outnumbering and 
crushing the enemy. Thus the increased strength 
of the defensive allowed also greater latitude in 
carrying out offensive operations. As soon as 
positions could be held with smaller numbers, 
and lines of battle could be weakened with less 
risk of fatal results, manoeuvring became of 
greater consequence. Mobility became then an 
object in the organization of armies, and strategy 
increased in importance. 

Neither Marlborough nor Frederick the Great 
appreciated fully the change that the invention 
of fire-arms was to bring about in the increased 
importance of strategical manoeuvres. Marl- 
borough gave little attention to strategy. In 
fact the organization of his army was such that 
he could not manoeuvre or deploy readily. His 
army lacked mobility. He exercised his skill in 
selecting positions and in fortifying them. His 
genius displayed itself more particularly upon the 
battle-field. He was a great tactical captain. 
When the storm of battle was at its- height, and 
confusion and death surrounded him, he was 



GENERAL COMMENTS, 209 

cool, clear-headed, and vigilant. In the turmoil 
of battle, he would detect the vulnerable spot in 
the enemy's line, and, by massing troops there^ 
would overwhelm and destroy him. ''This," says 
Hamley, "was his special gift." 

Frederick the Great was fortunate in falling 
heir to a thoroughly drilled and disciplined army. 
Having to make headway against superior num- 
bers and several enemies at once, he saw that 
success must depend in great measure upon the 
superior manoeuvring power of his own troops. 
But he saw only half the truth. His attention 
was directed more particularly to outmanoeuvring 
the enemy on the battle-field. He gave little 
attention to strategical manoeuvres and combina- 
tions. His strategy was often faulty. But on 
the battle-field, or in its immediate vicinity, he 
was a master. While the enemy was await- 
ing an attack in some strong position, he would 
march stealthily around him, and by striking him 
obliquely in some unexpected direction, or by 
attacking him upon an exposed flank, would roll 
up his line and shatter his formation. It was 
then that the superior fighting qualities of his 
disciplined troops carried everything before them 
and decided the battle in his favor. " Moving 
round their slow inert masses," says Hamley, 

"like a panther round an ox, he found the un- 

14 



2IO BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

guarded part, and cast himself on it with all his 
force. The secret of his success lay not so much 
in judicious movements in the theatre of war as 
in the use he made of the flexibility of his army 
as compared with the armies of his adversaries. 
It was by his success in the fields of battle, rather 
than by his plans of campaign, which were often 
faulty, that he finally emerged victorious from 
the struggle, with a military renown unrivalled 
in his generation." 

Frederick's army was organized into one com- 
plete whole; it was composed of an aggregate of 
battalions, each of which formed a fragment of 
the main army. Though it was an almost perfect 
machine, and had as an army great manoeuvring 
power, yet on account of the peculiarity in its 
organization it lacked that perfect mobility which 
has been found to be such a necessary attribute in 
the organization of modern armies. Had it been 
composed of divisions or corps, each capable of 
independent action, it would have had greater 
mobility, and would have been better adapted 
to the purpose of carrying out strategical manoeu- 
vres and combinations. 

It remained for Bonaparte to appreciate fully 
the increased importance of strategical manoeu- 
vres due to the invention of fire-arms. In the 
province of strategy he saw a field for great 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 211 

improvement. The Army of Italy was well 
adapted for carrying out his plans. It was 
already organized into several independent divis- 
ions, each of which was commanded by an able 
soldier. As these divisions marched rapidly, 
they could, under the eye of a skilful com- 
mander, be quickly combined into a powerful 
army on the field of battle, or be as quickly dis- 
persed to important points in the theatre of war. 
This method of organization gave to the Army 
of Italy great flexibility, without destroying in 
the least its cohesion in action. In Bonaparte's 
hands this army became a powerful weapon of 
destruction. 

In former chapters we have described in detail 
the strategical manoeuvres and combinations by. 
which he won his successes. It is unnecessary 
to repeat them here; but it should be remembered 
that only by the greatest skill in strategy could 
he overcome such odds against him, outnumber 
the enemy upon so many battle-fields, and destroy 
in succession so many armies. He was a master 
of both strategy and tactics. Herein lay the 
secret of his success. It was his perfect mastery 
of the whole system of war which made his suc- 
cesses seem so novel to the soldiers of his day. 
Neither the generalship of Marlborough, nor that 
of Frederick, approaches in this respect that of 



212 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

Bonaparte. It is only by going back to the cam- 
paigns of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of Caesar, 
that any parallel can be found with which to 
compare his successes. In strategical ability he 
seems to surpass even these great masters of war. 
Among all the campaigns of the great soldiers 
who have preceded or followed him, none will 
compare with this campaign in the brilliancy 
of the strategical combinations, or in the mar- 
vellousness of the results. 

No just comparison between Napoleon and the 
great soldiers who preceded him can be made, 
without going far deeper into the subject than 
is our purpose in this brief account of his ear- 
lier achievements. On this point, however, the 
words of Professor Seeley, who cannot certainly 
be said to overestimate Napoleon in any respect, 
are well worthy of quotation here. He says: 
"The series of Napoleon's successes is abso- 
lutely the most marvellous in history. No one 
can question that he leaves far behind him the 
Turennes, Marlboroughs, and Fredericks; but 
when we bring up for comparison an Alexander, 
a Hannibal, a Caesar, a Charles, we find in the 
single point of marvellousness Napoleon surpass- 
ing them all." 

In this campaign Bonaparte began active opera- 
tions on the nth of April, 1796, and ended them 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 



213 



on the 7th of April, 1797. In one year he 
crossed the Apennines and the Alps, defeated 
one Sardinian and six Austrian armies, won fifteen 
pitched battles, and killed, wounded, or captured 
one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians. 
He had never before commanded an army. He 
was only twenty-six years of age. Though he 
had received a military education at Brienne and 
Paris, had distinguished himself at the siege of 
Toulon, and had gained some notoriety in quel- 
ling a Paris mob "by a whiff of grape-shot," 
there was nothing in all this to indicate that he 
possessed great military ability, and would in 
one short year show himself to be the greatest 
master of the art of war. 

As the knowledge of war which he displayed 
in this campaign was not due to his own expe- 
rience, we are led to inquire how much of this 
knowledge was due to the experience of others, 
and how much was due to genius. In other 
words, how much was acquired, and how much 
was innate. 

While in the War Office at Paris prior to tak- 
ing command of the Army of Italy, Bonaparte 
submitted to the military authorities a plan for 
operating against the Austrians and Sardinians 
in Italy. He made a special study of that coun- 
try from a military point of view. He studied 



214 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

also the political history, the kinds of govern- 
ment, the peculiarities of the people, their be- 
liefs, their customs, and their laws. By means 
of maps and statistics, he informed himself 
accurately as to the topography and resources of 
the country. In fact he gave the most careful 
attention to everything which might have any 
bearing upon military operations in Italy. The 
campaigns of Hannibal in that country interested 
him greatly ; and as Bonaparte was a great ad- 
mirer of this great soldier, he studied thoroughly 
these campaigns. 

His life from the age of ten till he took com- 
mand of the Army of Italy was devoted to the 
military profession. At the military schools of 
Brienne and Paris he acquired a military edu- 
cation. While at these schools he was fond of 
mathematics and history. Afterwards he became 
very fond of his profession. He took the greatest 
interest in everything pertaining to the duties of 
a soldier, and the greatest pains to master all 
knowledge pertaining to the art of war. For 
this purpose he read and studied the campaigns 
of the great commanders. The campaigns of 
Alexander, of Hannibal, of Caesar, and of Fred- 
erick the Great, as well as the campaigns of 
many other noted commanders, were familiar to 
him. He was a thorough military student. He 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 21 5 

read and re-read the histories of these great sol- 
diers, studied their manoeuvres, their plans of 
battle, their victories, and their defeats. Every- 
thing that pertained to his profession interested 
him. No details were too trivial, no facts too 
insignificant, to be carefully weighed in his 
mind. 

To military problems of all kinds he gave the 
most careful attention. In military matters he 
would assume certain facts to be true, then, rea- 
soning from them, would study out the best way 
to arrive at certain desirable results. The lay 
of the land, the rivers, the mountains, the general 
topography of any portion of country, at once 
suggested to him military problems. Upon this 
ridge or that mountain side he imagined a line 
of battle; picked out in his own mind the strong 
places of the line; thought out how it could 
be most easily defended; how the rivers, moun- 
tains, and swamps could be turned to his or to 
his adversary's advantage; how re -enforcements 
from distant points could be marched to join the 
fighting forces; how much time it would take; 
how he could beat the adversary at such a point 
by such a manoeuvre; or how he would manoeuvre 
his own forces to counteract a concentration, or 
a charge, or a flank attack from his imaginary 
adversary. 



2l6 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

*' Napoleon," says Trevelyan, in his Life and 
Letters of Macaulay, '* set himself problems at 
the opera while the overture was playing. * I 
have ten thousand men at Strasburg; fifteen 
thousand at Magdeburg; twenty thousand at 
Wurtzburg. By what stages must they march so 
as to arrive at Ratisbone on three successive 
days?'" 

"' Unlike most army officers," says Ropes, in his 
work on the First Napoleon, *' Bonaparte found in 
the profession of arms a profession worthy of his 
utmost devotion. He read and studied the great 
campaigns of the world. He wrote for his own 
use commentaries and criticisms on Caesar's opera- 
tions in Gaul and Frederick's campaigns in Saxony 
and Silesia. Of every species of military knowl- 
edge he was a serious and accurate student. He 
was, moreover, as attentive to the dry details of 
the art as he was fond of studying the higher 
branches. No man in the army had a more sure 
eye for ground, could estimate more certainly 
what could and could not be effected by a battery 
placed here or placed there, whether a column of 
troops could or could not reach a given point by 
such or such a time. Nay, more than this, no 
captain of a company knew better than he whether 
the rations furnished to the men were what they 
should be or not. Napoleon to the end of his 



GENERAL COMMENTS, 21 7 

days was a good judge of the common soldier's 
soup and bread." 

'* Napoleon," says Colonel Dodge, *' collated the 
knowledge of war which existed in his youth, and 
out of it wrought so perfect a system that he is 
the one captain whom all modern soldiers strive 
to copy." "He was," says Lord, "a military 
prodigy equally great in tactics and strategy, — a 
master of all the improvements which had been 
made in the art of war, from Epaminondas to 
Frederick II." 

It is difficult to say just what effect all this 
acquired knowledge had on the mind of Bona- 
parte; but it seems certain to us that his 
knowledge of the art of war was in great meas- 
ure obtained from the experience of others. By 
studying the campaigns of the greatest captains, 
he laid the foundation of his own successes. 
Perhaps much of his knowledge was due to his 
solving those problems which his imagination 
suggested; perhaps much was due to his genius; 
but without the profound study and deep medita- 
tion of his youth, he would not, we think, have 
become one of the greatest masters of the art of 
war that the world has ever known. 

The conditions for great strategical combi- 
nations are to-day superior to the conditions a 
hundred years ago. As fire-arms increased the 



2l8 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

importance of strategical manoeuvres in the past, 
so likewise repeating arms, railways, and tele- 
graph lines have increased still more the impor- 
tance of strategical manoeuvres in our day. The 
principles remain the same, but the facilities for 
applying them have greatly increased. In the 
dispatch of orders electricity has annihilated 
time; steam has revolutionized the movements 
of troops; and inventions have given to armies 
much greater fighting power. Better weapons of 
warfare always increase the fighting power of an 
army; they increase its defensive strength, and 
allow small bodies to hold in check for a time 
large bodies of the enemy. In this way they 
increase the manoeuvring power and offensive 
strength of an army, and give to strategy a still 
greater value. 

Another Napoleon will likely never arise; yet 
im.agination can picture a soldier who, holding in 
his grasp the telegraph and railways, shall plan 
and execute as great strategical combinations in 
the campaigns of the future as Napoleon planned 
and executed a hundred years ago. 

There are many lessons to be learned from this 
campaign ; but perhaps the most important of all 
is that only by the deepest study can any man, 
however talented he may be, gain a knowledge 
of the science of war. He who would become 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 219 

a master in the military art must study deeply 
and think clearly. He must not only keep 
abreast of the military knowledge of his own 
day, but must study carefully the campaigns of 
the great commanders. 

" I desire to say now," says General R. W. 
Johnson, " that the young officer who reads the 
most, thinks the most, and obeys orders most 
promptly, is the one who comes to the front when 
necessity calls for men. I mean men of iron 
mould and dauntless purpose, who grasp not after 
baubles, who bow not at the venal shrine of a false 
and prostituted public opinion, — men whose souls 
are not intoxicated by shallow draughts from the 
beaker of success, and who do not shrivel in the 
first heat of disappointment, ■ — men whose spirits 
rise as adversities thicken, acquire fresh courage 
and sterner resolve with each succeeding failure, 
confront new perils and difficulties, new foes and 
trials, with 'unquailing front, — men who gather 
to their hearts more of the light and essence of 
heaven as the world glowers and glooms around 
them. How many of the young men in the army 
or in civil life are destined to make their marks in 
this world, or to leave behind them the record of 
useful lives with no shame to remember, no wish 
to forget? Think of this, young man, and let 
your aim be high. There may be mountains in 



220 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 

your pathway, but you will discover that with 
no more certainty do the recurrent waves wear 
away by ceaseless buffetings and gradual en- 
croachments the granite of their rocky shores 
than do persistent effort and unswerving perse- 
verance, when sustained by calmness, probity, 
and intelligence, wear away the rough places in 
life. There is no genius like the genius of labor. 
There is no reward like that which comes from 
energy, system, and perseverance." 

When Bonaparte took command of the Army 
of Italy he seemed a mere boy. At first the 
soldiers had misgivings as to whether he could 
lead them successfully. But when the Army of 
Italy descended from the Apennines into the 
fertile valley of the Po, t,he soldiers began to 
understand Bonaparte. They began then to have 
faith in him. They could see in the features of 
the boy the genius of the soldier; and as vic- 
tory followed victory their admiration for him 
increased. When he showed himself brave and 
fearless at the bridges of Lodi and Arcole, their 
admiration knew no bounds. Ever after these 
events he was the idol of his soldiers. His 
presence filled them with enthusiasm. He re- 
tained throughout his career the extraordinary 
hold that he gained over them in this campaign. 
In triumph or in adversity, on the field of Aus- 



GENERAL COMMENTS. 221 

terlitz, or amid the snows of Russia, his soldiers 
never wavered in loyalty to him. Twenty-five 
years after this campaign as he lay upon his 
death-bed, his mind went back to the Army of 
Italy. "Take this watch," said he to Count 
Bertrand at St. Helena, " it struck two in the 
morning when I ordered Joubert to attack at 
Rivoli. " As death approached, his mind re- 
verted to the days of his earlier triumphs, to the 
days of his glory, to the days when the lustre of 
his arms was undimmed and his star was in the 
ascendant. 



INDEX. 



Adige, river, description of, 39. 

Alessandria, fortified town, held by 
the allies, 21. 

Alexander the Great, campaigns of, 
referred to by Napoleon, 15, 173; 
compared with those of Napoleon, 
212. 

Allies, their situation before the bat- 
tle of Montenotte, 21 ; are defeated, 
27; how defeated, 36; their num- 
bers in Montenotte part of cam- 
paign, 1 68. 

Alpon, river, description of, 82. 

Alps, Tyrolese, 38; Swiss, 40; 
French, 40; Juhan, 124; Carnic, 
124; passage of, at Tarwis, 138; 
passage of, over the Great St. 
Bernard, 183. 

Alvinzi, General, commander-in- 
chief of Austrian forces, ']']\ his 
plan of campaign, 78 ; at battle of 
Bassano, 79 ; advances on Verona, 
81; withdraws through defile of 
Villa Nova, 83 ; at battle of Arcole, 
85 ; adopts another plan, 96 ; di- 
vides his forces, 100; expects to 
surround the French at Rivoli, 
loi; at battle of Rivoli, 104; his 
errors, 107, 111-115. 

Apennines, divide the French from 
the allies, 19; passes of, 20, 21. 

Archduke Charles, takes command 
of Austrians, 126; sketch of, 126- 
128 ; ordered to concentrate in Fri- 
uli, 127 ; arrives on the Fiave, 127 ; 
his forces, 131; instructed by his 
government, 131; his plans, 132; 
at battle of the Tagliamento, 134, 



135: falls back on Gradisca, 135; 
crosses the Isonzo, 136; retreats 
upon Laybach, 136; in a critical 
condition, 136; defeated at Mount 
Tarwis, 138; replies to Bonaparte's 
letter, 142; assembles his army on 
the road to Vienna, 142; makes a 
stand at Unzmark, 143; required 
to carry out faulty plans, 148; in 
front of Bonaparte, 155 ; probable 
result of uniting his forces near 
Villach, 157; divides his army, 157; 
hurries to Villach, 158 ; fights des- 
perately at Mount Tarwis, 159. 

Arcole, campaign of, ^'j et seq.; bat- 
tle of, Zt^^ 84, 95 ; bridge of, Z'},, 220 ; 
French and Austrians in campaign 
of, 168 ; Bonaparte has every avail- 
able man at, T93. 

Argenteau, General, commands cen- 
tre of the allies at Montenotte, 23; 
routed, 24 ; Hamley's remarks con- 
cerning, at Montenotte, 32; his 
forces at Montenotte, 36, 178; is 
overwhelmed at Montenotte, 179. 

Armies, Austrian, defeated, first, 43; 
second, 51; third, 67; fourth, 85; 
fifth, io5 ; sixth, 144. 

Army of Italy, Bonaparte takes com- 
mand of, 19, 167; addressed by 
Bonaparte, 19; average strength 
and losses of, 168; organization 
of, 198, 211. 

Army of the Rhine, Bonaparte pur- 
poses to unite with, but renounces 
the plan, 64, 65 ; Bonaparte re- 
ceives re-enforcements from, 129, 
183. 



224 



INDEX. 



Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 
Bonaparte receives reinforcements 
from, 129. 

Augereau, General, commands a 
Frencli division in campaign, 20; 
holds in check the Sardinians, 24; 
advises Bonaparte to fight, 49; 
fights battle of Castiglione, 51; at 
second battle of Castiglione, 51; 
at Arcole, 82 ; joins Vaubois, 84 ; 
attempts to hold Provera in check, 
104, 105. 

Austerlitz, battle of, proclamation of 
Napoleon at, 61, 202; Napoleon's 
intellect at, 171; description of, 
186, 187. 

Austria, ammunition obtained from, 
40; Bonaparte's progress alarms 
her, 47, 125; instructions from, to 
the Archduke Charles, 131, 148; 
reasons for separating her forces, 
147. 

Austrians, their supplies, where ob- 
tained, 40; were united at com- 
mencement of operations and 
scattered at close, 71 ; their losses 
during the campaign, 168 ; their 
system of war, 195, 196. 

Baraguay d'Htlliers, General, 
his division sent to join Joubert's 
in the Tyrol, 133. 

Base of operations, 22, 27, 128; sec- 
ondary, 40. 

Bassano, battle of, 65, 66; second 
battle of, 79, 88, 89; heroes of, 81. 

Bassano and San Georgio campaign, 
63 et seq. , forces in, 16S ; discus- 
sion of, 176, 177. 

Battle tactics, Napoleon's, 16. 

Bayalitsch, General, retreats upon 
Tarwis, 135; forced to surrender, 
13S. 

Beaulieu, General, general in chief 
of allies, 21 ; expects an attack by 
way of Genoa, 23; his plan, 23; 
begins operations, 23 ; attempts to 
concentrate at Dego, 25 ; his fatal 
movement, 35 ; makes his escape, 
42; his inefficiency, iSo. 



Bellegrade, General, carries instruc- 
tions from the Emperor to Bona- 
parte, 144. 

Bernadotte, General, his division 
joins Bonaparte, 129; his attack 
at battle of the Tagliamento, 134, 
135 ; pursues the Austrians to- 
wards Laybach, 136; approaches 
Klagenfurt, 142. 

Bertrand, Count, present during the 
last days of Napoleon, 221. 

Blucher, Marshal, at Waterloo, 182, 
183. 

Bochetta, pass of, Bonaparte asks 
permission to conduct his army 
through, 22; Beaulieu moves his 
army through, 23 ; by issuing from, 
Bonaparte could have decided cam- 
paign in one battle, 34. 

Bohemia, Bonaparte provides for a 
retreat into, 61, 187; Archduke 
Charles sent into, 126. 

Bonaparte, General, his campaign in 
Italy in 1796-97, 16 ; takes com- 
mand of Army of Italy, 19; his 
forces, 20 ; asks permission to con- 
duct his army through Genoa and 
the Bochetta pass, 22 ; at Monte- 
notte, 24; at Millesimo, 25; at 
Dego, 25 ; attacks Sardinians at 
Ceva and Mondovi, 26 ; unites 
his divisions at Alba, 26 ; deceives 
Austrian commander, 41; at Lodi, 

42 ; at Milan, 42 ; at Borghetto, 

43 ; his need of pontoon equipage 
at Placentia, 44 ; his forces in Lo- 
nato and Castiglione campaign, 
47 ; attacks Austrians at Lonato, 
Brescia, and Salo, 50 ; halts on the 
Chiesa, 50 ; at Lonato and Cas- 
tiglione, 50; is fighting constantly, 
56 ; has either to retreat or fight, 
57; his plan in Bassano and San 
Georgio campaign, 64 ; at Rove- 
redo^ 64 ; at Bassano, 65 ; at San 
Georgio, 67 ; believes in the offen- 
sive, 69; causes of his remarkable 
success, 75, 76 ; asks for re-en- 
forcements, 'jy ; his forces and his 
plan in Arcole campaign, j-j, 78; 



INDEX. 



225 



attacks Alvinzi on the Brenta, 79; 
harangues Vaubois's troops, 79; 
attacks Alvinzi at Caldiero, 80 ; 
writes bitterly to his government, 
80, Si; descends the Adige, 82; 
fights battle of Arcole, 83, 84 ; has 
four courses open to him, 90, 91, 
92 ; his confidence in himself, 93 ; 
is outnumbered for the first time 
upon every battle-field, 94 ; his 
forces in Rivoli campaign, 97 ; 
sets out for Rivoli, 99 ; fights 
the battle of Rivoli, 102; is sur- 
rounded, 102 ; starts for Mantua, 
105; is master of Italy, 106; is 
doubtful as to where the Austrian s 
will attack, 117; correct in his 
conclusions, 118; his judgment in 
the choice of a battle-field, 119; 
his strategy and tactics at Rivoli, 
121 ; is irresistible in war, 125 ; 
advances against the Archduke 
Charles, 131; his plan, 132, 133; 
selects General Joubert to com- 
mand in the Tyrol, 133; crosses 
the Piave, 134; at the battle of the 
Tagliamento, 134, 135 ; at Gra- 
disca, 135, 136 ; crosses the Alps 
at Tarwis, 138 ; in valley of the 
Drave, 140 ; writes to Archduke 
Charles, 141 ; at St. Veit and 
Neumark, 142 ; enters Leoben, 
143; grants an armistice, 144; di- 
vides his forces, 152; reasons for 
his plan, 153; his caution at the 
Tagliamento, 155 ; his orders to 
Massena, 156; his orders to Jou- 
bert, 160-162; seems to have 
adopted two lines of operations, 
162; his reply to criticisms on 
these operations, 163 ; sees the 
difficulties of marching on Vienna, 
165; his caution, 166; he might 
have died Emperor of France, 
166 ; his skill in strategy and 
tactics, 169 ; violates a principle of 
strategy, 177; carries out the prin- 
ciples of strategy, 1 79 ; crosses the 
Alps over the Great St, Bernard 
pass, 183; his freedom from er- 



ror, 193 ; his system of war, 196 ; 
his rapid concentrations, 198; his 
calculation, 201, 202 ; his procla- 
mations, 203, 204 ; makes no dis- 
coveries in strategy, 207 ; his 
mastery of strategy and tactics, 
211 ; his early career, 213, 214; 
his study of Italy, 213 ; his atten- 
tion to military matters, 215; 
writes commentaries upon Caesar's 
and Frederick's operations, 216 ; 
his knowledge of war, how ob- 
tained, 217; is a mere boy when 
he takes command of the Army of 
Italy, 220 ; his reference upon his 
death-bed to his earlier triumphs, 
221. 

Bbrghetto, battle of, 43, 46. 

Brenta, river, description of, 39. 

Brenner pass, great highway of Ty- 
rol crosses the divide at, 124. 

Brienne, mifitary school of, attended 
by Bonaparte, 214. 

C^SAR, his campaigns, 15, 212, 214 ; 
compared with Napoleon, 212. 

Calculation in war, necessity for, 15; 
in Bonaparte's operations, 201. 

Caldiero, battle of, 79, 80. 

Caliano, battle of, 64, 70. 

Capital of a country, its possession 
important, 153, 

Carlyle, Thomas, on the power of 
Napoleon's words, 205. 

Castiglione, battle of, 51,87, 94, 119; 
second battle of, 51, 93; heroes 
of, 81. 

Ceva, fortification of, 21, 178. 

Charles XII., compared with Na- 
poleon, 212. 

Cherasco, armistice of, 27, 41. 

Chiesa, river, description of, -^yZ. 

Col di Tenda, pass of, 20. 

Colli, General, commands the Sar- 
dinians, 21. 

Commander-in-Chief, Wurmser as, 
47 ; Alvinzi as, 'j'j ; Archduke 
Charles as, 126. 

Comments on the campaign at 
Montenotte, 27 ct seq. ; at Lodi, 



15 



226 



INDEX. 



43 et seq. ; at Lonato and Cas- 
tiglione, 51 et seq.; at Bassano 
and San Georgio, 68 et seq. ; at 
Arcole, 85 et seq. ; at Rivoli, 107 
et seq. ; at the Tagliamento, 144 
et seq. ; general, 167 et seq. 

Coni, fortification of, 21. 

Containing force, definition of, 33. 

Davidovich, General, commands 
an Austrian arm}^ in the Tyrol, 63 ; 
defeated at Roveredo and Caliano, 
64 ; commands a second Austrian 
army in the Tyrol, yy ; attacks 
Vaubois at Trent, 78 ; driven into 
the Tyrol, 84. 

Dego, battles of, 25. 

Delmas, General, his division joins 
Bonaparte, 129; sent to join Jou- 
bert in the Tyrol, 133. 

Derrecagaix, Colonel, on the defects 
of Alvinzi's plan, iii,.i:i2 ; on the 
Tagliamento campaign, 162, 163. 

Directory, instructs Bonaparte, 35 ; 
orders divisions of Delmas and 
Bernadotte to re-enforce Army of 
Italy, 129. 

Dodge, Colonel, on Napoleon's sys- 
tem of war, 217. 

Drave, river, description of, 124. 

Dufour, General, on the application 
of strategical principles, 17 ; on the 
strategical importance of a capital 
city, 153. 

Earth-works at Montenotte, im- 
portance of, 31. 

Emperor of Austria alarmed at 
Bonaparte's progress, 143 ; sends 
two officers to Bonaparte's head- 
quarters, 143. 

Empires, fate of, how decided, 31. 

English at Waterloo, 37, 182. 

Eugene of Savoy, Prince, his cam- 

. paigns, 15 ; his campaign against 
Catinat in 1701, 112. 

Fire-arms, invention of, increased 
the importance of strategical ma- 
noeuvres, 207, 217. 



Fombio, battle of, 42. 

Forces, Austrian and French, the 
strength and losses of, in this 
campaign, 168. 

Fortresses, fate of, how decided, 31. 

Frederick the Great, his campaigns, 
15, 214; his strategy often faulty, 
209 ; his military renown unri- 
valled in his generation, 210: or- 
ganization of his army, 210 ; his 
generalship, 211. 

French, their supplies, where ob- 
tained, 40 ; are scattered before 
the commencement of operations, 
united at close, 71 ; their strength 
and losses during the campaign, 
168. 

Friedland, battle of, 171. 

Friuli, Quasdanovich retires into, 66 ; 
Bonaparte hurls Austrians into, 
70 ; the Archduke ordered to con- 
centrate in, 127 ; the Austrians 
driven from, 143 ; the route through 
selected by Bonaparte as his prin- 
cipal line of operations, 153. 

Front to a flank, definition of, 45. 

Garda, Lake, description of, 39. 
General in Chief, Beaulieu as, 21 ; 

Bonaparte as, advises Massena of 

his intentions, 156. 
Genoa, city of, 20 ; Republic of, 22 ; 

Senate of, 22 ; government of, 130. 
Goddess of fortune is favorable to 

Bonaparte, 76. 
Grouchy, Marshal, his inefficiency, 

183. 
Gustavus Adolphus, his campaigns, 

15- 
Guyeux, General, commands a 

French division in the Taglia- 
mento campaign, 133. 

Hamley, Lieutenant-General, on the 
■ communications of an army, 30 ; 
on battle of Montenotte, 32, 2,3 '■> 
on the result of two armies manoeu- 
vring against each other's com- 
munications, 75 ; on the use of 
a containing force, 179; on Marl- 



INDEX. 



227 



borough, 209; on Frederick the 
Great, 209, 210. 

Hannibal, his campaigns, 15, 214; 
was the cause of his army's suc- 
cess, 173; principles of strategy, 
the same now as in his time, 174 ; 
kind of formations in his time, 
205 ; his strategical and tactical 
knowledge, 207; compared with 
Napoleon, 212 ; his campaigns 
studied by Bonaparte, 214. 

Hungarians, are about to join the 
Archduke Charles, 165. 

IsONZO, river, description of, 124. 

Italy, campaigns of Hannibal in, 
15, 212 ; Northern, description of, 
38, 39 ; supplies obtained from, 
39 ; Austrians driven out of, 46, 62, 
67 ; Austrians attempt to recover, 
47, 63, ^l, 96 ; Bonaparte's gen- 
erals ready to give up, 93; Bona- 
parte is master of, 106; like a 
cyclone he passes over, 125 ; the 
political state of affairs in, 129; 
Bonaparte makes a study of, 213. 

Jena, battle of, 183; campaign of, 
189. 

Johnson, General R. W., on the 
genius of labor, 219. 

Jomini, General, his definition of 
theatre of war ^ 38; on the character 
of Bonaparte's individual actions, 
46 ; on Napoleon's power of con- 
centrating his forces, 201. 

Joubert, General, is wounded, Si; 
at battle of Rivoli, 98 et seq. ; is 
given command in the Tyrol, 133; 
receives orders from Bonaparte, 
133, 160, 161,162; attacks Aus- 
trians at St. Michael and Neu- 
mark, 140 ; sets out to join Bona- 
parte, 141 ; his force is a containing 
force, 159; his operations discussed 
by Bonaparte, 163, 164; referred 
to by Bonaparte at St. Helena, 

221. 

Jourdan, General, commands Army 
of Sambre and Meuse, 128. 



Kellerman, General, commands 
French army in the Alps, -XiZ' 

Kerpen, General, commands Aus- 
trian force in the Tyrol, 131 ; 
defeated, 140; marches to join 
Archduke Charles, 141. 

Kilmaine, General, besieges Mantua, 
"]"] ; sent to take command at Ve- 
rona, 82 ; returns to besiege Man- 
tua, 85 ; left in Italy to protect 
French rear, 132; fights Venetian 
insurgents, 144. 

La Favorita, battle of, 105, 106. 

La Harpe, General, at Savona with 
his division, 20; marches from 
Voltri to Montenotte, 24 ; attacks 
Argenteau, 24. 

Lannes, at the bridge of Lodi, 42 ; 
covered with glory, 46 ; wounded, 
81. 

Laudon, General, commands Aus- 
trian force in the Tyrol, 131 ; de- 
feated, 140 ; descends the Adige, 
141 ; retires into the Tyrol, 144. 

Legnago, fortified town of, 39. 

Leoben, armistice of, 144. 

Lodi, campaign of, 38 et seq., iSo; 
battle of, 42, 93 ; bridge of, 42, 
220 ; heroes of, 80. 

Lonato, battle of, 50, Zj, 93, 94, 200. 

Lonato and Castiglione, campaign 
of, 47 et seq. ; battles of, 54. 

Lord, on the tactics and strategy of 
Napoleon, 217. 

Lusignan, General, forms the right 
of Austrian army at Rivoli, 100 ; 
envelops Bonaparte's rear, 102; 
finds himself entrapped, 103 ; at 
Feltre, 131 ; is captured, 134. 

Macaulay, quotation from Life of, 
regarding Napoleon, 216, 

Mack, General, commands Austrians 
in Ulm campaign, 185; surprised 
at Napoleon's flank march, 185. 

Mantua, fortress of, 39 ; invested, 
43 ; Austria's efforts for the re- 
lief of, 47 ; siege of, is raised, 49 ; 
Wurmser arrives at, 50; again 



228 



INDEX. 



invested, 51 ; Wurmser driven into, 
67 ; number of soldiers shut up in, 
>]•] ; Kilmaine witiidraws 2,000 sol- 
diers from, 82 ; Wurmser remains 
quiet at, 85 ; the capitulation of, 
106, 122 ; Austria not able to hold 
Italy though in possession of, 146 ; 
why Bonaparte raised the siege of, 
190. 
Marengo, campaign of, 34, 44, 183 ; 

battle of, 61 . 
Marlborough, Duke of, gave little 
attention to strategy, 208 ; his gen- 
eralship, 211. 
Massena, General, at Verona and 
Rivoli, 47 ; crosses the Mincio, 
49 ; at Lonato, 50 ; at second Cas- 
tiglione, 51 ; is delayed in crossing 
the Adige at Ronco, 66, 75; at 
Bassano, 78, 79, 85 ; the intrepid, 
81 ; at battle of Arcole, 82 ; joins 
Vaubois, 84 ; at Verona, 97 ; 
marches to Rivoli, 99 ; at battle 
of Rivoli, loi, 102, 103; hurries 
to Mantua, 105, 119, 120; attacks 
Provera, 105 ; defeats Lusignan, 
134 ; defeats Ocskay, 135; marches 
on Tarwis, 136 ; meets the Arch- 
duke, 138; his presence on a 
battle-field equivalent to twenty 
thousand soldiers, 169, 170. 
Meerfeld, General, carries instruc- 
tions from the Emperor to Bona- 
parte, 144. 
Milan, Bonaparte's triumphal march 
into, 42 ; citadel of, 43 ; Bona- 
parte's communications with, 50 ; 
Bonaparte desires to preserve his 
line of retreat on, 60. 
Militia, Tyrolese, 127; fight only on 
their own mountains, 131 ; de- 
scend the Adige, 141 ; their value 
as a re-enforcement to the Austrian 
army, 154. 
Millesimo, battle of, 25, 36, 93, 180, 
204 ; victor of, 55 ; heroes of, 80. 
Mincio, river, the base of operations 
of Austrian army, 22 ; description 
of, 39 ; Austrians retreat behind, 
42 ; Wurmser should have thrown 



bridges across, 55 ; Serrurier could 
have guarded the crossings of, 59 ; 
by marching to, Alvinzi could 
have intercepted the French, 109 ; 
Bonaparte's base of operations, 
128. 

Mondovi, fortification of, 21 ; victor 
of, 55 ; battle of, 26, 93, 180, 204. 

Monte Baldo, 99, loi, 112, 115, 117. 

Montenotte, campaign of, \<^ et seg., 
53; battle of, 24, 52, 93, 178, 179, 
180; numbers engaged at battle 
of, 36; victor of, 55. 

Mont Cenis, 27, 33. 

Moreau, General, commands the 
French Army of the Rhine, 128. 

Murat, General, commands the cav- 
alry at battle of Borghetto, 43 ; 
is wounded, 81. 

Napoleon I., on calculation and 
system in war, 15 ; is a genius in 
war, 16 ; is the greatest soldier in 
modern times, t6; his criticism 
of the alhes, 30; his criticism of 
Wurmser's plan, 55 ; knew when 
to scatter and when to unite his 
forces, 71 ; never lost a battle in 
which he was superior to the en- 
eviiy in numbers, 90 ; on a double 
line of operations, 107; the Alps 
not impassable to him, 117 ; his 
manoeuvres are the foundation of 
his military glory, 122; his opinion 
of the Archduke Charles, 126; his 
opinion of Massena, 169, 170; on 
the qualities of a commander-in- 
chief, 172, 173; the principles of 
strategy in his time, 173, 174 ; why 
he seldom made flank movements, 
182; at Ulm, 183, 184, t88 ; at 
Marengo, 183; at Jena, 183, 189 ; 
compared with Frederick, 189, 
211 ; dictated instructions which 
would be of themselves a title to 
glory, 202 ; his words hke Auster- 
litz battles, 205 ; the marvellous- 
ness of his achievements, 212 ; 
collated the knowledge of war, 
and out of it wrought a perfect 



INDEX. 



229 



system, 217 ; is a military prodigy, 
217 ; his equal will likely never 
again arise, 21S. 
Nelson, commands an English squad- 
ron in the waters of Genoa, 23. 

OCSKAY, General, succeeds to the 
command of Lusignan's division, 
135 ; his forces routed by Massena, 

Oglio, river, description of, 38. 
Ormea, pass of, 20. 

Paris, military school of, attended 
by Bonaparte, 214. 

Peschiera, town of, Bonaparte makes 
a demonstration against, 43 ; at- 
tacks Austrians at, 51 ; Wurmser 
should have crossed the Mincio at, 
5 5 ; Vaubois could march by way 
of, to join Bonaparte, 72. 

Piave, river, description of, 124 ; 
Archduke arrives on, 127 ; Bona- 
parte crosses, 134 ; an army sta- 
tioned on, covers the roads to 
Trieste, 147, 149; if defeated on, 
the Austrians could fall back on 
the Tagliamento, 147. 

Placentia, passage of the Po at, 42, 

43. 75) 181' 194- 

Pope Pius VI. compelled to yield, 
130 ; his hatred of Bonaparte, 130. 

Provera, General, commands Sar- 
dinians at Millesimo, 25; strength 
of his forces at Millesimo, 36 ; 
commands Austrian army in Fri- 
uli, 96 ; approaches Verona, 98 ; 
marches upon Mantua, T05 ; de- 
feated at La Favorita, 105 ; his 
march could have led to no prof- 
itable result, 112. 

Prussians, at Waterloo, 37; at 
Jena, 183, 189. 

QuASDANOViCH, General, com- 
mands the right of Wurmser's 
army, 48 ; is worsted, 50 ; badly cut 
up, 51 ; engaged with Bonaparte, 
53, 54 ; supposititious case in 
regard to, 59 ; retreats into Friuli, 



66; in Friuli, Tj; at battle of 
Rivoli, 100; overwhelmed, 103; 
driven towards Salo, 200. 

Rey, General, at Desenzano, 97 ; 
receives orders from Bonaparte, 
98 ; hurries towards Rivoli, loi ; 
attacks Lusignan, 103 ; pursues 
Alvinzi, 105. 

Rivoli, reasons why an attack should 
have been made at, 58, 191 ; as a 
battle-field, 59, 119; campaign of, 
96 et seq. ; plateau of, description 
of, 99 ; battle of, 102 ; a tactical 
battle, 104; loss at, 106; com- 
ments on battle of, 107 ei scq. ; 
an Austrian victory at, promised 
great results, no; tactical ma- 
noeuvres at, 121 ; numbers engaged 
in campaign of, 168 ; Bonaparte's 
intellect at, 171 ; Bonaparte has 
every available man at, 193 ; 
Bonaparte surrounded at, 199 ; 
Napoleon at St. Helena refers to 
battle of, 221. 

Rome, government of, felt bitter to- 
wards Bonaparte, 130; Hannibal, 
made her tremble, 173; the legions 
of, 207. 

Ronco, French forces delayed at, 75, 
194; Bonaparte crosses the Adige 
at, 82, 181. 

Ropes, John C, on Bonaparte's de- 
votion to the military profession, 
2t6. 

Roveredo, battle of, 64, 70, 93, 200. 

Sahuguet, General, receives orders 
to prevent the Austrians from 
reaching Mantua, 66. 

San Georgio, battle of, 67, 70, 93. 

San Marco, heights of, 99, 100, 1 12. 

Sardinians, position of, 20 ; treat for 
peace, 27; fight hard, 33; defeated 
by Bonaparte, 41 ; first movement 
against, when made, 46; Bona- 
parte concentrates against, 199. 

Sauret, General, commands 4,000 
French at Salo, 47, 57; driven 
back, 48. 



230 



INDEX. 



Savona, pass of, 20. 

Science of war, knowledge of, how 
obtained, 15. 

Seeley, Professor, on Napoleon's 
successes, 212. 

Serrurier, General, at the pass of 
Ormea, 20 ; makes false attacks 
against Colli, 25 ; at Mondovi, 36 ; 
besieges Mantua, 47, 97, 192; 
raises the siege of Mantua, 49, 54 ; 
attacks Wurmser's left flank, 51; 
at the battle of the Tagliamento, 
134; crosses the Isonzo, 136; at- 
tacks Bayalitsch in rear, 138. 

St. Bernard, pass of, 34, 183. 

St. Gothard, pass of, 61, 183. 

Strategist, test of a, 193. 

Strategy, in Napoleon's campaigns, 
16; principles of, 17, 173, 174; 
aim of, 37, 175; on the battle- 
field, 174; in the days of Alexan- 
der, of Hannibal, of Caesar, and 
of Napoleon, 174; has increased 
in importance, 208, 217, 218. 

Tactician, test of a, 193. 

Tactics, changes in, 1 7 ; on the battle- 
field, 174; aim of , 175. 

Tagliamento, river, description of, 
124; battle of the, 134, 135; cam- 
paign of, 123 et seq. 

Tarwis, pass of, held by Massena, 
136, 137; battle of, 138. 

Theatre of war, definition of, "^Z. 

Thiers, on Bonaparte's activity at 
Lonato and Castiglione, 56. 

Ticino, river, description of, 38. 

Toulon, Bonaparte distinguishes 
himself at, 213. 

Trent, taken by Bonaparte, 64, "^^ ; 
was an important point, 64. 

Trevelyan, on Napoleon, 216. 

Trieste, seaport of, 127, 131 ; im- 
portant that it be protected, 147. 

Turenne, campaigns of, 15. 

Turin, fortified city of, 21, 33; gov- 
ernment of, 130. 

Tyrol, Austrians driven into, 43, 46, 
64 ; Austrian forces in, 68, 72, 'j'j^ 
86 ; Bonaparte leaves a division in, 



1Z^ 74; great highway of, 124; 
Joubert gains possession of, 140; 
an Austrian army hi, would have 
protected Trieste, 150; Bonaparte 
decides to send a strong force 
into, 153. 

Ulm, battle of, 183; campaign of, 
184. 

Valenza, Bonaparte deceives the 
Austrian commander at, 41, 44. 

Vaubois, General, commands Bona- 
parte's left in Bassano and San 
Georgio campaign, 64 ; at Salo, 
71 ; holds Davidovich in check 
in the Tyrol, 65; commands 
Bonaparte's left in Arcole cam- 
paign, 78 ; forced towards Corona 
and Rivoli, 79 ; not able to hold 
Davidovich in check, Z%. 

Venice, Gulf of, 39, 124; govern- 
ment of, felt bitter towards Bona- 
parte, 130. 

Verona, fortified town of, 39 ; taken 
by Bonaparte, 43 ; Bonaparte falls 
back on, 79, 89 ; Kilmaine takes 
command at, 82 ; Bonaparte has 
the advantage of interior lines at, 
87 ; probable results had Bona- 
parte allowed himself ■ to be be- 
sieged at, 90. 

Victor, General, wounded, 81; left 
in Italy to protect French rear, 
132 ; preserves Bonaparte's com- 
munications, 144. 

Voltri, Beaulieu attacks a French 
brigade at, 23. 

Vukassovich, General, commands 
the left of Alvinzi's army at Riv- 
oli, 100 ; could not reach battle- 
field, 114. 

Wagner, Captain, his definition of 
a containing force, 33 ; on the 
criticisms of military operations 
after the event, 117. 

Warfare, offensive and defensive, 
principles of, how obtained, 15. 

Waterloo, campaign of, 27 j battle of, 
166, 182. 



INDEX, 



231 



Wellington, Duke of, expects Na- 
poleon to attack his right at Water- 
loo, 182. 

Wurmser, Marshal, commands the 
Austrians, 47 ; divides his forces, 
48 ; his plan, 48 ; arrives at Mantua, 
50 ; his errors, 50-55 ; again divides 
his forces, 63, 69, 70 j his plan, 



6t,, 64; in a critical condition, 65, 
106; fights battle of Bassano, 66; 
driven within the walls of Man- 
tua, 67; the chances of victory 
offered him, 72 ; repeats former 
errors, "j-^; his delay at Legnago, 
75 ; signs the capitulation of Man- 
tua, 106. 



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